Jat Maratha Relations

Wikified by Laxman Burdak, IFS (R)

Note: This article is copy of Chapter-14 (pages.147-158) by Dr. Raj Pal Singh from The Jats Vol. 2: Their Role and Contribution to the Socio-Economic Life and Polity of North and North West India, Vol.II, 2006. Ed. by Dr Vir Singh, Publisher - M/S Originals (an imprint of low priced publications), A-6, Nimri commercial Centre, Near Ashok Vihar, Phase-IV, Delhi-110052. e-mail: lpp@nde.vsnl.net.in, url: http://www.lppindia.com, © Surajmal Memorial Education Society. ISBN 81-88629-51-0 (H.B.) Price Rs 525/-& ISBN 81-88629-52-9 (P.B.)

Chapter-14: Jat-Maratha Relations By Dr. Raj Pal Singh

The purpose of this paper is to study Jat Maratha Relations from c. 1740 AD to c. 1756 AD in Historical perspective. Since both the Jats of Bharatpur under Brij Raj Badan Singh and Marathas under Peshwa Baji Rao I started to play vital roles in the politics of ever declining and disintegrating Mughal empire, this fact alone is sufficient to signify the importance of the study. For the purpose of our analysis, the paper has been divided into three sections. The first section is in the form of introduction. The second section is devoted to examine various shifts and changes in the relationship of the two political powers. Main observations and conclusions are embodied in section three. The study is based mainly on contemporary sources but use of standard research studies on the relevant issues have also been used unhesitanily throughout the study.

I

With the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, the centrifugal forces that had been kept under control so far, became restive and intensified their attempts to dismantle the Mughal empire. With the invasion of Nadir Shah in 1739, the disintegration process took a great leap. As the Mughal empire was falling rapidly to pieces under the new wave of regeneration and reaction, various political centres emerged in the country. Among them the Jats under Badan Singh of Bharatpur emerged as one of the major players in the politics of Northern India. Coincidentally, Badan Singh's advanced age and problem of eye-sight threw forward leadership upon his eldest son Suraj Mal, who became de facto ruler in about mid-fifties of the eighteenth century. He under the guidance of his father consolidated his sway on the Jats of Agra-Delhi region and successfully enlarged the Kingdom of Bharatpur.

On the other hand, Marathas under Peshwa Baji Rao I were able to establish a confederacy consisting of Bhonsles of Nagpur, Holkars of

[148]: Indore, Gaekwads of Gujarat and Scindhias of Gwalior. After having emerged as a power to reckon with in the Deccan, they envisaged plan to enlarge their possessions in North India. For entering North, they had to cross Chambal where lay kingdoms of the Jats at Gohad and Bharatpur. This led to an interesting phase of History when nascent Jat power and the fast emerging national level power in the form of Maratha confederacy came face to face with each other.

II

The Bharatpur ruling house came in contact with the Marathas in 1736 when Suraj Mal and his uncle Shardul Singh waited upon the Peshwa in the Durbar held by Sawai Jai Singh. "When Jai Singh introduced Suraj Mal to the Maratha, Baji Rao made disparaging remarks about Suraj Mal's humble origins. The young Sinsinwar kept calm and responded with a dignified silence." ¹ However, on the recommendations of the Peshwa, Sawai Jai Singh conferred seven villages of Jharoti as Jagir on Thakur Shardul Singh of Pathaina. ². Then Peshwa Baji Rao started from Agra, passed through the Jat state and made his swift and secret appearance at the imperial capital on 30th March, 1737. But his troops caused no harm to villages lying enroute Delhi.³ In 1738, the Mughal emperor sent a 'Farman' to the Rajput rulers to join the Mughal forces in the Bhopal expedition against the Peshwa.⁴ Jai Singh of Jaipur sent some of his troops under his eldest son Ishwari Singh. In this expedition Badan Singh also sent a Jat battalion under Partap Singh,⁵ to assist the Jaipur contingent.

Jai Singh expired on 21 September, 1743⁶ and Ishwari Singh succeeded him.⁷ This was resented by his younger brother, Madho Singh, who was the son of a princess of Mewar. For, Jai Singh had earlier agreed that the son born to Sisodia princess was to succeed him to the exclusion of his other brothers, even those older than him.⁸ The accession of Ishwari Singh was followed by fratricidal war between the two brothers. The Jats and the Marathas fought on opposite sides in the battle of Bagru⁹ in August 1748.

