The Jats - Their Role in the Mughal Empire/Chapter VII

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The Jats - Their Role in the Mughal Empire
The book by Dr Girish Chandra Dwivedi, Edited by Dr Vir Singh 2003.

Chapter VII - The Rising Importance of the Jats in the Imperial Affairs--(I) (1749-1753)

The Rising Importance of the Jats in the Imperial Affairs

[p.129]: Marching merely as auxiliaries in the Mughal army till the end of Muhammad Shah's reign, the Jats in the reign of Ahmad Shah came to play a bold and varied role in the imperial affairs. Incapable and imbecile, the new Emperor, Ahmad Shah, spent his days in debauchery and childish acts. He entrusted all his functions to an intriguing and corrupt eunuch, Javed Khan, who was equally ignorant of state affairs. The Queen mother, Udham Bai, lacked capacity and sense but cherished high ambitions. At a time when the treasury was empty and the soldiers daily rioted for their long overdue salary, she squandered big sums of money in celebrating her birthdays.1 Verily had the Mughal Empire become "a child's game".2 There being no master to be feared, the nobles and zamindars grabbed what they could.3 Dismemberment going space, the term 'Empire' looked a misnomer. It had degenerated virtually into a petty tribal chiefdom, with no force of its own except that maintained by the top nobles. The new Wazir, Safdar Jang, tried to put the Empire into gear. But the Turani nobility throughout conspired against him and the Emperor himself deprived him of his confidence and pursued the ruinous policy of playing one group against the other. These exigencies obliged Safdar Jang to devise means on the one hand to weaken his opponents and on the other to seek powerful allies.4

These cross-currents of the situation provided the Jats unique opportunities to increase greatly their fortunes as well as to emphasize their Status in the contemporary politics.5 They continued to profess


1. TAH., 13b-15a, 21 a, 25a, 28b, 46b, 85b and 86a; 108; Sarkar, Fall, I, 328ff.

2. Shah, 2

3. Sarkar, Fall, I, 343, 339, 344-345, 461.

4. For details see, Srivastava, Oudh, 13 Off., Vide also Mirza Ali Azhahar, A History of the Freedom Movement (Karachi: 1957), J, 215.

6. Memoires des Jats, 31-33.


[p.130]: loyalty and yet they did not lag behind others in territorial acquisitions. In addition, they made it clear that they were not prepared to brook interference in their affairs. We shall now take up these developments.

Safdar Jang's First Expedition Against The Jats

Whereas Muhammad Shah generally pursued a policy of conciliation, his successor intially addopted a punitive attitude towards Suraj Mal and his men. His Wazir and the Mir Bakhshi took field against the Jats and though the Bakhshi had left Delhi slightly earlier,6 it was die Wazir who confronted them first. Towards the middle of November, 1749 (Zil-Hijja) 1162 A.H ), Safdar Jang moved out of Delhi, following the refusal of Suraj Mal and his protege, Balram, to vacate Faridabad, which lay in his jagir. He soon recovered Faridabad from Balram and then sent messages to Suraj Mal asking him to make over the usurped imperial territories. Suraj Mal, however, was not prepared to resign the advantages that he had endeavoured hard to gain and he began to fortify, Deeg, Kumbher and other forts to measure sword with the Wazir. Meanwhile, he addressed Safdar Jang "sometimes with promises of surrender and sometimes with threats of vengeance" . The situation was fluid when the Wazir, hearing the news of the death and defeat of Qaim Khan Bangash (12th November), hastened back to the Capital.7

Suraj Mal Defeats The Mir Bakhshi

A few weeks later the Mir Bakhshi, Salabat Khan Zulfiqar Jang, who held the governorship of Agra and Ajmer, including the faujdar of Narnaul,8 forced a foolish contest on Suraj Mal. Leaving Delhi in November, 1749 with 15 to 20 thousand men,9 Salabat was proceeding to Ajmer following an agreement between the Court and Bakht Singh (the chief of Nagor) requiring the Bakhshi to extend armed help to the latter in seizing the gaddi of Jodhpur from his nephew and the reigning King Ram Singh. In return Bakht Singh was to assist Salabat Khan in defending Agra and Ajmer against the Maratha interlopers and other local rebels.


