The Jats - Their Role in the Mughal Empire/Chapter XII
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Contents
- 1 Causes of the Withdrawal of Suraj Mal from Bhau's Camp
- 2 Suraj Mal's one more advise to Bhau
- 3 Differed in their outlook towards the enemies
- 4 Bhau directly antagonised the Jat Raja
- 5 Surajmal never relished the Maratha expansion in the north
- 6 Jat Sarva Khaps help Marathas in Panipat
- 7 Suraj Mal Helps The Fugitives From Panipat
- 8 Durrani's Jat Expedition Fizzles Out (March, 1761)
Causes of the Withdrawal of Suraj Mal from Bhau's Camp
[p.215]:The date having been examined, we may now turn to another controversial issue namely Suraj Mal's withdrawal from Bhau's camp. Some scholars1 attribute this incident predominantly to Bhau's indiscreet insolence to the Jat King. On the other side some Maratha historians,2 while absolving the Maratha chief, blame Suraj Mal's selfishness alone. But all these historians have mostly relied upon the Maratha sources, generally ignoring the other relevant ones.3 The account thus prepared has been neither complete nor convincing. No doubt some other scholars4 have considered a large number of sources but even they have left out relevant information on the subject. Moreover, as the focus of their attention was on a different subject, they have either dismissed the present one summarily or have treated it in a general manner.
At the outset we would like to emphasize the danger involved in singling out any particular factor. The Jat withdrawal was the result of the joint operation of varied factors, some immediate, while others of an abiding nature. We shall discuss them accordingly.
We have noted that even after his assurances, Bhau refused at Delhi to retain on the Wizarat and made secret overtures to Shuja. This played an important role in Imad-Suraj separation from that chief. This duplicity and breach of faith was followed by the appointment of Naro Shankar and Baloji Palhande as the governor of Delhi and the custodian of the fort respectively. This arrangement had nothing to do with the Wizarat. But
1. Duff, A History of the Mahrattas, I, 520; Owen, The Fall of the Mogul Empire, 247; Qanungo, Jats, 133ff.
2. Shejwalkar, Panipat, 48-49; Sardesai, Marathas, II, 435.
3. Duff has taken note of a few Persian histories like Siyar, while Owen mainly follows the account of the Maratha Brahmin Kashi Raj. K.R. Qanungo's narrative (Jats., 136) is a "free translation" of Bhau Bakhar. Likewise, Shejwalkar and Sardesai also depend upon the Marathi sources only.
4. Sarkar, Fall, II, 255-257; Gupta, Panipat, 156; G. Singh, Durrani, 243f
[p.216]: in the ultimate analysis, the fact of Bhau picking up his own subordinates for these key posts reflected his ambition to brook nobody else's authority over the capital and the imperial affairs.5 It is said that Bhau remained obstinate even after the entreaties of the Jat, Holkar and Scinde to restore Imad.6 The latter's hopes of regaining power were thus completely shattered. There were some other factors as well which affected Suraj Mal's decision but in his protege's case this camouflage alone enraged him beyond limits and estranged him forthwith from Bhau. In the realm of intrigues Imad had few equals. Imad now threw in all his weight to detach his Jat patron also.7
Accepting Bhau Sahibanchi Kafiyat with approbation, some scholars uncritically maintain that Suraj Mal yearned for being and demanded to be made "keeper" of the Capital. But Bhau declined it, which was the predominant or according to one scholar8 the exclusive cause of his return. Suraj Mal's ambitions conceded, a critical perusal of evidence and the circumstances, however, do not warrant this claim. It is to be borne in mind that besides the Kafiyat, we have a wide range of evidence in Persian, French and Marathi (other than the above source) but nowhere do we find any confirmation of this view. Its total omission in contemporary Marathi correspondence is inexplicably strange and extremely significant also. On the Jat side, Wendel has also nothing to suggest, much less to prove it. Bhau Bakhar9 and the persistent Jat tradition so sensitive about the transactions of the Panipat days, do not allude to it either.
Besides, the inherent logic of the events also goes against this notion. It is difficult to justify on practical grounds Suraj Mal's duality of policy and efforts; his pleading for both the Wizarat of Imad as well as his own guardianship of Delhi. The maximum that the second alternative could hold out would have been automatically guaranteed to him by Imad's defacto Wizart. To be the patron of a subservient Wazir was in itself
5. Purandare, I, 389; Bhau's doings gave rise to wild apprehension that he intended to enthrone Viswasrao on Delhi's throne. See Duff', op.cit. 519; Muharbat, 12.
6. Bahu Bakhar quoted by Qanungo, Jats, 130.
7. Dow, Hindostan, II, 340; Gupta, Panipat, 156; Raghubir Singh (in Brij, 190) says that Suraj Mal became angry and left the Marathas following the Maratha- Afghan peace negotiations.
