The Jats - Their Role in the Mughal Empire/Chapter VI
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Jat Policy And Implications Of The Emergence Of Jat Kingdom
[p.119]: It has been noticed in the preceding chapter that gradually by 1756, Suraj Mal extended his hold over large parts of the province of Agra and some parts of Delhi. The area under his control was worth Rupees one crore which amounted to nearly one eighth of the total revenue, but most of it was never paid to the royal exchequer since long.1 It is apparent that at a time when the Empire had miserably shrunk, the Jat usurpations between the two Capitals (Delhi and Agra) inflicted a big territorial and financial loss upon it. The loss it suffered in terms of prestige was also great, indeed. Side by side, the Jat daring must have also emboldened others to commit aggression. The Jats thus had their share in aggravating the malady of the Empire.2
However, it would not be fair to view the Jat expansion as an isolated event. It has to be examined dispassionately in the general context of the Empire as a whole. All repercussions of the Jat encroachments conceded, the pertinent questions remain whether the Emperor retained any effective grip over the Jat areas during the period commencing from 1739, which coincided with the major part of the Jat expansion; could he have staved off other aggrandizing powers in case Badan Singh had kept his hands off; if not, to what extent the Jat aggression by itself inflicted the real as against the ostensible loss upon him. This leads us to recollect the prevailing situation, which was characterized by the indolence and frivolity of Muhammad Shah, self- aggrandizement and insane jealousy of the nobles, administrative and financial breakdown and military impotence. Shakir's couplet meaning - the house goes desolate if its master behaves like a child3 -applies with
1. TAH., 2b; Shah, 2; Sarkar, Fall, II, 33.
2. Memoires des Jats, I; Also Shah, 2.
3 Shakir, 89.
[p.120]: as much aptness to Muhammad Shah and his ministers as to their immediate successors. Inactive and indifferent as ever, even the horrible experience of Nadir's invasion did not make the Emperor any wiser. He failed to appreciate that, to rule, something more was needed than getting sunk in the embrace of the harem beauties or sports and pastime and that it is only the hand armed with the sword that commands fear and authority. This neglect on the part of the ruler was speedily taken advantage of by all his nobles. With a few exceptions, the faujdars of every sarkar and the subeders of every province "refused to pay the revenue on khalisa and jagir-lands". Instead they now merely "sent gifts and presents to the Court."4 Nay more, some of the imperial governors like Nizam-ul-Mulk, Safdar Jang and Aliwardi Khan set up their semi-independent rule in their respective provinces and thereby encouraged others to defy the Emperor's authority under the cloak of loyalty, so much so that "proud and haughty of every region raised their heads"5, and "every zamindar became a Raja and every Raja a Maharaja."6
The suba of Agra was very much within the same Empire. Of the Khalisa parganas that continued to send revenue even after Nadir's invasion, were a few situated near Agra, which the Jat chief grabbed during the worsening anarchy.7 But if we keep the general trend in view, it would appear that except the above parganas the rest of the areas passing under the Jat control after 1739, must also have ceased to remit revenue. By implication it means that as a result of the Jat expansion' as such the real financial loss to the imperial treasury would not have been as much the statistics might lead us to believe. And if some expelled officials happened to pay something casually to it or to offer gifts, similar instances are not altogether wanting in case of the Jat usurpers either.8 Likewise, the comparative ease with which Suraj Mal expanded himself, suggests that as an upshot of the breakdown of the Emperor's authority, his neighbourhood had been practically reduced to a 'no man's land and whosoever possessing the requisite strength would have occupied it. That this was partly due to his policies and doings is not as relevant in this context as the manifest impotence of the Mughal government. And weakness invariably invites aggression. Few would deny that irrespective of the Jats, in this state of affairs, the impoverished and crumbling empire would not have succeeded in
4. TAH., 2b-3b; Jallhar-i-Samsam In Elliot, VIII, 73; Memoires des Jats, 29-30.
5. Juuhor-t-Samsam in Elliot, VIII, 73; TAH 3a-3b.
6. Supra p.74; Rustam Ali in Elliot VIII, 60
7. The remnant were seized by Najib-ud-Daulah, Imad and the Rajputs, TAL., 28; TAH , 2b-3a; Sarkar, Fall, II, 35.
8. Infra. pp. 109, 201 ff, TAL., 330.
[p.121]: keeping Agra under its folds, more so in view of the ambitions of Jai Singh as well as the Marathas. Having wrested Malwa, Gujrat and Orissa and overrun Bengal, Bihar and parts of Rajasthan and Agra the encroaching Marathas now threatened to devour the territories in Agra.9 Super-session of the Mughal authority here thus looked only a question of time and so far as the overall interests of the Empire were concerned it did not matter who the aggressor was.