6. TAH., 21a and 22b, A.L. Srivastava (Oudh, 141) says that Safdar Jang and Salabat Khan had entered into a understanding against Suraj Mal.

7. TAH., 22b; Chahar Guizar Shujai in Elliot, VIII, 212-213. Though its date is wrong Chahar narrates the episode in some details as against the Court history of the reign, which has obviously intermixed the events of the first with the second expedition of Safdar Jang. Despite being a contemporary work, Tarikh- i-Ahmad Shahi at places gives very short and even wrong account of the events. For instance it erroneously asserts (TAli., 27b) that the Jats did not participate in the second Afghan expedition.

8. TAH, 29a and 21a, Siyar, III, 311; cf. Sujan, 40.

9. TAH. 21b is silent about the number. Another contemporary work, Sujan Charitra, (38) seemingly puts it at 20,000, while the author of Siyar (III, 311) whose uncle was present in the Bakhshi's army, speaks of "about 15000 troops".


[p.131]: Halting at Pataudi for some time, Salabat Khan proceeded, ravaging Mewat, to The fort of Nimrana (33 miles south-west of Pataudi), which he wrested from the Jat garrison on 30th December, 1749. The Bakshi now changed his original plan and decided first to go to Agra and attack the Jats. The reversal dismayed his lieutenants who counselled him that "a quarrel with the Jat was improper" at this stage and it should be thought about only when Bakht Singh had Joined them and the Mughal troops had been heartened following their success in the Rajput expedition. But me easy success against an insgnificant garrison had inflated the Bakhshi. He disregarded their reasonable advice, recalled his advance camp and set out for Agra. The night halt was made at Sarai Sobhachand.10

Meanwhile, Suraj Mal had advanced with his forces to a nearby place, Naugaon. Herefrom he sent his Vakil to the Bakshi, entreating him not to despoil the country (Mewat) as it had been assigned to him (by Muhammad Shah)11 and he was living as a royal vassal of the Emperor. Salabat Khan, however, arrogantly rejected his petition. Demanding an explanation for killing Asad Khan, he asked Suraj Mal to pay Rupees two crores, vacate the lands of his jagir and "join the Emperor". The last demand, in the light of Suraj Mal's former affiliations with the late Qamar-ud-Din, impliedly meant that he (Suraj Mal) should break off relations with his son, Intizam-ud-Daula and his group and join the Mir Bakhshi and his friend, the Wazir instead. In the end the Bakhshi warned Suraj Mal either to accept these terms or be prepared for war.12

Suraj Mal accepted the challenge and he swiftly moved with his lieutenants (Gokul Ram, Surati Ram, Balram, Pratap Kachhwaha etc.) the Rana of Gohad and picked a force of over 6,000 horses (rest he left behind) . He divided it into five squadrons to attack and invest the Bakhshi from all sides and he overtook him on the night of 31st December, 1749. Next day (lst January, 1750) at midday hi men surrounded and harassed Salabat's troops under Fateh Ali (the same whom Suraj Mal had helped against Asad Khan, 1745) some 3 miles away from the Sarai. Ali Rustam Khan and Hakim Khan and HakimKhan Kheshgi led re-inforcements two hours-before sunset. But the Mughals could not cope with the mounted Jat matchlockmen. Pannic gripped the Bakhshi's camp. The Jats fired the volley of muskets causing heavy slaughter. Hakim Khan, the commander of the Bakhsni's right wing, was fighting on an elephant. Har Narain charged his horse upon


10. Styar, 111,311-313 SPD., XXVII, 58, XXI, 26; TAH, 21b; Sarkar, Fall, I, 306-308: cf. Sujan, 37-39.

11. cf. Supra. Ch. V, f.n 76.