The, infant Jat principality had grown unhampered under the shadow of the late Sawai Jai Singh. Hence to repay the debt by maintaining the senior brother Ishwari Singh as rightful ruler at Amber, Brajraj sent his son, Suraj Mal to Jaipur with 10,000 handpicked cavalrymen and 2000 troopers. He was accorded a warm welcome by Ishwari Singh.

After the flight of the Jaipur contingent before the Maratha onslaught in the Baffle of Moti Dungri (near Jaipur). Suraj Mal made a counter-attack and compelled the Marathas to retreat. Malhar Rao Holkar had to retreat to his camp at Bagru¹⁰ where pro-Madho Singh contingents

[p.149]: joined them. On the other hand, Ishwari Singh and Suraj Mal joined the battle on 20th August 1748. During the course of the baffle, Shiv Singh, Commander in Chief of Amber, was killed and a strong Maratha detachment under Gangadhar Tantiya created confusion in the rear of Ishwari Singh's forces. In this hour of peril, Ishwari Singh asked Suraj Mal, who was fighting on the other flank, to push back Gangadhar. It was the time when the Amber gunners had been cut down and their cannons spiked when the obstinate, stubborn Jats delivered a flank charge upon the half-victorious Marathas and within two hours pushed them back. According to eye-witness account of Suraj Mal Mishran, Suraj Mal Jat triumphantly snatched a victory for the Amber ruler from the jaws of sure defeat by "killing 50 and wounding 108 of the enemy with his own hands." The poet goes on to say:

The Jatni did not in vain bear the pain of travail,

The issue of her womb was Suraj Mal,

The scourge of enemies, and well-wisher of Amber,

Turning back the Jat began,

to fight Malhar in the van,

Holkar was the shadow (night)

And the Sun; (Suraj)

The two champions well matched in conflict.

Finding it impossible to dethrone Ishwari Singh so long as the Jats were auxiliaries of the Amber Raja, Madho Singh concluded peace. He had to content with five paragans granted by his brother.

The Marathas were very angry with the turn of events at Jaipur. Next year, to teach the Jats a lesson, the Maratha forces under Malhar Rao Holkar crossed the Chambal and invaded the Jat territories in May 1749. They started burning and looting the villages. An indecisive encounter took place between the Jats and the Marathas near Fatehpur.

But the Maratha forces outnumbered the Jats. Overcome by the sheer weight of numbers Suraj Mal requested the wazir to provide help and to intervene in the matter.sup>11 The imperial wazir, did not respond favourably because he considered Suraj Mal a usurper of the 'Khalsa' lands. Therefore, Suraj Mal had to agree to pay Chauth amounting to one lac and ten thousand rupees for which a hundi was written immediately.¹² Later on, when an alliance was fonned between the Wazir and Suraj Mal, the power of Jats increased and he suspended altogether the payment of the Chauth.¹³

Again, the Jats and the Marathas fought together in Safdarjang's invasion of Rohilkhand in 1751-52. But, during Safdarjang's rebellion

[p.150]: against the emperor, the Jats and Marathas were on opposite sides in 1753 because the Peshwa accepted the tempting offer of the Emperor granting him Allahabad and Awadh and deserted his old ally Safdarjang.

Sir Jadu Nath Sarkar says in this regard: "The Marathas were mere mercenaries, ever ready to transfer their venal swords to the highest bidder. "¹⁴ When Safdarjang was driven away from Delhi Intizam-ud-daullah became the Wazir and Imad-ul-mulk the Mir Bakshi of the empire. Imad-ul-mulk had requisitioned more Maratha troops during the civil war.¹⁵ But "the war for which they were so urgently invited had been closed, and now the presence of large Maratha armies in the north was considered quite a nuisance as they had to exact their subsistence from the inoffensive and helpless populace. "¹⁶

An advance party under Khande Rao reached Delhi by the end of November, 1753 and Imad had employed these Maratha troops to chastise the Jats.¹⁷ Khande Rao, during his one and a half month's stay at Hodal, ravaged the Jat villages within a radius of 25 kilometers.

Jawahar Singh was driven away by Khande Rao's troops and they established Maratha military posts near Barsana.¹⁸ While Khande Rao and Imad were busy reconquering the Jats' territories, Maratha forces under Raghunath Rao and Malhar Rao Holkar lay encamped at Jaipur collecting tributes from the Rajputana rulers.

