Dilemma of Being a China

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Dilemma of Being a China
Author: Colonel Ranvir Singh Tomar Retired

People’s Republic of China

People `s Republic of China is the world's most populous country with a population of 1.4 billion in 2019. As a one party state led by the Chinese Communist Party, the country is officially divided in 23 province, five Autonomous Regions, four direct controlled municipalities and the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau.

The Chinese civil war resulted in division of territory in 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party led by Mao Zedong established the People's Republic of China on main land while the Kuomintang led Republic of China government retreated to the island of Taiwan. In the early days of this party, the prevailing nationalism and populism in 1910s in China, played an important part in the formulation of ideology of early communists such as Li Dazhao and Mao Zedong. On the other hand Marxism was a spiritual utopia to the early communists, while on the other hand they modified or ’Sinicized’ some doctrines to support their revolution in China. These ideological synthesis led to the emergence of the famous Great Leap Forward movement and the Cultural Revolution.

China is one of the few remaining socialist states after the cold war era. The country is a permanent member of the United Nations since replacing Republic of China in 1971. China has been a founding member of many multilateral and regional cooperation organisations such as Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and the East Asia Summit. After economic reforms in 1978 and its entry into the World Trade Organisation in 2001,

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China’s economy grew to the largest in the world by Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) method in 2014, and became the second largest country by nominal GDP in 2010.The nation has the world’s largest standing Army , the second largest defence budget and is a recognised nuclear weapon state. China has been aspiring for long and is an emerging superpower due to its large economy and powerful military. China is indeed becoming rapidly a predominant power in Asia Pacific and has started challenging the role of the United States and Japan.

The liberal world order, led by the United Sates is showing signs of losing its global dominance. This is not because of ineffective leadership but because the non - Western powers of Asia and the Pacific - namely China and India are on the rise, and seeking to flex their muscles by challenging existing world order. China in 2005 floated the idea of an East Asia Community which was inspired by the European Union. China saw an opportunity to steer multilateralism along the line of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to serve Beijing’s strategic goals. China’s President Xi Jinping has repeatedly told the world that China is ready to lead on issues like free trade and climate change. He is ready to extend his leadership to political parties everywhere. He further elaborated that China is offering a “new type of political system” – a Chinese solution that contributes to the development of political parties around the world. Beijing’s diplomatic offensive was met by the strategy of inclusion of India, Australia and New Zealand at the behest of Japan and ASEAN members that were wary of an East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere under China's leadership.

Geographical Characteristics of China

  • China’s geography can be understood as consisting of Han Core (China proper) and a shell of buffer regions that encloses it from North and the West. The 15 inch Isohyets encompasses the area of China that receives 15 inches or more inches of rainfall per year, and is capable of supporting substantial agricultural activity and hence large population.
  • China’s population and industry are concentrated geographically. It looks big on map but most sparse population live in Xinjiang, Tibet and the Far East. Population wise China is roughly 1500 X1500 miles. 80% of population live in this square. The concentration will not do well against large scale aerial bombing.

15 inch Isohyets and China Population Density

15 inch Isohyets and China Population Density
  • Aside from its geostrategic value of Tibet as a buffer, there is another perhaps more important reason why China must control Tibet, this has to do with water security. Tibet plateau is source of China’s major rivers. The agricultural productivity of the Han core stems from all the water that comes down from the highlands.
  • China is also geographically too close to two major land powers (Russia and India) and one sea power (Japan).
  • Retaining the control of the buffer regions has been eternal geostrategic imperatives for china. In modern times, if control of Tibet was lost, India could move across the Himalayas and establish the base for operations.
  • Ethnic and cultural fault lines – notably three of four buffer zone mentioned above are categorised as Autonomous Regions. This is primarily due to their distinct ethnic, cultural and religious non - Han identity, which has been a source of tension for much of Chinese history. In Xinjiang a volatile mix of radical Islamist ideology and localised ethnic separatism has manifested in localised terrorists acts and insurgency that threatens the Central government.
  • The more pertinent division right now pertains to economic disparities between inland and coastal provinces. That is the reason why the Communists derided the Shanghai as ‘Whore of Imperialism’. Mao’s solution was, to raise a massive peasant army from the interior, liquidate the collaborators, expel the foreigners and close China to the world. Consequent upon China lapsed into impoverished equality. When Deng reopened the economy to the world he began with the coast.
  • China has a short coastline so it is not hard to land lock China and deprive it of its ship building capability. There is no safe place for China to build ships and project as maritime power.
  • Korean Peninsula though acts as mini buffer of sorts but also serve as an invasion route.
  • South China Sea remains a contested maritime zone as China is involved in complex dispute with Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan and lately Brunei over Spratly islands; and with Vietnam over Paracel islands. Hanoi has proposed multinational solutions between the ASEAN countries but China says it prefers to negotiate with individual states separately.