12. Sujan, 39f. TAH., 21 b, says that Ishawari Singh had called in Suraj Mal's troops.


[p.132]:the elephant and killed the Khan. Ali Rustam who led the vanguard was severely wounded. The Jats achieved a singular victory. They fell upon Salabat Khan's camp and plundered it for four "gharres". The Amrr-ul- Umra was so much struck with terror that it was only the vigilance of his commanders that prevented his cowardly flight.13 At last, after two or three days of strict confinement, the helpless Bakhshi sued for terms, He sent his Vakil (probably Fateh Ali) to Suraj Mal, offering to vacate the lands he had just recovered. Jawahar Singh was then sent to the Bakhshi to dictate peace (c:4th January, 1750) on the following terms

(i)--the Bakhshi's men would refrain from cutting the 'Peepal' trees,

desecrating the temples or any other object of Hindu worship, (ii) that Suraj Mal would realize Rupees 15 lakhs from the Rajputs as the revenue of Ajmer, by personally sharing in his (Bakhshi's) Rajput expedition, provided that the latter did not proceed beyond Narnaul.14

The phenomenal encounter at Sarai Sobhachand marks a glorious stage in the career of Suraj Mal. No other Jat leader had ever before succeeded in humbling the commander-in-chief of the Mughal Empire. The material gains of this success were neglgible beyond the recapture of his former possessions in Mewat. It, however, enhance is prestige and increased his self-confidence as is evidenced by his accepting the onerous task of realizing the revenue of Ajmer. As for the Empire, the defeat of its highest military official revealed once more its rottenness to the core.

The Bakhshi had to lament his own rashness for his utter disgrace. He did not exercise due caution while embarking upon the hazardous expedition. More than one authority testifies that the contest was forced on Suraj Mal and it was "only in his own defence"15 that he had arisen to confront him. It is noteworthy that despite his being in a position to do so, Suraj Mal refrained from capturing or killing the Amir-ul-Umra. Instead he expressed his regrets over his "impertinence" and assured him of his loyalty as well.16 Undoubtedly, this humility demonstrated his practical wisdom. He attempted to assuage the wounded pride of the Bakhshi, now that his immediate object had been attained. At the same time, it symbolizes his chivalrous magnanimity towards the fallan foe. His extending of asylum later on to his arch enemy, the Wazir, Imad, furnishes another similar example.

It can be inferred from Siyar that after the contest Salabat Khan and Suraj Mal marched to Narnaul, where Bakht Singh came to know of the


13. Siyar, III, 313f; Sujan; 41-51; S.P.D., XXI, 26; XXVII, 58; TAH., 21b

14. Siyar, III, 314-315; Sujan, 51f.

15. Siyar, III, 314; S.P.D., XXVII, 58, Sujan, 40.

16. Sujan, 52; Siyar, III, 314.


[p. 133]: Bakhshi's recent understanding with Suraj Mal. His prospects in Marwar now appeared to be adversely affected by it. He, therefore, prevailed upon the Bakhshi to revert to the original plan, namely to march to Ajmer in his company. This offended Suraj Mal and he personally left his camp, leaving 5,000 horses under Jawahar Singh. His protege,the Rana of Gohad, followed him, leaving 200 horses under Fateh Singh.17

Whatever the justifications, it was perhaps a tactical lapse on the part of Salabat Khan to discard Suraj Mal in preference to Bakht Singh. It is true that both of them were largely inspired by their selfish motives. But the question was one of their relative merit, Salabat could not judge that Suraj Mal-whose superior prowess he had the occasion to taste just then - was unquestionably better to deliver the goods than the one (Bakht Singh) who himself depended upon his (the Bakhshi's) might. As it was, Salabat Khan returned a ruined man, wrapped in disgrace and bankruptcy, neither gaining victory nor money in his Rajput campaign.18 With this also ended the last attempt to retrieve the Mughal fortunes in Rajasthan.