Suraj Mal, during the civil war at Delhi, had amassed wealth and he was the only ruler in northern India who had not paid them Chauth, a sign of overlordship of the Marathas. ¹⁹ Moreover, a flourishing Jat state was in itself a provacation and an irresistible temptation for the Marathas. Suraj Mal knew it only too well and he made precautionary arrangements against such an eventuality. ²⁰ About the provisions in the Jat forts at that time Father Wendal observes: "Artillery, bullets, cannon-balls, powder and materials for making these, are to be found there in such quantities that it is amazing how the peasants have stored them up in so short a time and to learn their use. "²¹

In a bid to avoid the conflict Suraj Mal first attempted to find out avenues of peaceful settlement of the issue. He sent his minister-emissary, Rup Ram to Jaipur.²² He, as authorised by-his master, offered a fairly large amount of Rs.40 lacs to the Marathas as price for peace but Malhar Rao haughtily demanded rupees two crore.²³ A letter of Jaipur agent, who was present at the Maratha camp at the time of negotiations between Rup Ram and Malhar Rao, makes it clear that Holkar made this high demand because he was determined to fight the Jats and exact much more money. ²⁴

On Rup Ram's return from Jaipur the matter was discussed in the Jat Khap Panchayat held under Badan Singh at Deeg. It was decided

[p.151]: to make preparations for a befitting reply to the enemy.²⁵ Again, Suraj Mal sent his emissary to Raghunath Rao with two packets. One contained a letter from Suraj Mal, which offered peaceful acceptance of Rs.40 lacs; and other was to be given if the first was rejected. This contained five connon-balls and some power, which symbolised a challenge for fight from the Jats.²⁶ Suraj Mal, was not idle during the period of Rup Ram's peace mission to Maratha generals. In the interim period, to implement the decision of the 'Jat Khap Panchayat', Suraj Mal, left for Bharatpur to inspect the defence of Deeg fort.²⁷ From Bharatpur, he sent a fast camel-rider to Weir who conveyed Suraj Mal's message to Bahadur Singh. He positioned his men at the gates of the fort of Bharatpur and left it in charge of Dwij Raj. ²⁸

The Maratha forces started from Jaipur on 16 January and established their camp at the Jat-Kachwah border village, Jaluthar where they were joined by Khande Rao and Gangadhar Tantya on 19th January, 1754.²⁹ On 20th January 1754, using Pingore village as their base, the Marathas attacked the Jats.³⁰ One pitched battle was fought in the plains between Deeg and Kumher in which many men fell on both sides. Suraj Mal, overcome by the superior numbers of the Marathas, took shelter in the fort of Kumher.³¹ On 20th January 1754, the Maratha batteries started firing at the fort of Kumher. They could not make any impression on the garrison for want of heavy guns.³² But the Marathas resorted to plunder of the Jat countryside where crops were flattened and men and beasts were killed in large numbers.³³

During the course of the siege of Kumher one-day (17th March 1754) when Khande Rao Holkar had gone in a palanquin to inspect an advanced battery, he was gunned down by the Jats. On learning of the death of his only son, Malhar Rao Holkar "turned almost mad with grief and vowed to extirpate the Jats in revenge." But Suraj Mal, never failing in ceremonial propriety shared the bitter grief of Malhar by sending him and Khande Rao's infant son, mourning robes. In memory of Khande Rao a temple was also built³⁴ which stands even today (near Gangarsauli Village) in front of the fort of Kumher.

On Malhar's invitation Imad joined the besiegers.³⁵ "Raghunath Rao gave Imad-ul-Mulk a written undertaking to deliver to him one-fourth of the treasure and other booty expected to be captured from the Jats. "³⁶ With his arrival the Maratha army attempted more vigorously to invest the fort but they were held at bay by obstinate Jats who fired back from their cannons fixed on the walls of the fort.³⁷ Malhar Rao was bent upon total extermination of the Jat power. The Jats had defended

[p.152]: Kumher valiently but feelings ran high on both sides. "When all seemed lost Maharani Kishori^[1] ^[2] roused the drooping spirits of her husband, telling him to trust her and banish despair from his mind. "³⁸ She sent, one night, Tej Ram Kataria (son of Rup Ram Kataria) to Jaippa Scindhia with the turban of Suraj Mal and a letter seeking his help. Jaippa accepted the presents and in reciprocation sent his own turban to Suraj Mal along-with an encouraging letter promising all possible help.