8. Sardesai, Marathas, II, 435. We presume that this is his revised view on this issue. In Panipat Prakaran, (quoted by Qanungo, Jats, 136-37) he also included the refusl to send the Maratha families to Gwalior, to re-instate Imad and the removal of the silver ceiling, among the causes, of the Jat defection; Shejwalkar, Panipat, 43 and 49
9. If it were otherwise, K.R. Qanungo, who wholly bases this part of his account on Bhau Bakhar, must have pointed out accordingly.
[p.217]: most flattering to his honour10 and also conducive to his personal interests. The fact that he backed Imad's case now and continued to do so even afterwards, looks conclusive. One of the two seems to be incorrect: either Suraj Mal did not stand for his protege's chancellorship, or he did not demand the wardenship of the capital. Thus, in the absence of its corroboration by the weightier sources, extant tradition and implied probabilities, the above view cannot be accepted, much less the assertion that his failure in getting the wardenship was the only cause of his departure.
Apparently, all his calculations were essentially linked with the defacto re-installation of Imad as the Wazir. Destitute of his own resources, the Wazir was then a pensioner of and wholly dependent on the Jat Raja.11 Little wonder, therefore, that Suraj Mal perceived in Imad's re-installation a good opportunity to promote his selfish interests. The traditional Jat policy to earn the favour of Delhi's Wazir appeared to be reaching its culmination. But [Bhau]]'s refusal now not only threatened his calculations but also his plighted words to Imad.12 This could not but annoy the Jat chief.
Evidence in Persian and Marathi emphasizes (in varying degrees) Bhau's removal of the silver ceiling of the Diwan-i-Khas as another factor in displeasing Suraj Mal further. Mirat-i-Ahma refers to the Maratha vandalism in general and the stripping of the ceiling in particu1ar as one of the two main factors which made Suraj Mal "writhe with discontent".13 Siyar is most emphatic on the point. According to it this episode shocked him most and he left the Marathas.14 In spirit, Bhau Bakhar and the local tradition also agree with it. The former adds that by offering to pay 5 lakhs he tried to dissuade a too needy Bhau from disfiguring that place as that would bring them "no credit but only odium of disloyalty". But Bhau hoping to get more, disregarded him and stripped off the ceiling. This infuriated him and he said to Bhau, "You have destroyed (the sanctity) the throne while I am present here and thereby brought odium upon me (as well). Whenever I make any request on any affair you disregard and reject it."15 That partly this utterance was a piece of Suraj Mal's political rehtoric can hardly be denied. But as the shrewdest diplomat and statesman of the time,16 he
10. Memoires des Jats, 50.
11. Ibid., 49-50; Mirat (908) puts it, that the Wazir "had strength because of Suraj Mal".
12. Qanungo, Jats, 133.
13. Mirat, 908.
14. Siyar, III, 385.
15. Bhau Bakhar, quoted by Qanungo, Jats, 131 f.
16. Gupta, Panipat, 144, 153; Also Sarkar, Fall, II, 257.
[p.218]: could easily foresee the likely hazards of such an impolitic act17 and hence his strong objection to it. As it was, Bhau could no doubt secure 9 lakhs of Rupees from the ceiling, but politically it proved harmful. It gave his enemies a genuine ground to exploit the situation.18 The persisting discord over the military strategy and Bhau's final rejection of Suraj Mal's war plan was another and a very important cause of the latter's departure. Difference had crept in at the very beginning, dampening Suraj Mal's enthusiasm in the process.
Suraj Mal's one more advise to Bhau
Suraj Mal made one more attempt at Delhi when he advised Bhau:
- to make Delhi (now that he had advanced upto and captured that place) the siege of war (base) and not to advance too much in the country guarded by such a powerful enemy, (the Abdali and his allies). Thus, (while remaining in Delhi), the Maratha-Jat army could be furnished with whatever it needed from the (nearby) Jat provinces and Delhi could in any case serve as a retreat. But this "wise" counsel met the same fate as did his preceding one.19
It can be reasonably inferred that he tendered this advice when Bhau first thought of proceeding to Kunjpura (c. middle of August,1760).20 Not that whatever Bhau thought was useless, but on practical grounds the soundness of Suraj Mal's counsel could not be easily challenged. Whereas Bhau was a complete stranger to north Indian conditions and the adversaries pitted against, the Jat veteran was very well familiar with them. In fact the latter had as much personal experience of north Indian warfare as was then the total age of the Maratha commander.
Suraj Mal's suggestion to exercise due caution in facing a consummate general like the Abdali and to keep encumbrances, immobile artillery21 and a huge number of non-combatants22 away was militarily correct. The stress on the last three was intended on the one hand to impart extreme mobility to the fighting force, while on the other to reduce greatly was feeding expenses of the camp. Suraj Mal preferred swift
17. cf. Sarkar, Fall, II, 442.