Safdar Jang's Second Expedition Against The Jats: July, 1750

About six months later, Safdar Jang who had returned to the Capital after settling affairs at Farrukhabad, once more marched against Balram Jat. Balram had meanwhile shown more daring. His men attacked and expelled the Wazir's outpost at Shamspur near Delhi. Safdar Jang on receiving this news detached a fresh force but the miscreants refused to bow down and showed readiness for fight. Thereupon, he marched in person and spent the night near Shamspur. Here he received the news of the fomidable Pathan uprising. This , distracted him once more and he became inclined to a patch up with Jats. On the other side, Balram, getting confounded by the Wazir's arrival, had become eager for terms. A Maratha Vakil, who mediated between the two, brought Balram with his wrists bound together to the presence of the Wazir at Khizrabad (July, 1750). Safdar Jang pardoned him on his promising to become his adherent and thereby implicitly sanctioned his illegal acquisitions. The Wazir then hastened back to Delhi.19


17. Siyar, III, 315; Sujan (52) gives an interesting information here that after this campaign Suraj Mal celebrated his marriage at Mathura; SP.D., XXI, 25, 26 also 34.

18. cf Sarkar's comments (Fall, I, 357). His (Salabat Khan) subahdari of Agra and Ajmer yielded him no revenue, thanks to his fatuous policy of antagonizing the Jats, who alone could have kept that region in order. For details of Rajput expedition see Fall, I, 310ff.

19. Delhi Chronicle (R.S.L. script of Sir J.N. Sarkar's abridged trans.); TAH., 22b-23a; Qanungo, Jats, 80; Srivastava, Oudh, 147f.; cf. Memoires des Jats, 33.

Alliance Between The Wazir And Suraj Mal

[p.134]: We learn from the despatch of the Peshwa's agent that when the Wazir was yet to leave Delhi for the Bangash country, "the Jat" (Suraj Mal) in response to the former's invitation, came to the neighbourhood of Delhi. The Wazir despatched one of his officials to receive him. Then he himself followed and had a friendly parley with Suraj Mal at the tank of Krishna Das, near Khizrabad. Bidding farewell to Suraj Mal, the Nawab Wazir then returned to the Capital.20

The details of what both of these talked about are not known to us. It is, however, clear that the above parley tied them in an alliance of friendship.21 The spectacle of the imperial Wazir favouring Suraj Mal with a personal visit was indeed a unique and unprecedented honour done to any Jat leader by the highest dignitary of the realm. It demonstrated the growing importance of the Bharatpur family in the political arena of the day. Side by side it also pointed to the compulsions of the Wazir already explained, which made him go more than halfway to placate the redoubted Jat. On his part, the astute Suraj Mal obviously deemed it advantageous to come to terms and court the good-will of the Wazir. The recognition of mutual merit and the prospect of reciprocal gains thus fastened the Nawab and Suraj Mal with each other in 1750. More precisely they rather renewed and made stronger the relationship of the days of their respective uncles, Saadat Khan and Rup Singh.22

Suraj Mal And The First Afghan Expedition

Safdar Jang was worried over the recrudescence of the Afghan rebellion. He, therefore, planned an expedition and accordingly set out from Delhi (25th July, 1750). On his way he received the upsetting news of the defeat and death of his deputy, Nawal Rai. Realizing the gravity of the situation, he resolved to muster up additional troops and he sounded, among others,23 the Jats also. He sent letters to Suraj Mal (then at Sahar), urging his immediate help.24


20. S.P.D., II, 15. The date printed on this letter refers to December, 1749, which does not seem to be correct. By placing the above event after the second Ballamgarh expedition, Prof. Srivastava (Oudh 147) also doubts the printed date. Memoires des Jats, 33 confirms that "interview", but wrongly states that immediately after that Suraj Mal went to the Court.

21. Amirah, 80; Memoires des Jats, 33: Imad, 73, 85 and 94.

22. Sujan. 54 and 60.

23. D.C.; TAH.. 25b-26a; S.P.D" II, 14a; Siyar, Ill. 292; III/ad, 74; Shakir, 63; Srivastava, Oudh, 156.

24. Sujan, 54f.


[p.135]: Accordingly, Suraj Mal came to Kol to join the Wazir (c. end of July, 1750).25 According to Sujan Charitra, the Wazir sent one of his officials26 to greet the priced ally. When Suraj Mal went to pay his respects, the Wazir displayed utmost friendliness, "clasping" Suraj Mal and taking his hands into his own while talking over the new problem. Suraj Mal emphasized the need of calling in more help such as from Himmat Singh of Bhadawar. The Wazir then paid him a return visit.