Thus Jaippa was won over to the Jat side by a clever move of Maharani Kishori^[3] ^[4]. ³⁹ Using his influence, Jaippa Scindhia pressed Raghu Nath Rao to accept 'Khandani' and to come to an understanding with the Jats and end the futile fight. But Raghu Nath Rao was aware of Malhar Rao's 'sacred vow', therefore, he did not commit anything. In the meantime, the news about the secret contact between the Jats and the Scindhia leaked.⁴⁰ This caused bitterness among the Marathas. Raghunath consulted his senior friends on the issue. On the other hand, the diplomatic moves of Suraj Mal were accepted by the emperor. ⁴¹ In pursuance of his plan, the emperor left Delhi (27 April 1754). ⁴²

Imad who dreamt of sieging the throne⁴³ was alarmed at this move of the emperor and his interest in the siege of the Jat forts diminished. This further weakened the position of the Marathas. The Marathas, "finding themselves unable to stand against the Jats"⁴⁴ accepted the Jat Raja's offer of Rs.30 lacs in installments in three years (18th May, 1754).⁴⁵ "It is obvious enough that it can have been so small number of forces that was needed to keep busy a people who were as numerous and aggressive as the Jats had been for some time past, and to make them defend themselves with troops of strong, well-armed peasants. But this great army was not enough to make Suraj Mal lose courage nor yet to bring him to his knees. "⁴⁶ Rather, The Jats showed remarkable courage in sustaining the onslaught of the enemy. They had stocked their fort abundant provisions to last for years for the vast number of people who flocked in to it. "When ever the enemy artillery made a breach in the ramparts during the day-time, this was quickly and effectively filled in through the indefatigable industry of Suraj Mal and his Jat cultivators, during the night, so that the following morning it was hard to find any trace of damage. "

Side by side, Suraj Mal left no diplomatic avenue unexplored to get rid of the enemy. First, he contacted Hargovind Singh Natani, who was in charge of the Jaipur Contingent. ⁴⁷ Secondly, to weaken his enemy,⁴⁸ Suraj Mal contacted Intizam-ud daullah, the imperial Wazir. Intizam was an intriguing politician. He contrived from the outset to maintain the Jat power intact⁴⁹ to bridle the ever increasing power of

[p.153]: Imad. He was easily overtaken by moves of Suraj Mal. In early February 1754 Imad had suggested the Emperor to sell the Jat Kingdom to Mohkam Singh⁵⁰ but the emperor refused. And again, Suraj Mal was saved from destruction by the Emperor, who withheld the supply of big guns so pressingly demanded by Imad for helping the Marathas.⁵¹ Thus, the wise move of Suraj mal to isolate his sworn enemy Imad at the court was successful. Thirdly, Suraj Mal had created differences between the Jaipur troops and the rest of the besiegers as noted earlier. Then, on the advice of his 'masculine-queen' Hansia, Jaippa Scindhia was won over from the Maratha camp. The Scindhia's opposition to Malhar Rao's plan to finish the Jat power made the situation favorable for the Jats. Raghunath Rao had a hard time keeping the Maratha camps' unity intact. ⁵²

When the situation in the Maratha camp was explosive the news of the emperor's movement outside the capital was received by Imad. He had sneaked⁵³ the bold plan of Intizam and Suraj Mal to beat the Marathas at Chambal. Suraj Mal had produced peculiar circumstances in the besiegers' camp. Jaippa Scindhia was pressing for an early settlement with the Jats. Imad was more interested in checking the movements of his rivals at the court than to stay at Kumher. Malhar Rao alone was worried about his vow of revenge upon the Jats.

In January 1754, the Marathas' insensible greed over-reached itself when they adamantly rejected an offer of Rs. 40 lacs from the Jats. But they had soon to satisfy themselves with a meagre Rs.2 lacs in cash⁵⁴ and a bond promising payment of war indemnity amounting to Rs.30 lacs in three yearly installments⁵⁵ but except the payment of Rs.2 lacs the balance remained unpaid. ⁵⁶

The Marathas induced by Imad, immediately after lifting the siege of Kumher, started their chase for the Emperor on 19th May.⁵⁷ Sardesai⁵⁸ considers this episode (Siege of Kumher) as a personal failure of Raghunath Rao. "At any rate, the immediate object of Raja Suraj Mal's diplomacy viz., to turn away the Marathas from Kumher, was eminently successful. "⁵⁹

On 22nd May, 1754, the Scindhia with his troops left Kumher ⁶⁰and with this Jats could heave a sigh of relief. Now the Jats, were in a bargaining position and "Suraj Mal's fame spread all over India from his successful defence of Kumher against 80,000 men led by Malhar Holkar, Imad and a Jaipur general. "⁶¹