18. S.P.D., XXVII, 257; Shejwalkar, Panipat, 46.
19. Memoires des Jats, 53; Also Bhau Bakhar referred to by Qanungo, Jats, 132. The tradition generally supports it. A Sakha, recited to me by the Jogis of a village near Chhaprauli (Meerut) adds that a war council was convened near the Purana Qila where the Sarva Khap Panchayat levies agreed to follow the leadership of Suraj Mal.
20. Supra, eh. XI f.ns. 81-92.
21. Once planted, the big cannons (some were so heavy that 200 bullocks were required to drag them) could not be adjusted with the movements of the army. At Panipat they could do nothing except make harmless noise. S.P. Sangar, (ed. Gupta), Panipat, 252.
22. In Bhau's army this number was eight times that of the actual fighters. Sarkar, Fall, II, 352.
[p.219]: cavalry tactics not because the infantry tactics were bad but because both the Marathas and the Jats excelled in the former. And one cannot ignore the best weapon in one's armoury and yet hope for the best.
Equally sagacious was Suraj Mal's insistence on keeping a firm base at Delhi. Impliedly it meant that the line of communication should not be lengthened and that continuous supplies be vigilantly ensured. The real implications of ignoring it were seen later on. After Bhau's departure from Delhi the Abdali forded the Yamuna, intercepted the Maratha line of communication and in time caught Bhau in "trap" from which he could never come out.23 That the astute Jat had apprehended such a mishap in case the whole Maratha camp moved northwards neglecting Delhi as a base, is evident from the wording of his above advice. Little wonder, therefore, that this has been extolled almost on all sides. Keene observes that had it been followed the "resistance (to the Abdali) wouldhave been more successful and the whole history of Hindustan far otherwise, than what it has since been."24
Bhau, however, differed sharply. He stuck to the entrenched mode of warfare through heavy artillery and foot musketeers of his favourite Gardi without appreciating that this system had yet to be synthetized with the traditional Maratha mode to yield the intended results.25 An "overwhelming majority" of his lieutenants upon whom largely depended the final outcome, never had recourse to this system. They remained sceptical about it and did not exert heartily on the fateful day at Panipat.26 What an irony! The Abdali himself wished the Marathas to come to a pitched contest rather than their pursuing their traditional mode of warfare.27 Moreover, the way Bhau declined to make the Jat forts his base and left Delhi also afterwards carrying all his camp impedimenta and non-combatants and leaving a paltry force of 6,000 at Delhi, leaves the impression that he did not share Suraj Mal's concern about encumbrances or a firm base.28 What disastrous consequences followed from it, are well known to us.
23. Sarkar, Fall, II, 283; SPD., XXVII, 259; Nur. 46b.
24. H.G. Keene, The Moghul Empire, (London: 1887), 77-78; Memoires des Jats, 53; Sarkar, Fall, II, 363, 258; Qanungo, Jats, 128, 131, 133; Owen op.cit., 242; Gupta, Panipat, 151 and 251; Also Shejwalkar, Panipat, 48.
25. Rajwade, I, 174; Mehra (ed. Gupta), Panipat, 214ff.
26. Shejwalkar, Panipat, 116f; cf. Nana Farnvis laments that Bhau "though sufficiently wise on all other occasions seems on this occasion to have lost his wisdom ... he abandoned our system of warfare and adopted that of the enemy" quoted by Mehra (ed. Gupta), Pantpat, 213-214: Mirat (918) says "when they (the Marathas) turned from that custom (of their own warfare). they got involved in disgrace and affliction".
27. cf. Shejwalkar, Pantpat, 107.
28. cf. Sarkar, Fall, ll, 325, 363; Sangar (ed. Gupta), Panipat, 251.
Differed in their outlook towards the enemies
[p.220]: Their differences were not confined to the war strategy alone. They also differed sharply in their respective outlook towards the enemies. The period which witnessed Suraj Mal's departure (middle of August, 1760) also found Bhau's bloated with pride. Apart from other sources Bhau's own correspondence shows that his easy capture of the Indian Capital, turned his head. The fort was occupied on 1st August, 1760, and the very next day he wrote, " .. the Afghan allies would leave the Abdali and that Shuja now felt swamped by having joined the invader ... My capture of Delhi has broken his (the Abdali's) waist."29 Same is the tone in which he writes on 21st August, 1760, "My conquest of Delhi has terrified the Abdali and caused a split in his camp."30 Besides his own buoyancy, Shuja's persistent overtures for peace, flattering reports from his subordinates and the intrigues of some Afghan chiefs (such as Ahmad Bangash, and Sadulla Rohilla) supplicating his favour, increased his pride and insolence.31 All this confirmed his notions that his enemies were frightened and disunited and they would be thankful to him if only he allowed them a safe passage to their homes. Whatever be the initial anxiety of the Abdali, it was foolish on the part of Bhau to take a grossly exaggerated view of the situation and discover in the peace proposals a proof of hopeless weakness of the Abdali's cause."32 For all practical purposes, the Abdali's potentiality was the same as before and it called for unusual foresight and discretion. But an inflated Bhau fell a victim to an imprudent optimism. This was a dangerous development in the attitude of a general when the real issue was still hanging in the balance. There is not the slightest evidence to show that Suraj Mal at any stage shared Bhau's far-fetched calculations. Sanguine he never was about the war plan of Bhau (to which he still clung), now his conceit, under-estimation of the enemies and the like left the calculating Jat in no doubt about the final outcome. He discerned that the ultimate fate of the Marathas was not good.33 Nay he became convinced of their prospective defeat under such a fllippant leadership and made a clear prediction to that effect months in advance of Panipat. This conviction became probably the biggest single factor of his return.