Suraj Mal greeted him submitting, "We zamindars feel honoured by your visit." In course of consultations Safdar Jang urged his host to support him wholeheartedly. Assuring him of it, Suraj Mal called in troops making the number to 15,000.27 From Kol the Wazir marched to Marahara (beginning of August) where he halted for one month, awaiting fresh arrivals. At last his muster fully made up (about 70,000 men), Safdar Jang resumed his march and finally encamped near Ram Chatauni. On the other side, Ahmad Khan Bangash assisted by 20,000 of his own men and 10,000 Rohillas stood to oppose the enemy.28According to Sujan Charitra, Ahmad Khan sent his Vakil to Suraj Mal, to persuade him not to fight against him. But the latter refused to budge from his alliance with the Wazir.29

At last the fighting commenced at 9 A.M. on 13th September, 1750. Safdar Jang with most of his troops stood in the centre, while Suraj Mal commanded at the Wazir's right, nearest to the van and Ismail Khan to his left. On the other side, Ahmad Bangash, divided his troops into two parts; the first one consisting of 10,000 was deputed under Rustam Khan Afridi against the enemy, while the other under his own command was kept in hiding for a surprise attack. An interesting story goes that Rustam Khan offered to the Bangash chief that soldier (i. e. himself) should fight the soldier (i.e. Suraj Mal) and the Nawab (i.e. Ahmad Khan) should fight the Nawab (i. e. Safdar Jang).30


25. Ibid., 56; TAH., 25b; S.P.D., II, 23; Amirat, 80; Memoires des Jats, 34; Hadiqat, 174: Gulistan, 37; Gul-i-Rahmat (Litho. Agra, 1836),56.

26. Sujan (56) mentions the name of Ismail in this connection. This is wrong. The fact is that he joined Safdar Jang later at Marahara. The man in question must have been other than Ismail.

27. Sujan, 56-64. Among the notable Sardars accompanying Suraj Mal were, Balram of Ballamgarh, Balram, Gokul Ram, Mohan Ram, Surati Ram, Mansa Ram, Kripa Ram, Pratap Kachhwaha, Har Nagar Misur, Samar Singh Chandel, Chain Singh and Tilak Singh Tomar. Gulistan (37) Gul (56) and probably following these Irvine (Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhabad, J.A.S.B, 1878-79, 67) stretch the number of the Jat army to 30,000. It is wrong.

28. Srivastava, Oudh, 155-157.

29. Sujan, 69-70.

30. Irvine's Bangash Nawabs, 71.


[p.136]: The fight began with the advance of the Pathans and the boom of cannons from both sides. Suraj Mal and Ismail Khan moved forward to confront Rustam Khan. Balram Jat (of Ballamgarh) captured and implanted his guns upon a rising ground lying between the two armies. The Jat guns opened murderous fire upon the Pathans and at first repulsed them. But soon Rustam Khan with 7,000 men moved forward to reinforce his men and eventually succeeded in wresting that ground along with the guns atop. Balram and his Jats fought most vigorously but they were outnumbered and suffered heavy losses. Chain Singh, Sahib Ram and Tilak Singh Tomar were among those who perished there. At this Suraj Mal immediately sent his maternal uncle, Sukh Ram to reinforce Balram, instructing him to use arrows and firelocks instead of swords and he himself moved forward, assisted by Ismail Khan and Hipimat Khan in a semi-circular form and discharging matchlocks and arrows pounced upon the Pathans. Rustam Khan and his men fought most gallantly. But they could not cope with the enemy. Rustam Khan was killed along with six to seven thousand Pathans. On the opposite side, three to four thousand Jats perished in the process. Suraj Mal vigorously pursued the surviving enemies a long way in the direction of Aliganj and grabbed a rich booty.31 He thus scored a complete triumph in his theatre of war.32