Suraj Mal then changed the plan envisaged earlier to join the Emperor's camp at the end of the siege of Kumher. He did not take part in the proceedings at Sikandrabad (on June 26th) or at Delhi on

[p.154]: June 2nd 1754. Perhaps, he was not satisfied with the modus operandi proposed by the Emperor and the wazir who, instead of marching to Aligarh as had been agreed upon, had gone to Sikandrabad. On 2nd June, 1754 Imad-ul-Mulk was invested with the robe of the wazir by the Emperor. But the next day, Imad ul-Mulk assisted by Najib and the Marathas dethroned Ahmed Shah and proclaimed Bahadur Shah, [[Shah Alum II]], as emperor.⁶²

Suraj Mal was happy that the Marathas had evacuated all his territories. Now, he considered Imad as the foremost enemy of the Jats, who was in possession of vast areas previously held by them. Marathas for their part had experienced futility in their efforts to subdue the Jats by using force. Therefore, both sides wanted friendly relations and, forgetting their old animosity, they decided to implement their expansion plans in the northern India. Hence, Suraj Mal "agreed neither to Oppose the Maratha enterprises nor to obstruct the frequent marches of Maratha forces through northern India which had now become necessary while Raghu Nath Rao allowed Suraj Mal to occupy much of the territory of the province of Agra, then at Maratha disposal. "⁶³ Accordingly, the Marathas handed over the fort of Sikandrabad to Suraj Mal. ⁶⁴

This agreement was put to test immediately (September 1754), when the wazir complained against the renewed Jat expansion to Raghu Nath Rao and sought his help. But Raghu Nath Rao told Imad:"we have come to terms with Suraj Mal and shall not deviate from our promise to him. "⁶⁵ After the recovery of Ballabhgarh and conquest of Aligarh in mid-December, 1754 in their victorious march in Trans (Ganga-Jamuna) Doab, the Jats came face to face with Antaji who, in spite of the Jats' aggressive attitude, avoided confrontation.⁶⁶

Rana Bhim Singh, after having built a fort at Gohad, had enlarged his possessions around Gohad and established his authority over vast areas including the fort of Gwalior. The Marathas, Who had started pouring into the northern India, used to the cross the river Chambal from his state and in the process Rana Bhim Singh's estates faced annual raids. And Antaji Mankeswar's forces captured a vast area of his Zamindari⁶⁷ and besieged the fort of Gohad about June, 1755.⁶⁸ Then, Rana Bhim Singh of Gohad⁶⁹ sent his emissary seeking help form Suraj Mal against the Marathas, who had besieged Gohad in June 1755.

Rana Bhim Singh took advantage of the absence of the main Maratha forces and recovered his estates including Gwalior from the Marathas. But the Jats' control over strategically important places like Gwalior

[p.155]: was intolerable to the Marathas. Hence, a contingent under Sadashiv Rao Vittal was despatched to subdue the Jats. He put the Rana in a tight corner. Fateh Singh, the emissary of Bhim Singh, met Suraj Mal. In spite of his involvement in the Doab, Suraj Mal sent 500 horse and 2000 foot soldiers to fight the Maratha contingents. ⁷⁰ The combined Gohad-Bharatpur armies gave a tough fight and worsted a Maratha force numbering 15,000.⁷¹

Sadashiv Rao Vittal enlisted troops from the Zamindars of the area and a fierce Fight ensued in which many men fell including 125 horsemen from the Bharatpur contingent. Then, the Jats were forced to retire towards the jungles⁷² to continue their guerrilla warfare. Sadashiv Rao Vittal received an encouraging letter from [[Raghu Nath Rao]] promising reinforcement and asking him to continue sticking to his assigned job. ⁷³ On receipt of the enforcements led by Gopal Ganesh, the Maratha forces wrested Gwalior and a portion of the Gohad Zamindari.⁷⁴ The Rana contacted Ragunath Rao through Rup Ram Kataria⁷⁵ for a peaceful settlement of the affair. It was arrived at by November, 1755.

It can be inferred that the Jat chief of Bharatpur patronised his clansmen of Gohad and helped them in times of need. Previously he had acted likewise in the case of the Jats of Ballabhgarh. In return the gtrateful, Rana of Gobad fought for, and under the banners of the Bharatpur State on a number of occasions. Braj Raj Badan Singh who, after his retirement had mostly stayed at Sahar and Deeg, passed away on 7th June, 1756, leaving behind a well carved out Jat kingdom of his dreams.⁷⁶ His successor was Suraj Mal, who continued his lofty mission of raising the status of his community.