As it was, seeing the writing on the wall, the calculating Badan Singh, cleverly availed himself of opportunities for expansion and thereby forestalled the rest in the fray. In doing so he conformed to the all-pervading spirit of the age, which he lived in. The Jesuit Father aptly remarks, "none of these two (Suraj Mal and Pratap Singh) could act otherwise", that is, contrary to what he terms, "The maxim of the (whole) country".10 The irony was that for their own considerations the governor of Agra (Jai Singh) and the imperial Wazir themselves heartened him in his defiant objectives. What part the former and his deputy played we have already noted. As to the Wazir, Qamar-ud-Din, either through suppleness or heavy presents, Badan Singh and Suraj Mal procured his support and he espoused their cause like that of Ali Muhammad Rohilla. If and when any complaints were taken to the Court, the "great advocate of the Jats" (The Wazir) would silence them by "pointing out a lot about what Badan Singh had done (for the sake of the Empire)" and insisting that "it was for the reputation of the Empire to have zamindarsas powerful as the Jats, who could serve (in future also) well in moments of necessity. Such was the judgement of a minister on such a delicate affair of such consequence, lamented Wendel.11 The attitude of the Wazir and the government had to thank itself directly for propping up the nascent Jat power. Incidentally, the fact that Qamar-u-Din and Jai Singh represented the rival factions at the Court12 and yet Badan Singh and Suraj Mal succeeded in having their backing simultaneously may give an insight into the working of the initial Jat policy towards the Mughal government. In humouring the rival factions they obviously calculated to ward off possible opposition,13 although as they struck roots of their own became confident to face any eventuality.14
Suraj Mal provided peace and security
However, harmful to the Empire, Suraj Mal provided the Jat areas with a measure of peace and security from predatory raids and
9. Irvine, Later Mughals, II, 275.
10. Memores des Jats. 29.
11 . Memoires des Jots, 19, 31 and 20.
12. It is noteworthy here that both these held opposite views with regard to the Maratha problem.
13. Shah, 2.
14. Memoires des Jats, 27.
[p.122]:administrative oppression15 is as the irresolute and imbecile Emperors had latterly ceased to guarantee. He accomplished it at a time when the Marathas were repeatedly ravaging the major part of the Empire. Suraj Mal thus appeared to be timely safeguarding his people from possible ruin. This implies that the instincts of self preservation16 also guided his distinct ambition, which was in no mean measure sustained by the imperial government itself. If contrast has any relevance in sober history, it is manifest in the present context. Comparative fate of the Delhi government and the local people as a whole can be visualized if we suppose that instead of the Bharatpur rulers the ever squeezing and formidable Marathas --who did feel sour about Agra being not under them17-had entrenched themselves here and thereby permanently brought their peril so dangerously close to the imperial metropolis.
New aspect of the Jat policy under Suraj Mal
A new aspect of the Jat policy under Suraj Mal was that unlike his predecessors (excluding of course Badan Singh) he never repudiated in theory the Mughal suzerainty, and remaining always on the side of the Emperor and his ministers, participated in his military operations. This as much reflected the prevailing tactics as his own expediency and conviction. We know that all the ambitious personages of the day including the pillars of the state such as the Nizam, Saadat Khan, Sarbuland Khan, Aliwardi Khan, Najib-ud-Daula and Imad-ul-Mulk either established their own independent rule or usurped the crown lands, and yet they were never tired of calling themselves the loyal servants of the Emperor. Similarly, Suraj Mal, even though he seized extensive areas always styled himself as the old and loyal servant of the Emperor.18 Such loud professions (on the part of the contemporaries) lacked sincerity. They, in fact, make a depressing reading. However, the only redeeming aspect of the Jat claim was that Suraj Mal showed himself willing to serve faithfully the Emperor19 in all his ventures, save those endangering his local position.