But what Suraj Mal achieved, his master (in his own quarter) could not. This eventually changed the complexion of the campaign and spoiled the fruits of his personal exertions. We have little interest in the details of Safdar Jang's personal encounter with Ahmad Khan. Suffice it to remember that as a tactical move to boost the morale of his men, Ahmad Bangash publicized the rumour that Rustam had won the day and imprisoned Suraj Mal and his colleagues. In the circumstances, they would become the scoff of the Afridis if they failed to accomplish the same against the enemy pitted against, that is, the Wazir,33 The Afghans now made a determined rush upon the Wazir, who, by detaching reinforcements to the pursuers, had dangerously weakened his position. To make matters worse, the generals placed in the vanguard, such as Rao Bahadur Singh, Mir Baqa, Kamghar Khan Billoch and Sher Jang (most of whom were in treacherous collusion with the enemy) fled from the battle-field. The Afghans, taking fullest advantage of Safdar's helplessness, attacked him from two sides. A severe bullet shot drowned the Wazir in


31. Qanungo (Jats, 81) thinks that Suraj Mal occupied Farrukhabad.

32. For Suraj Mal's part see Sujan, 72-90; Siyar, 1II, 295; Imad, 74; Hadiqat, 171 and 174; TAH., 26b; Amirat, 80-81; S.P.D., II, 23, 21 also 20; Gulistan 38f.; Gul, 57f; Memoires des Jats, 34; Irvine, Bangash Nawabs, 71, 72 and 84; also Shakir, 63-64.

33. Imad, 73; Gulistan, 38; Gul, 58; Irvine, Bangash Nawabs, 72.


[p.137]: his houda. Completely beaten, he was somehow led out of the field into safety at Marahara enroute to Delhi.34

When the triumphant Suraj Mal returned from the chase of the Afridis he heard of Safdar Jang's defeat and flight. He stayed for a while at the grove of 'Palash' trees. Understandably this caused anxiety to Ahmad Bangash and he forbade his men to move towards the Jats. Suraj Mal himself was equally anxious about the Afghan movements. Hence, he left the field and spending the night on the bank of the river Kali, he went back to his horne.35

Jats And The Court Politics Between The Two Afghan Expeditions

Misfortune never comes alone. The defeat at Ram Chatauni eventually plunged Safdar Jang into a triangle of troubles. Besides involving him in deep disgrace and inevitable mental agony, this, in its wake, created a potential danger for the security of his dominions, now defenceless. His victorious enemies overran and occupied their considerable parts, making a bid for the rest. To make matters worse, this also provided a golden opportunity to his Court adversaries. Javed Khan, Udham Bai and Intizam, with the connivance of the Emperor, devised schemes for attaching his property and mansion and also for overthrowing him from the Wizarat in favour of the old claiment, Intizam-ud-Daula.36

The available evidence shows that amidst this deep predicament his thoughts turned hopefully to his trusted and powerful ally, Suraj Mal. Memoires des Jats states that "after giving him the honour of putting him (Suraj Mal) among his children, he (Safdar Jang) sent him off (promised) many more licences for land (fagirs)" and granted him "other similar favours" to fasten Suraj Mal "more strongly and to assure himself of his assistance" on a foreseeable occasion.37 Memoires is a later work, but the points emphasized by it find their endorsement in others including the contemporary sources, as well.38

Even after giving due allowance to the element of political cleverness on the part of the Wazir, there remains much in what we have seen above to suggest his increasing dependence upon Suraj Mal for his enterprises and in the same proportion Suraj Mal's share in the political transactions of the day.


34. For details see Srivastava. Oudh, 160-162.

35 Sujan, 91. It claims that in a momentary flush of anger Suraj Mal thought of re-attacking the Pathans. Also Gulistan, 39; Irvine, Bangash Nawabs, 75.