Bhau directly antagonised the Jat Raja
In addition, Bhau directly antagonised the Jat Raja by his offensive disposition in course of the discussion at Delhi, alluded to above. Supposing Bhau Bakhar to be the only source to bear it out, T.S. Shejwalkar
29. Rajwade, 1,224; For Bhau's pride also see Memoires des Jats, 52, Mir Dard, who met that chief at Delhi found him "very proud and haughty", quoted by Gupta, Panipat, 154, footnote; Mirat, 907.
30. Rajwade, I, 233
31. Ibid. 236-237.
32. Sarkar, Fall, II, 259-260, 279-280, Gupta, Panipat, 155; Also, Raj. I,233; Mirat, 911
33. Amira, 105; See, for identical statement, Tarikh-i-Ibrahim Khan in Elliot VIII, 277, Also Memoires des Jats, 53
[p.221]: completely denies that the Maratha leader ever humiliated or slighted Suraj Mal.34 But he does not have a single authority to support his thesis, which he builds up upon a dubious interpretation of facts and situations. An exchange of views between the top generals at the one or other's initiative is the most common phenomenon amidst a continuing (military) situation. In that case how a puffed up Bhau-whose habitual harshness the learned historian himself concedes35 -would have reached to any counter advice, can be easily imagined. Luckily, we have evidence of the French historian (who in 1760 was at Bharatpur) backed by the persisting tradition, to safely conclude that even if Bhau did not call him a mere land holder ("Jat"), he certainly offended him by spurning his counsels at Delhi.36 The contemporary Marathi despatches indirectly corroborate it by assuming complete silence for some time, Suraj Mal's cup of endurance was now seemingly full to the brim.
The above analysis brings forth one relevant point. If we follow Suraj-Bhau relationship closely, it would appear that at least in August, 1760, the Maratha's interest in the Jat alliance had certainly dwindled and this was the period when the Jat relinquished him-the Maratha side. Its convincing proof is to be found in the marked difference in Bhau's earlier wholesome regard for the Jat Raja as reflected in his prompting a veteran like the Holkar to escort him, his personally advancing two miles to receive his ally honourably, his showing earnestness for the Jat alliance by solemn vows and the like, stand in deep contrast with that chief's subsequent stubborn and disparaging attitude towards Suraj Mal, though differences between them had existed right from the very start. His handling of Imad is also a case in point. Its secret may be discovered in Bhau's differencing assessments of his prospects before and after that date. His earlier "wholesome respect" for the Durrani's might vis-a-vis a realization of his own difficulties and Shuja's decision to join the Abdali vis-a-vis the rejection of his appeal for help by the rest of the powers37 has increased the significance of the Jat co-operation. He, therefore, found it expedient to be respectful towards his only ally. But upon taking Delhi, Bhau
34. Shejwalkar, Panipat, 48-49.
35. Ibid., 129.
36. Memoires des Jats, 53; Also 64 footnote; Qanungo, Jats, 133; cf. Duff, Mahrattas, I, 520; Owen, Magill Empire,247.
37. Sarkar, Fall, II, 258. Though conceding Bhau's pride the insolence after Delhi's capture (Fall, II, 258, 259, 260) J N Sarkar thinks that Bhau yet realized gravity of his situation even after that event. We, however, presume that he does not mean this statement to refer to the first two weeks of August, with the developments of which we are concerned herewith. Incidentally, the two letters (SPD, XXVII, 255, 257) that he cites as his authority for his above observation also refer to different periods, the first letter bears the date of 26th June, while the second that of 15th September.
[p.222]: discovered his adversaries frightened and disunited, and consequently success awaiting him, Once the very object of courting the Jat alliance seemed fulfilled, his interest in it was bound to diminish. Vows made in storm are forgotten in calm. Bhau's overconfidence made him callously indifferent towards Suraj Mal when the latter did not toe his line blindly. This gives new dimensions to the present question.