In addition, he, unlike Imad and the Marathas, refrained from outraging the royal dignity and also, like Najib, never did he enter into collusion with an alien foe. That all this he did to procure the formal ratification of his territorial gains is apparent.20 But that undermeath it also lay an intention for the Empire to survive as a balancing factor in the contemporary political situation, can hardly be denied. Despite all his ambitions, Suraj Mal for one, never desired the extinction of the Mughal authority.21 All these aspects merit our attention
15. Supra. 99-110; Bharatpur, Jai Singh. 103.
16. Memotres des Jats, 29.
17. Raghunath Rao's letter. S.P.D., II, 84.
18. Sujan, 14,40, 52, 55; M.U., I, 440, 441; Tankh-i-Bharatpur, 4b.
19. Suraj Mal's statement in Sujan, 60.
20. Sarkar, Fall, II, 431, footnote.
21. Infra, 173-174ff.
[p.123]: while assessing the overall implications of the Jat policy and the emergence of the Bharatpur State.
Jat Participation In The Imperial Affairs
Having surveyed the Jat policy towards the Empire and vice versa, we may now turn to the Jat participation in the imperial affairs. We have already noted that Suraj Mal was assigned the guardianship of the imperial highways between Agra, Delhi and Jaipur and also the lease of a part of Mewat. It appears that Khema Jat was also granted some office befitting his status.22 Barring these three instances of a different nature the rest of the references pertaining to the Jats relate to their sharing in several campaigns23 fought during this period (extending upto 1749). The first information about Suraj Mal's movements refers to the time of Peshwa Baji Rao's sudden dash upon Delhi (March, 1737). But it is both ambiguous and insufficient. The Marathi letters tell us that Suraj Mal lay emcamped with 5000 troops in Urabag at Agra, probably to join the incoming Saadat Khan and Qamar-u-Din against the Marathas. Though it is not specified, it appears that later he marched in the vanguard of Saadat Khan's army.24 On the other side, the Peshwa deluding the Mughal forces and passing through the west of Deeg,25 rushed to Delhi and created panic there. It may be reasonably inferred from Iqbalnama that the Maratha movements in general, and the march of Baji Rao in particular, caused deep concern to Suraj Mal and his men.26 Of late they had their own grievances, against the encroaching
22. Tawar ikh-i-Hunud (20b) claims that Khema was granted the governorship of Agra by the Emperor (presumably Muhammad Shah). Its only basis that it seems to be assigning for the favour is the pleasure of the Emperor over the Jat's skill in killing tigers by wrestling. It is, however, ridiculous to presume that such a dignified office could be conferred on such a trifling ground. Moreover, this is not corroborated by contemporary sources either. Hence, it cannot be regarded as historically accurate. It is likely that Fransoo mistook some inferior office for governorship.
23. Muhammad Khan Bangash, in one of his despatches (Vide letter quoted by Irvine, Later Mughals, II, 233-234) covering his campaigns in Bundelkhand during 1727- 1728, refers to a certain 'Jat' who joined the Bundelas against him. The Jats and the Marathas have been described by him as the "brethren" of the Bundelas. Which Jats are meant herein, has not been specified. We know that Churaman II had allied with the Bundelas. But we have no information about Suraj Mal ever helping or receiving any aid from Bundelas. Besides an alliance against the Emperor stood opposed to his professed loyalty to him. Suraj Mal was too astute a man to have provocated the Mughals for nothing. He had little interest in the affairs of the far off Bundelkhand. It leaves the impression that the Jats in question were other than under his following. May it be Muhkam Singh, the desperate ally seeker or some other local chieftain that is referred to by Muhammad Bangash.
24. SP.D., XXX, 196, XV, 20, 29 also see 37, 47, 22.
25. Rust am, 529.
26. Iqbal, 157.
[p.124]: Marathas. Remaining south of the Chambal till 1732, they later carried their activities across the river upto a few miles from Agra. Their bands roamed along the countryside, fleecing the people and plundering the villages. They imposed arbitrary dues and failing that despoiled Jatwara (a name used in the Marathi despatches, to denote the region roughly from Gohad to Chhata), Bhadawar and other places. Thus, we learn from a news report how about 1735 the greedy myriads "ate up supplies to a grain" in Jatwara; impliedly subjecting the local populace to severe hardships.27 Now with Baji Rao's march through the heart of their territories, the Maratha danger appeared to have been veritably carried to their doors. This naturally generated reaction among the Jats. It cannot be said with certainty, whether or not they stood for renewed concerted move against the Marathas. But Jai Singh, who was in collusion with the invaders,28 hushed up the Jats and the latter at this stage could not afford to antagonize the Raja for reasons already explained.29 It is these undercurrents that lqbalnama seems to be alluding to. The Jat reaction, though primarily born of the instinct of self-preservation, tended in the right direction. The interests of the Empire demanded a converted and bold stand against the increasing Maratha danger. This was, however, not forthcoming.30
Jat troops accompanied the Mughal army to Bhopal
Next, the Jat troops accompanied the Mughal army to Bhopal, where they gave a good account of themselves in an otherwise abortive fight against Baji Rao on December 9, 1737. The Peshwa's march to Delhi had terrified Muhammad Shah and he summoned Nizam-ul-Mulk to the Court and ordered him to expel the Marathas from Malwa and Bundelkhand. Asaf Jah then moved out with an army and the Jats under Pratap Singh also joined him along with several other contingents. The opposite army met at Bhopal. The Nizam, though a renowned and experienced general, displayed over-cautiousness, which proved to be his undoing. Instead of outright attacking the Marathas, he entrenched himself in the neighbourhood of the fort of Bhopal, with the tank on his