36. For details see Srivastava, Oudh, 163-164.

37. Memoires des Jats, 34.

38. TAL, 108; (for assignment of the jagirs only); Tawarikh-i-Hunud 21 b-22a; Also Siyar. 92.


[p.138]: However, as Safdar Jang strengthened his alliance of friendship with Suraj Mal, his Court opponents conspired to undermine it in a like manner. The intriguing Javed Khan used Suraj Mal's ambitious son, Jawahar Singh (restless over what he thought the long governance of his father) as his tool for the purpose. He summoned Jawahar Singh and presented him to the Emperor. Jawahar was granted the title of "Rai" and other "favours?"39 which usually were shown to "most honoured people" and befittingly should have been conferred on his father or the reigning grand- father instead. Having been "filled up with highest hopes", Jawahar Singh was presently dismissed till it was planned when and how to exploit him to weaken the strength of his father and in a corresponding degree that of Safdar Jang, who was the ultimate object of this game.40 In a way this incident was the precursor of Javed's promptings to Balram Jat, two years later.41

The Jats And The Second Afghan Expedition

But Javed Khan could not cash this tendentious favour to the lucky Jat as presently he himself climbed down for a bribe of Rupees 70 lakhs and thus got Safdar Jang pardoned and re-installed on the Wizarat. Safdar Jang now seriously planned for avenging his defeat, the thoughts of which had kept him occupied ever since his return. Ismail Beg, Raja Lakshmi Narain, Raja Nagar Mal and Suraj Mal and others were called in and after consulations to acquire the Maratha help as well was decided upon. Safdar Jang promised to pay Rupees twenty five thousand (or thirty five thousand) and rupees fifteen thousand a day for the Maratha and the Jat armies respectively. Necessary preparations having been made, the Wazir resumed his march. On reaching Agra, he detached 20,000 Marathas against Shadil Khan (the Bangash governor of Kol and Jalesar) while the rest of the army, including the Jats, marched towards Farrukhabad. The Maratha contingent overpowered and put to flight Shadil Khan's small force at Qadirganj (c. 20th March, 1751).42


39. Memoires des Jats, 34; Sujan, 5. It adds that Ahmad Shah granted him the right of Naubat also. Whether or not any mansab was given to Jawahar Singh on that occasion has not been specified by the above sources. We, however, learn from Delhi Chronicle that Jawahar Singh retained one of 3000 zat and 2500 horse when shortly afterwards (March, 1751) it was raised to 4000 zat and 3500 horse.

40. Memoires des Jats, 34-35.

41. TAH., 39a ff.

42. Siyar, III, 304-305; Amirat, 83; Sujan, 92; S.PD., [I, 32, XXVI, 176; Majma- ul-Akhbar in Elliot VlII, 362; Irvine Bangash Nawabs, 83 and 86; Srivastava, Oudh, 176, 179-180; [bra/nama by Khair-ud-Din Muhammad Allahabadi (My own extract Micro Film copy from Sr. Mus. Or. 1932), l5a. TAH. 27b is wrong in its assertion that Safdar lang did not take the Jats with him that time.


[[p.139]: On hearing about it, Ahmad Bangash raised the siege of Allahabad, rushed to his Capital and entrenched himself at Fatehgarh. Here he worsted a Maratha contingent under Gangadhar Tantia. Meanwhile, Safdar Jang accompanied by the Marathas and the Jats reached the spot and besieged Fatehgarh from three sides except the east. Daily skirmishes took place at the fort but with no decisive gain to either side. When the siege had dragged on for over a month Sadulla Khan with his Rohilla re-inforcement of 12,000 came to the riverside (Ganga) opposite Fatehgarh. Here-from he sent a message to Ahmad Bangash boasting that next day he would bring in the heads of Safdar Jang, Suraj Mal and the Maratha generals.