It is obvious that no astute and self-respecting person of Suraj Mal's stature would have stayed on with Bhau when neither his dignity was safe nor his valid objections, counsels and interests were heeded to and when he had grown so sceptical about the final outcome as well. To pull on in such circumstances might be a compulsion with a subordinate like Malhar (whose views were similar to those of the Jat), but Suraj Mal was neither a subordinate nor a vassal but an ally of once passionately sought for alliance. By right Bhau could not claim allegiance from him. Mutual trust and regard, honest execution of plighted words, and reciprocal adjustments are the life blood of an alliance, but they became increasingly scarce in the present case. For Suraj Mal, the Maratha alliance now looked like a servile submission to Bhau's command. How far this could be acceptable to him can easily be surmised.
Surajmal never relished the Maratha expansion in the north
Alongside these decisive factors must be duly emphasized the contributory role of Suraj Mal's lack of unstinted zeal for the Maratha cause. Ambitious as Suraj Mal was, he never relished the Maratha expansion in the north. We know that right from the days of the Mughal Emperor Ahmad Shah till his accord with them (in 1757), he had been interested in the formation of anti- Maratha coalition. Though subsequent stress and strains he had ceased to pursue the anti-Maratha policy, he was all along apprehensive of their designs. As related above, he had joined them because he regarded them a lesser evil as compared to the Abdali's confederacy: Then again, having thrown his lot with them, he treacherously kept himself in touch with the opponent's ally, Shuja.38 This was bound to annoy Bhau in the same way as his (Bhau's) own perfidious overtures with Shuja did Suraj Mal and Imad. Whether or not Bhau actually demanded two crores from him we cannot say39 -for we find him hesitating to demand money40-but he certainly had the reason to suspect such an extortionate demand amidst the changing mood of that chief. Here was, then, another probable reason with him for leaving the Maratha.
All the same, there is insufficient ground to agree with T. S. Shejwalkar here. Conveniently ignoring Bhau's part explained above, he confines his inquisitiveness to what he thinks Suraj Mal's rank
38. Shejwalkar, Panipat, 51; Also Shah A/am Nama, 173; cf. Mirat, 908.
39.Imad, 276.
40. S.P.D., XXI, 190.
[p.223]: selfishness and unscrupulous tactics.41 This estimate is not only grossly exaggerated but one sided too. Harping on Suraj Mal's selfishness alone is to ignore the all pervading spirit of the age that he lived in. Everyone in that age, including the Marathas, shaped his policy and conduct to suit his own interests. It must be borne in mind that the Jat interests were not inextricably involved in the present struggle, which was essentially one for political supremacy between the Afghans and the Marathas. It is claimed that Bhau fought for the motto: "India for Indians"42 But strangely, no Indians except the Jat responded to his call. In the light of the persistent Maratha conduct, no serious student of their history of the period can fail to conclude that actually the "Indians" meant here were none else than the Marathas themselves. Yet, Suraj Mal accompanied Bhau because he would have relished the defeat of the Abdali's confederacy. However, the current flippancy of Bhau, coupled with his clinging to tactics wrong in his eyes, convinced Suraj Mal of the Maratha defeat instead. Possibly, T.S. Shejwalkar would not have termed him so selfish, had he knowingly sacrificed himself at the altar of the Maratha selfishness. The learned scholar seems to have missed that everybody possesses the instinct to safeguard one's existence against an impending disaster and Suraj Mal was not an exception to it.43 We know that later on Bhau, finding his own existence endangered, sent the imprint of his palm dipped in saffron to Shuja to save himself. It is another thing that with his unerring sense of perception the shrewd Suraj Mal preconceived the odds (under Bhau's leadership) which the arrogant Bhau realized only when he had been irredeemably entrapped by them. The fact is that thrown as Suraj Mal was between two mile stones (the Afghans and the Marathas), caution had become a necessity for his survival, which should not be unsympathetically characterized as rank selfishness.
In his obvious enthusiasm to make a scapegoat of the Jat Raja, the reputed Maratha historian has silently bypassed the injudicious Maratha policies towards him. That Suraj Mal himself was opposed to the Maratha advance has already been elucidated. But the Maratha record in this respect was apparently worse. Right from its inception the Maratha policy towards the Jat State was characterized by what J.N. Sarkar aptly terms "the grasping tyranny".44 In 1754, the Marathas had launched a formidable offensive against the Jat State. Thereafter in 1757 they (the accredited defenders of the Empire against the Abdali) had displayed a culpable indifference when the exterminating Afghan
41. Shejwalkar, Panipat, 49.
42. Ibid., 123.
43. cf. Memoires des Jats, 53
44. Sarkar, Fall, II, 256.
[p.224]: legion subjected parts of Suraj Mal's State to sack, slaughter and sacrilege. This apart, the Maratha support to the pretensions of Muhkam Singh and Zul Qaran, the staunch enemies of Suraj Mal, speaks of their subversive designs. Even as friends, the Marathas were not remiss in capitalizing the internal matters of the Jat State. An incident of 1758, when they tried to exploit differences between Suraj Mal and his intractable son, Jawahar Singh,45 is a case in point, although citing here the example of the Maratha ambition to dispossess the Jats of Aligarh (in 1760)46 looks doubtful. Such bitter reminiscences largely formed the secret of Suraj Mal's cool enthusiasm for the Maratha cause.