Strategic Space – Effects on China

  • Indo - Pacific. Now the term ‘Indo Pacific’ is being used increasingly in geo political discourses, the German geopolitician Karl Haushofer had first used it in 1920s in the academic work Indopazifischen Rau’. However in the contemporary context beginning the 2000, analysts began to observe the security linkage between the two oceans. ‘Indo Pacific’ refers to the maritime space stretching from the littorals of East Africa and West Asia, across the Indian Ocean, Western Pacific Ocean to the littorals of East Asia. The spirit of the term was picked up by the Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe as reflected in his speech in ndian Parliament in 2007. It is also symbolically linked with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue’ - an informal grouping of like minded democracies in the region, comprising Australia, Japan, India and the U.S.
  • South China Sea. It being very rich in natural resource is estimated to have deposits of approximately 11 billion barrels of oil,190 trillion feet of natural gas and 10% of world fisheries. Most important is that 30% of the global trade flows through here. For the purpose of power projection the entire China`s coastline is in the East .The ntrance to the Pacific Ocean from Yellow Sea is blocked by South Korea. The entrance to the Pacific Ocean through East China Sea is there blocked by Japan and Taiwan. Entrance to the Indian ocean is blocked by India and Indonesia. The only safe route to access the Pacific Ocean from South China Sea is through south of Philippines.

India China Border Issue

India and China are two large countries with world’s largest population and emerging economic power houses with large standing militaries; but their borders are not marked, delineated and remain contested with counter claims. The area in East Ladakh, the vast open uninhabited area of Aksai Chin is claimed by India on the basis of colonial era agreement with Tibet by British. China does not recognise this and claim that entire Aksai Chin belongs to China on the basis of its name and the old silk route the Chinese traders used, to go to central Asia. In 1954 India published its political map showing the entire Aksai Chin as part of India on the basis of Johnson’s line of 1865. China countered this and issued its own maps in 1960 and depicted entire Aksai Chin as China’s claimed territory. China fought an unilateral war with India in 1962 in Aksai Chin; and after reaching up to the claimed lines of 1960, China stopped and declared a ceasefire after a month. In this war China captured 38000 Sq kilometre of Indian territory in Aksai Chin. Subsequently during Sino Pakistan Border Agreement of 1963,Pakistan illegally ceded 5180 Sq kilometre of Indian land from its Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. The cease fire line after 1962 war is serving as de facto border and is internationally referred to as ‘Line of Actual Control (LAC)’. It is a notional demarcation line that separates India controlled territory from Chinese controlled territory in the India China border with armies of both countries remain in eye ball to eye ball contact.

Important Timeline Border Markers in Aksai Chin

Important Timeline Border Markers in Aksai Chin

McMahon Line in the East. The McMahon line is the demarcation line between Tibet and the North East region of India proposed by British colonial administrator Sir Henry McMahon at the1914 Simla convention. It is currently the generally recognised boundary between China and India. Although its legal status is disputed by the Chinese government.

The entire India China border is 4056 Km long and traverses five Indian States/ Territories namely - Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. On the Chinese side the line traverses the Tibet Autonomous Region. The demarcation existed as informal cease fire line between India and China after the 1962 war until 1993 when its existence was officially accepted as the ‘Line of Actual Control’ in the bilateral agreement. Clause 6 of the 1993 ‘Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control’ in the India China border areas mentions “ The two sides agree that references to the Line of Actual Control in this agreement do not prejudice their respective positions on the boundary question”. China does recognise the Line of Actual Control, which closely approximate McMahon Line also in the East; according to a 1959 diplomatic note written by Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai.