His approach caused some anxiety to the Wazir and he called Suraj Mal, Malharrao Holkar and Jayappa Scinde for consultation. The decision taken was that Sadulla Khan be prevented from effecting a junction with the Bangash troops across the river. Accordingly, the Marathas under Khanderao and Tantia and the Jats under Jawahar Singh and Rana Bhim Singh (of Gohad) moved forward and crossing the river at Singirampur, they attacked Sadulla Khan's van under Bahadur Khan. The latter fought bravely but could not cope with the Marathas charging him from one side and the Jats from the other. Ultimately he was defeated and killed. Ten to twelve thousand Afghans were either slain or wounded (April, 1751). Bahadur Khan's rout changed the complexion of the campaign. Sadulla, now growing fearful, fled to Amla. Hearing of his flight, Mahmud Khan Bangash also lost heart and hurried across the river to his father at Fatehgarh. Jawahar Singh might have intercepted him effectively but for the objection of Bhim Singh of Gohad who was friendly to the Bangash family. Meanwhile, the Marathas and the Jats, who now commanded the northern side of the Ganga, set ablaze Sadulla Khan's camp. Already disheartened, now the sight of its high flames completely unnerved Ahmad Bangash and the fort garrison. During the same night he left the fort and fled across the Ganga towards Amla. With the Marathas and the Jats pursuing the fugitives closely, their flight while crossing the river at Shikarpur presented a pathetic sight. Many of them either fell to the enemy or were drowned in the river. Next morning (19th April) Fatehgarh was occupied by the victors. Hereafter, the approaching rains brought a lull in the fighting and Safdar Jang went to Lucknow. But the Marathas remained busy ravaging the Afghan country and in the process they amassed huge plunder.43


43. Siyar, Ill, 305-307; Shakir, 84; Sujan, 93-95 (Hereafter it ignores the course of operations in Rohilkhand. May be its author accompanied most of the Jats back home following the suspension of the campaign (cf. Qanungo. Jats, 83), Suraj Mal, however, stayed on till the end); Irvine, Bangash Nawabs, 87-100 (His figures putting Jats at 40,000 seems over stretched); Srivastava, Oudh-180-l85.


[p.140]: After the rains Safdar Jang came back and in November, 1751 commenced the desultory and drawn-out warfare in Rohilkhand. Barring sporadic rebuffs, the imperialists on the whole kept pressure on and the allied Afghans were pushed into the Tarai of the Kamayun Hills. The Wazir and his allies encamped within six miles of the Afghan entrenchment at Chilkea. Skirmishes and artillery duel between the opponents continued but without any decisive results. The difficult terrains, the inaccessible forests, the stream of water around the Afghan encampment and the increasing indifference of the Marathas - the biggest partners - towards an enterprise now that promised little booty, hindered the imperialists. Both the Holkar and Suraj Mal attempted in vain to discover a way of entrance into the Afghan positions. Meanwhile, the Wazir was getting impatient. He expressed his disapproval of the allies not being able to advance during the past two months. At last the valiant Rajender Giri Gosain came forward to attack the enemy entrenchments (under Najib Khan and others). But Jayappa treacherously passed on his plans to Ahmad Bangash and this largely contributed to the Gosain's subsequent defeat. Meanwhile, the news of the coming of the Abdali worried the Emperor (at Delhi) and he ordered the Wazir to make peace with the Pathans and repair the Capital. Safdar Jang himself had no other alternative. So he terminated the war now in progress for over a year and made peace with the Afghans (April, 1752). Thereafter, he proceeded to Lucknow to restore administration there and the Marathas to Qannauj, while Suraj Mal apparently went back to his home.44

Thus ended the expedition in favour of Safdar Jang. His overall gains were, however, more apparent than real. Both his allies earned him good success in its first place but none of them proved so effective in the concluding one. Specially at Chilkea even the Maratha hordes failed to accomplish anything. They, in fact, played double game and manipulated the expedition in such a way as to emerge the real gainers,45 whereas Safdar Jang achieved little more than a hollow gratification of humbling his enemies. Success at Chilkea eluded Suraj Mal as well, but he served his master faithfully throughout in proportion to his available strength.46


44. Irvine, Bangash Nawabs; 108-122; Srivastava, Oudh, 185-189. The following sources describe the above event without tracing the role of the Jats. TAH. 27b- 28b; Imad, 86ff.; Gulistan, 40-44; Gul, 62-66; Shakir, 64; Hadiqat, 175.

45. Srivastava, Oudh, 190.

46. Siyar, IV, 29; Ma;ma-ul-Akhbar in Elliot, V 1/1, 362; Dow's assertion (The History of Hindustan, II, 322) that instead of helping, Suraj Mal frustrated the Wazir, is baseless.


End of Chapter VII - The Rising Importance of the Jats in the Imperial Affairs--(I) (1749-1753)

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