Moved by the above factors Suraj Mal, though visibly disgusted,47 resolved to part company with Bhau. But retreat from his camp was not easy. Presumably, Suraj Mal's underhand dealings with Shuja and his gradual sending back of his men in advance48 made Bhau suspicious. Every commander remains watchful against a possible desertion, because apart from causing a depletion in his own ranks, it may lead to a corresponding increase in the enemy's strength. Though Suraj Mal never intended to cross over to the enemy, Bhau suspected it and he tried to keep him under surveillance. Meanwhile, the Holkar helped Suraj Mal and alongwith Imad he decamped at night and went to Ballamgarh.49 The only potentate who had cared to respond to the Maratha call thus left them. This proved disastrous for their cause.50
Bhau raged and fumed as he learned of the Jat retreat. He "swore to leave only the remembrances of the Jats in Hindustan" once he was free
45. SPD., XXVII, 226.
46. Quoting Rajwade, I, 187. J.N. Sarkar (Fall, II, 256) concludes it. No doubt the wording of this letter leaves such an impression. But from the other despatches of this period it becomes clear that the Maratha intention to capture Aligarh at present implied their expelling the Abdali (then encamping at that place) with the Jat help. Significantly, one letter clearly speaks of the Maratha plan to "re-establish" their own and the Jat's former outposts in the Doab. See Rajwade, I, 251,261 also see 174, 186,204 and 205.
47. Imad, 108.
48. Memoires des Jats, 53.
49. Mirat-i-Ahmadi (908) claims that Bhau wanted "to do away with" Suraj Mal and Imad and that the Jat escaped the "death valley" with the help of Shuja, who by discharging cannons controve to produce an opportunity for his escape. This part of its version looks overdrawn. If the reported attempt on his life were correct, he could not have displayed that sympathy and compassion towards the Marathas in general and Bhau's wife in particular, which he did later on; Memoires des Jats, 53; Imad, 276; Bhau Bakhar (slightly differing in details but generally supported by the tradition) quoted by Qanungo, Jats, 134-136; Tarikh-i-Ibrahim Khan in Elliot, VIII, 277-278; Shah Alam Nama, 173; Merely announcing the departure, SPD.,XXVII, 258; Amirah, 105; Siyar, 1II,385; Muharbat, 12.
50. Sarkar, Fall, II, 256.
[p.225]: from his engagements.51 This was, however, not to be, as futility of the peace talks became soon manifest and war appeared to be certain to the Marathas.52 This cooled down Bhau and he thought of placating the Jat Raja. Sometime in the first half of September, 1760, he sent his secretary Chitnis, the Scinde's secretary, Ramaji Anant and the Holkar's secretary, Gangoba Tatya, to persuade the Jat Raja to rejoin him,53 failing that to ensure that he did not unite with the Abdali54 and allowed the line of Maratha communication remain open. As Bhau had been exposed, he appeared to be apologetic in sending an elephant and a khilat to Suraj Mal. He also wrote, appealing to him to block the enemy supplies.55
A burnt child dreads the fire. Though Bhau's gestures, breathing a spirit of repentance, seems to have calmed down Suraj Mal's anger and anguish, he did not agree to rejoin him. There is no evidence to show that their (Suraj-Bhau) discord over policy was resolved either. It would appear, however, that the Maratha plenipotentiaries yet importuned his favour, which he gracefully agreed to. Significantly, on 18th September, 1760, we find Bhau assuring Govind Ballal of help from the Jat contingent (of Shikohabad) in his bid to seize the enemy supplies.56 On the other hand, Suraj Mal allowed the Maratha supplies to pass on freely on the Agra-Mathura route as is evident from a despatch of October from Bhau's camp. The addressee therein was assured that "the Jat is ours".57 On 4th November, Bhau himself emphasized that Suraj Mal was quite friendly and in no way would he obstruct the Supplies.58
Ahmad Shah Abdali, who must have relished the Jat-Maratha split, felt disturbed at the renewed Maratha overtures to Suraj Mal. He had earlier sent through Shuja a letter and a khilat for the Jat Raja at Ballamgarh.59 In the last week of September, 1760, he re-opened negotiations with him through Shuja, trying to assure himself (the Abdali) that he did not re-join the Marathas. The Abdali sent him a