History of War/Border Clashes with India

In Chinese communists philosophy there are no fixed borders and PLA will always strive to improve and gain land inch by inch by proverbial ‘salami slicing’ method. China through their official news paper or other publications keep declaring new boundary markers or claimed line like in the Aksai Chin. This objective of expansionism is always an attempt of establishing Chinese hegemony against its neighbours to exert pressure and coerce weak countries to submit to Chinese diktats. The history of India China war / border skirmishes are as under :-

  • In 1962 a full scale war at Aksai Chin and in Arunachal Pradesh resulting in heavy casualties on both sides and China moved upto its claimed lines (the present day of LAC).
  • In 1967, the bloody skirmishes at Nathu La in Sikkim where firearms were used by troops in stand off first time after 1962 war. Chinese suffered more number of fatal casualty and an attempt to capture Nathu La was thwarted by Indian soldiers.
  • In 1987 at Somdurang Chu valley in Arunachal Pradesh when India objected to Chinese construction on Indian side. China was stunned by Indian air lift capability and its swift deployment of Brigade size force. Chinese stopped construction and retreated.
  • In 2017 at tri junction of India, Bhutan and China border at Doklam Plateau when China attempted to construct a road through Bhutan to reach Doklam plateau to pose a strategic threat to sensitive chokepoint known as Siliguri corridor, a narrow corridor with width of 27 km at the closest point and which is the only passage linking India to its North Eastern states. India having signed a security treaty with Bhutan, reinforced the area and forcibly stopped Chinese road construction activity and forced them to withdraw in a stiff stand off .
  • In recent past in June 2020 at Galwan in Ladakh region where a bloody hand to hand fight took place as unarmed combat between Chinese and Indian soldiers on the Galwan ridge when Chinese wanted to capture vantage heights to dominate for future interdiction of Darbuk - Shyok - DBO Road.

Chinese Communist Party and People’s Liberation Army

Chinese Communist Party is committed to the communism and continues to participate in the ‘International Meeting of Communists and Worker’s Parties’. CCP believes that provocative tactics based on its convenient and one - sided interpretation of history; and fuelled by its focussed propaganda would enable it to achieve the expansionist aims. On the other hand People’s Liberation Army is the regular armed forces of the People’s Republic of China and the PRC’s founding ruling political party, the Chinese Communist Party. There is also substantial political interference in the PLA, the chairman of the Military Commission is also the leader of the CCP. A Chinese soldier being enrolled in the PLA swears allegiance to the CCP and not the PRC’s constitution.

PLA relies heavily on sneakiness, propaganda, deniability and provocation for achieving the expansionists plans of the CCP. Lacking operational and strategic level maturity that comes from combat experience, PLA is hawkish even at the tactical level. To make up for its lack of professionalism and experience, PLA invests heavily in unconventional and asymmetric warfare and weapons.PLA is also heavily dependent on propaganda through likes of WeChat and Global Times, to create a false narrative of being one of the most professional armed forces in the world. The unification of Taiwan is but one of China`s eclared strategic goals and hard stake claims on disputed islands in South China Sea. PLA views India a strategic counter force to its hegemonic positions in Asia. PLA on ground leaves no efforts to confront and engage Indian forces on borders to demonstrate superiority and invincibility of PLA forces.

India Centric China’s Western Theatre Command

China’s Western Theatre Command

The current round of ambitious PLA reforms including creation of peacetime joint theatre commands will significantly increase its joint operation capabilities. The Western Theatre Command is one of the five theatre commands of PLA of China since 2016. Its jurisdiction includes Sichuan, Tibet, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Shaanxi and Yunnan Chongqing. And it covers three Autonomous Regions – Tibet, Ningxia and Xinjiang. The Western Theatre Command has clear and specific responsibility for the Indian strategic direction. The Western Theatre Command is the largest theatre and has complex terrain including dessert and high mountains; and challenging social conditions. External responsibilities include responding to possible unrest in Central Asia under the auspicious of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, however the primary strategic direction is India and the contested border regions. Tibet and Xinjiang Military Districts have been elevated by one level compared to other provincial level military districts and placed under the PLA Army unlike other military districts under the control of National Defence Mobilisation Department of the Central Military Commission.

PLA Air Force Limitations in Western Theatre Command

The research by the Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs compares the IAF and PLAAF. The IAF has an estimated 270 fighters and 68 ground attack aircrafts across the three China facing Indian Army Commands. PLA AF in the Western Theatre Command suffers from a numerical disparity to the IAF and it has around 157 fighter aircrafts and a varied drone armoury. A portion of WTC air assets may be kept reserve for Russia centric missions. On a strict comparison of available 4th generation fighters, authoritative assessments hold that China’s J-10 fighter is technically comparable to India’s Mirage 2000 and Indian Su-30 MKI is superior to J-11 and Su-27 models.The high altitudes of Chinese air bases in Tibet and Xinjiang, and geographic and weather conditions mean that Chinese fighters are limited to carrying around half their design payload and fuel. Whereas IAF will launch from bases and airfields unaffected by these geographic conditions, with maximum payload and fuel capabilities. The most significant PLAAF forward air bases and airfields near Indian Borders are located at Hotan, Lhasa/ Gonggar, Ngari Gunsa and Xigaze and are vulnerable to a dedicated Indian offensive. Incidentally China has at least ten fully operational airfields in the Tibetan plateau across the LAC.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative – Strategic Reach