27. S.P.D., XIV. 52, XV, 4,8, 10-13, 15,47,89.
28. S.P.D., XIV, 47, 31, 39, XV, 89; Raghubir Singh, Malwa, 266, 279; Sarkar, Fall, I, 257-259; G.H. Khare, "Some New Records on the Maratha-Jaipur Relations", I.H.R.C., XIV (1948); For a discordant note see Satish Chandra, 'Raja Jai Singh Sawai's Contribution to Imperial Politics', Proc. 1. H. C., 1948.
29. Supra, cs. V, f.n.s. 47-62.
30. It is interesting to note that side by side, some Jats were busy gratifying their lust for money. Thus, we learn that the Jats of Mitrol, a village between Palwal and Hodal, plundered the baggage of the Amir-Ul-Umra and Muhammad Khan while they were on return march to the Capital. Thereupon the royal troops sacked that village and set it ablaze Rustam, 543; Elliot (VIII, 55) in his translation of Rustarn's extracts, mistakenly writes Kodal for Hodal.
[p.125]: back and a nallalh on his front. He thereby allowed himself to be besieged and harassed by the Marathas. On 14th December (3rd Ramzan) he detached the Jats and the Rajputs to move forward and offer a battle to the enemy. Ranoji Scinde and other advanced from the other side and the fight that ensued both sides suffer losses. None could, however, gain any decisive advantage. Twelve days later when the Nizam suddenly turned towards Bhopal, the Marathas fell upon his rear. It was the Jats who bore the brunt of this surprise attack. As they grappled with the advancing Maratha columns, the Mughal artillery opened fire, and the Nizam managed his way to the fort. The Marathas, thereafter, completely invested the fort and at last the Nizam was forced to sign a humiliating peace (of Duraha Sarai, 6th January, 1738), practically ceding Malwa to the Marathas.31
Incidentally, the above two events may help in rectifying a lapse, namely that it was 1748 or 1749 that the Jats and the Marathas confronted each other for the first time.32
Jats helped the Mughals against Nadir Shah in Battle of Karnal
Next, the Jats helped the Mughals against Nadir Shah. Living upto their reputation to oppose foreign invaders, they marched to Karnal (February, 1739) to resist the Persian invader. Both Badan Singh and Suraj Mal advanced up to south of Delhi where they stayed to watch the developments but despatched a contingent which was placed under Rao Kripa Ram, the Vakil of Jai Singh. On the battlefield, the Jats were posted to the right of the Emperor in the division of the Amir-ul-Umra.33 But the man (Kripa Ram), who was to lead them, was a chicken-hearted fellow and he fled in the face of the relentless fire of the Persian artillery.34 The cowardly flight of the leader must have demoralized the remaining troops, including the Jats and they apparently followed suit.
Following the crushing defeat and utter humiliation of Muhammad Shah and his surviving grandees, the Capital, now defenceless, experienced the grasping tyranny of the victors of Karnal. Indulging in sack, rape and massacre, they created panic and intense commotion in
31. Sujan, 5, 212. It is, however, wrong in assigning victory to the Nizam and Pratap Singh. In its passing reference of this event, the only fact is the gallantry displayed by the Jats. S.P.D., XV, 58, 59, XXX, 207, XXII, 368, 369; Raj, VI, 117; Brahmendra Swami Charitra, 33-36, 116, 134, referred to by Raghubir Singh, Malwa, 287-294; Bhatnagar, Jai Singh, 155; M. U., (I, 441) seems to suggest that it was Muhkam Singh who sent "one of his relatives" to Bhopal. This is misleading Y. Husain (The First Nizam, 178-181) has somehow over-looked the Jat participation in this battle.