51. Memoires des Jats, 53; Also Bhau Bakhar, quoted by Qanungo, Jats, 136.
52. For instance on 12th September T.S. Purandare wrote (SPD., XXVII, 256) "Very likely there will be a war". On 14th Krishnaji Anant emphasized (S.P.D., XXI, 191) the same thing, "but the talks will not take a good tum. A battle alone will decide the matter". On 15th Bapuji Ballal reported (SPD., II, 130) "Battle will take place there will not be a compromise". The same day Nana Fadnis wrote (SP.D., II, 131) that Shuja "does not appear to be honest. So the talks will not be fruitful"
53. SPD., XXVII, 258.
54. Mirat, 908.
55. ibid. Shah A/am Nama (173) claims that finding himself secure Suraj Mal begged forgiveness for his sins from Bhau.
56. Rajwade, I, 244, see also Rajwade's Introduction, 82.
57. Ibid., 259.
58. Ibid., 264.
59. Mirat, 908.
[p.226]: khilat again (at Ballamgarh). Oaths were exchanged on both sides. Displaying diplomatic suppleness, Suraj Mal held assurances not to join the Marathas60 even though he of his own had taken such a decision already and his sympathies remained on the side of his countrymen.
Jat Sarva Khaps help Marathas in Panipat
Inspite of such a possibility raised in a fragmentary contemporary despatch (October, 1760), referred to above, we cannot say whether or not Bharatpur troops under anyone of the Jat Princes reached and sided with the Marathas at Kunjpura.61 The Sarva Khap Panchayat militia (17,000 in number?) under Chowdhary Sheo Lal Jat of Shoram, however, did the same. It forded the Yamuna near Issopur, reached Kunjpura, and helped Bhau. The latter is said to have expressed his gratitude for help, while the Chowdhary took oaths on the Yamuna's water to remain with him.62 The tradition goes that the Doab Jats, eluding the Abdali's patrols in darkness of night, supplied provisions to the Maratha army.63 The Jats on both sides of the Yamuna still feel proud of their ancestors having helped the Maratha during Panipat days.64
Suraj Mal Helps The Fugitives From Panipat
As is well known, the Marathas were later completely routed in the Battle of Panipat (l4th January, 1761). Some 50,000 to 1,00,000 survivors ran to the Jat State for safety from enemy slaughter. The unfortunate fugitives, afflicted with hunger, continuous marching and terror were harassed by the local populace till they reached the Jat dominions where they received the kindest and most hospitable treatment. Forgetting the Maratha wrong the great Jat ruler extended them every comfort. He provided them with food, clothes, blankets, residence and medical facilities. The illustrious Rani Kishori joined her husband and she was specially charitable to the Brahmans and the ladies. The fugitives were fed freely in Bharatpur generally for a week and then escorted safely to Gwalior after each one of the commoners being provided with a minimum of one seer of flour and one rupee. Thus, the Jat Raja altogether spent as much as 10 Lakhs of Rupees in this humanitarian work. Among the fugitives were Bhau's wife, Parbati Bai, and wounded Shamsher Bahadur. The Jat King consoled the heart-broken lady when she came to Deeg and after entertaining her for three days he arranged for her safe return to the south. But despite best medical care, he could not save the life of Shamsher Bahadur, the half brother of the Peshwa.
60. D.C.
61. Rajwade, I, 259.
62. Kanha Ram, 20. This is supported by a sakha i.e., that 22000 panchayat Militia joined Bhau. These lines occur in a ballad sung by the Jogis of Sabange in District Meerut.
63. By implication Nur-ud-Din, (Nur, 41a and 40b), verifies its general authenticity.
64. Shejwalkar, Panipat, 70.
[p.227]: The great Jat built a mosque and a house over his grave.65 He also helped the Marathas in searching those suspected to be missing, such as Jankoji Scinde. All have bestowed lavish praise on him for his generous behaviour. Even to this day the Marathas view with deepest gratitudethe Jat compassion displayed towards their forefathers on the occasion. An eyewitness comments that had Suraj Mal so desired not a single Maratha could have returned alive to the south to tell the woeful tale of Panipat.66 What adds to his greatness is the fact that he helped the vanquished knowing well that by doing so he would be giving an added provocation to the victors of Panipat67
Durrani's Jat Expedition Fizzles Out (March, 1761)
After his resounding triumph, the Abdali occupied Delhi, holding his Court in the Diwan-i-Khas. He opened negotiations with Suraj Mal. Raja Nagar Mal, the imperial Diwan (who had repaired to the Jat Court along with his office management), Raja Diler Singh, the peshkar of the Wazir and Majlis Rai came to Delhi on behalf of Suraj Mal. Meanwhile, in face of the clamourings of his unpaid soldiery, the Abdali had asked Najib to pay him the price of his extrication from the Maratha danger. However, the crooked Rohilla, trying to make Suraj Mal pay for him, presented that Raja's envoys before the Abdali on the evening of 21st February, 1761. He opened negotiations for the payment of Peshkash by the Jat Raja in return for the Durrani's pardon. But Zinat Mahal, who abhorred the patron of her husband's murderer (Imad) opposed them. Instead she pleaded for an outright military action, arguing that the Jat would pay nothing unless reduced by force.68 In the name of "state and religion" Najib also insisted on that the Afghans should march to Agra and beyond, so that the Maratha survivors, as also the Jats and others, who had occupied those environs, might be dealt with and the tribute be realized69 He, apparently, wanted to kill two birds with one stone; to find a way out to meet the Durrani's demand and at the same time to crush his foe, the Jat Raja. It is noteworthy that the exultant Rohilla had broken the news of his victory at Panipat to Suraj Mal in a