China’ Belt and Road Initiative strategy aims to build connectivity and cooperation across six main economic corridors encompassing China, Mongolia and Russia; Eurasian countries; Central and West Asia; Pakistan; other countries of the Indian sub continent; and Indo China. Asia needs USD 26 trillion in infrastructure investment by 2030 (Asian Development Bank in 2017).China can certainly help to provide some of this. Mutual benefits is a feature of the BRI which will also help to develop markets for China’s products in the long term and to alleviate industrial excess productivity in the short term. The BRI priorities hardware (infrastructure) and funding first .The BRI is best summarised by President Xi : China will actively provide international cooperation through the Belt and Road Initiative . In doing so we hope to achieve policy, infrastructure, trade, financial and people to people connectivity and then build a platform for international cooperation to create new drivers of shared development.

China Pakistan Economic Corridor

China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is defined by the Government of Pakistan “ are growth axis and development belt featuring complementary advantage, collaboration, mutual benefits and common prosperity”. The mega project is one of the largest bilateral investment (USD 62 billion) underway anywhere in the world. A flagship project of the Belt and Road Initiative, CPEC is in tandem with President Xi Jinping’s vision of ‘Chinese Dream’; which avows to commercially link China to Africa, Europe and the Persian Gulf by ways of land and maritime routes. Similarly in recognition of the CPEC infrastructure projects the vision comprise of mega network of highways, railways and energy pipelines to link Western China to the Arabian Ocean via the Gwadar port of Pakistan. The coal power project, Karachi – Gwadar coastal highway, Chashma nuclear power plant and a number of hydro power projects were achieved as a result of the bilateral partnership.

Economic Stress to China

The ongoing U.S. China trade war is a distraction from China`s big problems; the blowing of multiple bubbles and the country`s soaring debt, which will eventually kill economic growth. At economic front low marriages rate are followed by low birth rate and a shrinking labour force; the country strives to compete with labour rich countries like Vietnam, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Bangladesh. There is unfavourable ‘ dependency rate’ too few workers who will have to support too many retirees. Meanwhile there is infrastructure investment bubble at home and abroad. At home infrastructure investment have provided fuel to China’s ‘robust growth’. Abroad infrastructure investments have served its ambition to control the South China and secure a waterway all the way to the Middle East oil and Africa`s riches. The trouble is that these projects are not economically viable. They generate incomes and jobs while they last, but nothing beyond that, no accelerator effect as economists say. That’s why the bubble burst - and leave behind tons of debt. How much is China`s debt? Officially it ‘s small number 47.60%. Unofficially it`s hard to figure it out.

India’s Strategic Infrastructure Development

In the wake of heightened road and rail construction activity undertaken by China along India’s Northern and Eastern Frontiers, India constituted a China Study Group in 1997 to study the requirement of road construction along the China border for brisk movement of troops in the event of armed conflict. The CSG identified a network of 73 roads in phase1 and 32 roads in phase 2; called the India China Border Roads (ICBR). Some of the important strategic projects include the Darbuk - Shyok - Daulat Beg Oldie(DS DBO) road in Ladakh and Rohtang tunnel in Himachal Pradesh; and in the North East the Sela tunnel in Arunachal Pradesh to reduce distance to Tawang and a rail tunnel under the Brahmputra river with Indian Railways. Other major strategic infrastructure developments and renovations are:-

  • Zojila Tunnel. It is a 14.2 Km long two lane bidirectional tunnel under the Zojila pass in the Himalayas between Sonamarg and Drass. Zojila pass is located at an altitude of 11578 feet.
  • Bogibeel Bridge. Bogibeel Bridge is a combined road and rail bridge over the Brahmputra river in the Assam between Dhamaji district and Dibrugarh district. It is the longest rail cum road bridge in India measuring 4.94 km. The bridge is of strategic importance to India as it will significantly enhance India’s ability to transport troops and supplies to its borders with Tibet in Arunachal Pradesh.
  • Renovation of Advanced Landing Grounds. The Rs 720 core project to develop Advance Landing Grounds (ALGs) got an impetus in 2013 when India witnessed massive construction and development in the Chinese side. The IAF has identified at least 35 airfields in the North East for rapid modernisation. The strategically important seven ALGs in Arunachal Pradesh at Vijaynagar, Machuka , Pasighat, Tawang ,Tuting, Walong and Ziro have been renovated and operationalised. In the Ladakh sector, ALGs at Daulat Beg Oldie, Fukche and Nyoma have been renovated, Daulat Beg Oldie is one of the highest airfields in the world located at an altitude of 5065 Mtr .