32. Qanungo, Jats, 87: Hari Ram Gupta (ed.) Marathas and Panipat (Chandigarh, 1961),45; Pande, Bharatpur. 57.
33. Mirza Zaman's Journal, quoted by Fraser, Nadir Shah, 81; Iqbal, 186, 174.
34. Iqbal, 186; Peshwa Baji Rao's letter, S.P.D .. XV, 71.
[p.126]:the city. The passages of the Capital were blockaded and the city granaries sealed up by the order of Nadir Shah. As a result, grain became exceedingly dear and scare and famine gripped the city. Not only Delhi but also the villages around upto several miles felt the atrocious touch of the arms of the Persian invaders.35
Badan Singh and Suraj Mal helped the distressed
It was during these excesses that the Jat chief, Badan Singh, and his son, Suraj Mal, then encamping in the neighbourhood of Delhi, helped the distressed a lot. An eyewitness tell us, "Thana Rai (?) and Badel Singh Jat, the zamindar of Chitwarh (?)36 have stationed themselves assisted by the gallant Jats upto Sarai of Bakhtiar Khan while the Chowki of Nadir Shah does not extend beyond the tank of Kishan Das."37 As S. H. Askari suggests,38 Badan Singh's encampment with a "gallant" force displayed an attitude of "resistance", even though the above writer does not specify whether or not any engagement occurred between Badan Singh and the roving Qizilbash bands. However, we do have a definite proof of Badan Singh's (and impliedly also of Suraj Mal's) exertions for ameliorating the distress of the victims of Nadir's cruelty. The sad plight of the people of the Capital deeply stirred the feelings of the compassionate Jat. The author of Iqbalnama I adds:
- "He (Badan Singh) ordered that whosoever came from those environs, (the Capital) to his side would find refuge and shelter under his protection and none was to interfere with any such body. Consequently, many people stricken with misfortune and having been pillaged, plundered and ruined came and were taken
care of and treated kindly with favours, each according to his own condition and circumstances. Many people who had gone to Faridabad to bring grains received protecting guards, which escorted them safely. In this situation a world of people became busy in bringing grains and food (which came under heavy fire from the Persians) from that direction and the rates rose (sic.) from two seers to five and six seers."39
35. Fraser, Nadir Shah, 97-110; Anand Ram Mukhlis, in Elliot, VIII, 88-91; Iqbal, 203-209; Sarkar in Later Mughals, II, 364ff.
36. It is difficult to identify "Chitwarh". There is one place of a similar name called Chitwar, about 4 miles south of Hathras. Same is the case with "Thana Rai" also. It may be a mistake for Suraj Mal who was encamped south of Delhi, where from had passed Babu Rao Malhar as a fugitive from Karnal, Raj., VI. 131.
37. An Anonymous Journal of Nadir Shah's Transactions in India. trans. S.H Askari entitled. 'A Contemporary Correspondence Describing the Events at Delhi at the Time of Nadir Shah's Invasion; in Proc. I.H.C., X (\947), 366
38. Askari, op.cil., Introduction, in Proc. 1.H.e., (1947), 358.
39. Iqbal, 210; TAL. 166; On this occasion Rao Bahadur Singh of Kharisa (perhaps Ghasira) played a role nearly similar to that of Badan Singh, Iqbal, 197.