65. This is situated in Charbagh, in front of the Nakhas Sarai at Bharatpur.
66. Memoires des Jats,53-54; Nur. 51 b; Imad, 312; S.P.D.,XXVII; 271, XXIX, I; Bayan-o-Waqa, quoted by Qanungo, Jats, 140-141; Mirat, 917; Mehra (ed. Gupta) Panipat, 240 Francklin, Shah Autum (23) is misinformed in his statement that Naro Shankar was plundered at the orders of Suraj Mal.
67. Qanungo, Jats, 140.
68. D.C.; Shah Alam Nama 187; Memoires des Jats, 54; S.PD., XXI, 202; Mirat, 919; Nur 52b; G. Singh, Durrani, 263. At this time the "rumours arose" that after Najib's insistence the Abdali agreed to march to Malwa and that Suraj Mal consented to send a contingent. See Nur, 52b and 53b.
69. Mirat, 919; Also see S.PD., XXI, 202.
[p.228]: manner that smacked of his malignant threat to that chief.70 On his part, Suraj Mal was under no illusion about it. He apprehended that his victorious enemies might come down on him.71
The expedition was then planned. On 7th March, 1761 Shah Wali Khan, with Zinat Mahal, Prince Jawan Bakht and Mirza Bagar started for Agra to pressurize the Jat Raja. But the Durrani troops refused to march further towards Mathura. Their protracted stay in India had made them home-sick. Moreover, in the approaching summer they were averse to confronting the tenacious Jats, who were determined to received them "with shot and shell" from their strongholds. The mutinous spirit of his soldiers obliged the Abdali to recall them at once and he set out for his home on 20th March, 1761, getting perhaps nothing from Suraj Mal on this third and the last occasion also.72 Thus Suraj Mal succeeded in keeping himself solidly erect amidst the general ruin. An eye witness rightly observes that there was none in India of his age capable of achieving the same in the circumstances.73
While leaving this country, Ahmad Shah Abdali confirmed Shah Alam as the Emperor, re-appointed Najib as the Mir Bakhshi and Imad as the Wazir, thus frustrating Shuja, whom he had won over by promising the same office. The Abdali instructed Yaqub Ali Khan to carry a khilat and the pencase of the Wizarat to Imad in the Jat Kingdom.74 However, Shah Alam and Zinat Mahal could never tolerate their mortal enemy re-installed at Delhi. Likewise Najib was also opposed to Imad's restoration. He tried to exclude Imad dishonouring the wish of his patron (the Abdali) to live in harmony with him. He harped on the fears of the Royal family saying, that on gaining supremacy at Delhi Imad would "enthrone another Emperor". Eventually, Najib procured the sanad from the heir to come and take charge of the Capital and on 7th April, 1761, he entered Delhi and put on the robes of the Mir Bakhsi, faujdar of the gird and the regent. He appointed his own men on important posts including the Qiladari of the fort. Thus, hardly a fortnight had elapsed since the Abdali's return when Najib manipulated to become the dictator of Delhi, while the Abdali's agent (who left Delhi for Mathura only on 9th April, 1761) had yet to deliver the Wazir's robe to Imad at Mathura.75
70. Mirai, 918.
71. Memoires des Jats, 54.
72. D.C., Memoires des Jats, 54 also 55-56; Mirat, 919-920 (wrong in saying that Shuja and Najib marched upto Suraj Mal). Qanungo (Jats, 144) states that Suraj Mal paid one lakh to the Abdali. This seems unlikely, cf. SP.D. XXIX, 23 and 24; Also G. Singh Durrani, 263-264 footnote.
73. Memoires des Jats, 54.
74. Nur. 53b-54b; SP.D., XXI, 202, II, 103; Rajwade, I, 297.
75. Nur. 54a-55b; D.C., Sarkar, Fall, II, 377 and 380; Also Rajwade, I, 297; Mirat (920) claims that Zinat Mahal deliberately detained the AbdaJi's agent at Delhi and raised 5,000 men, posting them in the defence of the Capital against Imad's possible move.