Convergence of U.S. - India Defence Cooperation

  • New Framework for U.S. - India Defence Relationship 2005 established the increased cooperation regarding military relations, defence industry and technology transfer; and establishment of a framework on maritime security cooperation hence given India the status of a strategic ally. Both cooperate on a range of critical defence issues, from maritime security and counter terrorism, to defence production and disaster relief. Acknowledging this reality, the United States declared India a Major Defence Partner (MDP) in 2016. Putting India on par with Washington’s closest allies and opening the door to Indian procurement of sensitive technologies. India - U.S. bilateral relations have developed into a ‘global strategic partnership’, based on shared democratic values and increasing convergence of interests on bilateral, regional and global issues.
  • Quadrilateral Security Dialogue . It is an informal strategic forum between U.S, Japan, Australia and India that is maintained by semi regular seminars, information exchanges and military drills between member countries. The dialogue paralleled by joint military exercises of an unprecedented scale titled ‘Malabar Exercise’. The diplomatic and military arrangement was widely viewed as a response to increased Chinese economic and military power. The Quadrilateral was supposed to establish an ‘Asian Arc of Democracy’ envisioned to ultimately include countries in Central Asia, Mongolia, the Korean peninsula and other countries in South East Asia except the China. Some critics have called the project an anti China move mounted by the Asian powers in coordination with the U.S. Fears over Chinese military spending and missile capacities had helped drive Australia toward a defence agreement with the United States as outlined by the 207 Canberra Defence Blueprint; Sandy Gordan of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute had recommended the sale of uranium to India on the basis of similar considerations. In the early 21century America’s strategic pre - occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan was undermining its ability to adapt to major power shifts in the Asia Pacific. Then President Obama called for a ‘new world wide concert of democracies’ to counter the influence of Russia and China. American politician Rudy Giuliani called for incorporating Asia`s military capable democracies into NATO.

Galwan Incident – Chinese Power Projection or Expansionism

The Galwan stand off between Chinese and Indian armies on LAC in Ladakh resulted into a deadly imbroglio not seen until recently when soldiers fought a bitter unarmed combat; with Chinese troops using unconventional weapons like steel rods with spikes and nails. Many soldiers on both sides were grievously injured due to fall into the sub zero temperature waters of the glaciated Galwan river. 20 Indian soldiers including a commanding officer were fatal casualty and now lately acknowledged four Chinese casualty including one Regiment commander, by China.

Why China chose a border conflict with India during corona pandemic and why at Galwan? It is a study in contrast. India termed the incident as “premeditated”, that was orchestrated by Beijing to project India as aggressor who had breached the agreement and interfered in peaceful disengagement. The experts believe the answer lies in the complex anarchic doctrine of Chinese philosophy that ‘Political power grows out of the barrel of the gun’ and PLA is always ready to adopt belligerent methods to ‘teach a lesson’ to every neighbouring country who does not toe the Chinese line. This is to create a false image of invincibility of PLA and the Communist regime. Two important events most likely have shook China - one the bifurcation of Jammu and Kashmir State with Ladakh coming under direct control of the Central Govt. At that occasion Indian Home Minister re- emphasised to take back the Indian territory of Aksai Chin and the illegal land ceded to China by Pakistan. The second event was the Balakot air strike by India into China’s strategic ally Pakistan in a peacetime raid against terrorist camps. This had given a massive Indian blow to Chinese expansionism with a show of Indian political resolve and growing military power. China despite having signed numerous agreement with India to maintain peace and tranquillity, flared up the border tension in a new matrix bringing almost 60000 troops including tanks and armoured combat vehicles at all strategic points like Dipsang Plains, Gogra,Spanggur gap, Rezang La, move from finger 8 to finger 4 along northern bank of Pagong Tso lake to forcibly change the LAC alignment on Southern bank. It is likely that:-