Jats had grown into a first rate military power
[p.127]: It has been noticed in the preceding chapter that by seventeen forties the Jats had grown into a first rate military power. The reputation of Suraj Mal as a skillful commander and his Jats as gallant fighters spread far and wide and "there came repeated solicitations for his sword from the highest in the land."40 Reference has already been made of their participation in the Battle of Gangwana (1741). Next the Bharatpur troops accompanied Muhammad Shah and Safdar Jang in the Rohilla expedition (May, 1745). 'Memoires des Jats' is the only source referring to the Jat participation in it. But even this does not enlighten us any more beyond speaking of their heroic fight (in that otherwise shameful campaign) and rating that as "the most honoured of all their exploits (until then)". It adds that after the termination of this campaign, the Emperor granted a 'seropa' to Suraj Mal. This expedition, however, inglorious for the Mughal army, added to the popularity of Suraj Mal and he was now poised for a bigger role.41, XVIII
About six months later in Agahan, Samvat 1802 (28th October to 27th November, 1745), Suraj Mal extended help to Fateh Ali (son of Sabit Khan, the governor of Aligarh) against Asad Khan Khanahzad, the agent42 of Saadat Khan, the fourth Bakshi of Muhammad Shah. Asad Khan with 10,000 men issued from Delhi and subsequently seized parts of the paternal estates of Fateh Ali in Aligarh district. This alarmed Fateh Ali and through his Vakil he supplicated Suraj Mal (then on a hunting excursion at Noh, a place beside the Yamuna) for help. Later Fateh Ali personally met him at Ikhu with the request and discussed the plans for the proposed campaign. It looks almost certain that the possibility of his own local interest being affected by Asad's movements also influenced his decision to espouse the cause of Fateh AIi. The opposite troops met in the neighbourhood of Chandos (16 miles from Aligarh), where, in a swift action Suraj Mal completely routed and killed Asad Khan putting his soldiers to flight. They were given a hot chase upto 7 miles and large booty fell into the hands of the Jat pursuers. Suraj Mal sent Jawahar Singh to Kol and he himself returned to Sahar to meet his father.43 Incidentally Suraj Mal's fight against Asad Khan was destined to create some trouble for him a few years later.
40. Sarkar, Fall, II, 434: Tarikh-i-Bharatpur, 4b; Sujan, II; Memoires des Jats, 30.
41. Memoires des Jats, 30-31, Sarkar, Fall, II, 434; For details or this expedition see Sarkar, Fall, I, 57ff.,
XVIII. also Sujan, 16-26; Bharatpur Gazetteer, 63.-Fditor.
42. Sarkar, Fall, I, 309, 341; Sujan; the only source to have described this campaign, does not specify the mutual relationship between the two. It, however, suggests Salabat Khan's deep interest in Asad Khan. Sujan, 40.
43. Sujan, 9-24; Suraj Mal earlier humbled certain Sultan Khan(?) (Sujan, 10)
[p.128]: As in Karnal so in Manupur, a Jat contingent served the Mughal army against another foreign invader, Ahmad Shah. Unfortunately, the part played by the Jats in the Battle of Manupur (March, 1748) has not been elucidated by Murtaza Husain, the only historian who has cared to mention this significant and hitherto unknown fact.44
We may notice here briefly a brilliant feat achieved by the Jats in course of the fraternal feud between Raja Ishwari Singh and Madho Singh, although, being the internal affair of Jaipur, it does not lie within the scope of our subject. Ishwari Singh appealed to Suraj Mal for help when confronted by the hostile and formidable combination of seven confederated States. Responding to his call, Suraj Mal and his 10,000 gallant Jat soldiers fully justified the trust reposed in them. In the Battle of Bagru (1st week of August, 1748) Suraj Mal displayed, what K.R. Qanungo calls, "superhuman valour" by defeating the Marathas, under Malharrao Holkar, opposed to him, although taking as whole, the campaign ultimately went against the Jaipur Raja.45
The Marathas Dun The Jats For Tribute
An interesting feature of this period, not emphasized so far, was the beginning of the Maratha pressure for arbitrary dues on the Jats. The available evidence suggests that right from the seventeen thirties the Marathas visited the Jat country to levy tribute. Failing in that they resorted to their eternal practice of plunder. In 1736, a Maratha Sardar wrote of his resolve to proceed to Bhadawar and the Jatwara for the same, although, he apprehended that "there is little (prospect of collecting) money on way to Delhi across the Chambal."46. About the same time, Baji Bhimrao unsuccessfully tried to put apparentry the Jats Of the environs of Gohad under tribute47 In time, as the frequency of the Maratha movements in the north increased, the Jats felt added pressure of their extortionate demands. In 1748, Yashwantrao Pawar and Ram Chandra entered the Jatwara to settle the terms with "the Jat".48 In April next year, another Maratha army issued from Datia and ravaging the countryside and realizing tribute from the Rana of Narwar, it came to the environs of Agra. Suraj Mal sent his Vakil to the Marathas, but at the same time also prepared himself for resistance. Eventually, Damodar Mahadev went to the Jat and made some settlement regarding the money matters.49
44. Hadiqat, 135.
45. Sujan, 2nd Jang; Qanungo, Jats, 67ff., Sarkar, Fall, I, 239ff.
46. S.P.D., XIV, 54, XXX, 196.
47. Ibid., XIV, 52.
48. Ibid., XXVII, 34.
49. Ibid., XXVII, 42, 43, 44, 46, 53, 54; S.PD. New Series, I, 103.