  • China in an attempt to deflect the attention from corona spread from its land thought the time was ripe to draw world attention to conflict between two nuclear giants of Asia.
  • Galwan should not be viewed a mere localised incident but could have proved the flash point towards a full scale war as China deployed the tanks, long range artillery guns and rockets on wide frontage from Depsang plains to Rezang La, an unprecedented move. Chinese fighter jets squadron were seen at Hotan and other forward air bases in Xinjiang and Tibet. The area being the mountainous terrain affords little scope of air combat efficacy and unlikely quick build up by India. U.S. and Japan could also have possibly not been able to render desired assistance.
  • Galwan river flows westward into India and affords a large size strategic invasion route to both India and China. The capture of Galwan ridge line could afford China observation and interdiction on Darbuk - Shyok - Daulat Beg Oldie 235 Km border road. At this junction the above road is closest to the LAC and the Western Highway of China linking Tibet to Xinjiang. The Chinese Western Highway is also under Indian threat.
  • Heavy armour and troop build up by India could have taken days which would give China opportunity to occupy the positions of advantages and fortify defences on the heights. Disengagement and status quo ante would give China a hard bargaining stance against Indian border infrastructure.
  • Indian political resolve would be peace bargaining and submissive.

Lessons for India

Indian hard military response and infliction of heavy casualties on Chinese soldiers have dented the image of PLA not only in the eyes of its population but also boosted the independence aspiring Hong Kong and insurgency affected Xinjiang who could now challenge the Central Communist Authority.

It is now more pertinent that India must relook the border issue with China and the treaty and agreements both countries have signed. Chinese army is just a tool in the hands of its political masters to keep the borders under tension whenever bilateral peace talks are held to make neighbouring states cry for peace. U.S. and India are not only the biggest roadblock to Chinese ambitions but they have shown to the world how vulnerable the Chinese economy is, on which growth China aims to achieve super power status in the new world. However India must secure its borders and the lessons for India are :-

  • Analyse intelligence failure or gap in intelligence. Need for a real time integrated surveillance centre to cover entire LAC and beyond to counter Chinese moves.
  • Reassess troop and equipment requirement on LAC against future aggressions. No portion of the LAC should be left unguarded. There is an inescapable requirement of at least two additional infantry divisions with complementary armour and artillery to bolster defence posture in East Ladakh.
  • Present border management at LAC with Army and ITBP in joint command has again proved failure .Dual management or dual command system will prove weak against swift Chinese deployment. LAC should be the sole responsibility under unified command of the Army.
  • Unprofessional approach of senior Army hierarchy must be viewed seriously. If timely intensions of Chinese move could have been read by troops on ground then face saving and large resources could be saved.
  • Up gradation of air efforts in strike and lift capability of IAF.
  • Need to acquire the superior fighter aircrafts coupled with killer drone capability to deter China to use armour.
  • Capture of heights overlooking south bank of Pangong Tso and at Kailash Range by India rendered Chinese positions at south bank weak.that Indai a strong bargaining at negotiations. Proactive approach henceforth needs to be adopted.
  • Strong and decisive Indian political leadership with diplomatic acumen surprised China.
  • Chinese army was surprised with Indian mirror deployment of 60000 troops including superior T- 90 tanks. The night firing capability of IAF has made China felt weak.
  • The conscript PLA soldiers were found weak and untrained against the battle experienced Indian soldiers. More than 10000 PLA soldiers were evacuated who could not cope up with harsh winters at glaciated heights.
  • The Special Frontier Force which was formed with Tibetan refugee volunteers proved their mettle when they repulsed Chinese attempt to gain foothold on the strategic Kailash range on the southern bank of Pangong Tso lake. This gave a decisive blow to the invincibility of PLA, and exposed the training and motivational aspects of the Chinese soldiers.
  • The weakest point of China is to preserve the invicible image of PLA and the Chinese Communist Party. The heavy troops casualty China suffered in Galwan has dented that image ; and if their tender box fighter jets J -1O ,J-11 and J-20 are destroyed in the air or standing in open at forward air bases than no country would have bought their military hardware. With induction of Rafale jetsIndia could go deep penetration strike in Xinjian and Tibet. Chinese T- 15 light tanks stand no chance against Indian T-90 and T-72 tanks.
  • Absence of killer drones in Indian armoury was felt as shortcoming.
  • World has witnessed how China play psychological war with adversaries through propaganda giving out veiled threats through the government controlled newspaper Global Times and by releasing PLA training videos of massive fire assaults on enemy positions.

Blacklisting of Chinese companies and numerous social media Apps by India and the U.S. had regressive effects on Chinese economy. Acts of aggression and Chinese expansionism will no longer be accepted by international comity of nations. The democracies of the world will be united against the danger of Chinese communism.