III

The texture of the present paper has been built on the elucidation of the relations between the Jats of Bharatpur state and the Marathas under Peshwas. To a large extent, the findings have already been indicated in the preceding paragraphs. To conclude the study some of the more striking features may be summerised here.

It is worthwhile to note that the Jats occupied a very strategic region around the national capital to which the rising Marathas wanted to sway with their influential presence in this region. Therefore, it was natural that the Marathas did not like the rise of Jat Power in this region. Likewise the Jat rulers right from Badan Singh to Jawahar Singh considered Marathas as a challenge to their very existence. So the relations between the two powers were based on mutual suspicion and utility. Both the powers coveted Doab and Malwa regions. Suraj

[p.156]: Mal was always in favour of keeping the Marathas away from northern India. But neither Rajput rulers nor Ruhelas came forward to forge an alliance with him. Rather they actively participated in the sieze of Kumher in 1754 against the Jats. After concluding an agreement with the Marathas, Suraj Mal adopted equi-distance theory with the Ruhelas and the Marathas. But he definitely preferred Marathas to Ruhelas that is why he joined Sadashiv Rao Bhao. It is another thing that he had to abandon him before third battle of Panipat. Though he avoided Bhao's mad venture yet he rejected repeated solicitations from Ahmad Shah Abdali and Shujaud Daula to join them against the Marathas. Rather he remained neutral in this struggle. Jats provided food and monetary help to several thousand Maratha soldiers who escaped to Bharatpur from the battle-field of Panipat. After the fateful debacle of the Marathas, Suraj Mal picked up the opportunity to sway major portions of Maratha possessions in the Doab and northern Malwa.

References

1. K. Natwar Singh, Maharaja Suraj Mal and His Times, New Delhi 1981, p.31.

2 O'Dyre, Settlement Report. Vol. III, p. 40 and Vol. IV, p. 30; U.N. Sharma, Jaton Ka Navin Itihas; pp. 348-49.

3 William Irvine, Later Mughals, Vol. II, pp. 286-306.

4 SPD, XV, p. 53.

5 Dastur Kaumwar, Vol. VIII, pp. 441; S.R. Sharma, Mughal Empire in India, p. 570; V.S. Bhatnagar, Jai Singh (H), p. 155.

6 Vamsha Bhaskar, Vol. IV, p. 3323.

7 Ibid., p. 3324.

8 Ibid., p. 3018.

9 Ibid., p. 3491-3520; Sudan, Sujancharitra, pp. 32-36.

10 SPD, XXI, 98; Hingane, I, 30; Sudan, Sujancharum, pp. 7, 32-39; Vansh Bhaskar, pp. 3492-3538.

11 Hingane Daftar, Vol. I, No. 35.

12 Hingane Daftar, Vol. I, 36 and 40. From a letter (Hingane Dattar, Vol. I, p. 43, dated 4th March, 1750). It is manifest the said Hundi could not be encashed, perhaps, due to its doubtful character.

13 SPD, XXVII, p. 93.

14 J.N. Sarkar, FME, I, p. 255.

15 Sudan, p. 213.

p.157

16 G.S. Sardesai, NHM, II, pp. 367-69.

17 Mohan Singh, Waqya-i-Holker (Sarkar copy), p. lOa.

18 TAH, 93b-94b.

19 Sudan, Sujancharitra, p. 237, SPD, XXVII, p. 93.

20 Sudan, Sujancharitra, pp.240-249.

21 Wendel quoted by K. Natwar Singh (MSM), p. 52.

22 Hingane, I. 108; Sudan, Sujancharitra, pp. 214-216; SPD, XXVII, p. 79.

23 Sudan, Sujancharitra, p. 237; Bhao Bakhar, pp. 2-3; SPD, XXVII, 79 and 94.

24 Amber Records Mohan Singh's letter to Dewan Hargovind Natani, dated Magh Krishana, 1810 vs.

25 Bhao Bakhar, p. 3; TAH, 18b and lOa; Sudan, Sujancharitra, p. 237.

26 Ibid.

27 Sudan, Sujancharitra, pp. 242-45.

28 Sudan, Sujancharitra, pp. 246-47.

29 Amber Records, Letter of Mohan Singh's to Hargovind Singh Natani dated Magh Krishana 11, 1810 V.S.(I9th January, 1754).

30 Ibid., SPD, XXVII, Letter No. 104.

31 SPD., XXVII, p. 94; TAH, 109b.

32 Bhao Bakhar, p. 4.

33 TAH, p. 83; Hari Charan Das (Elliot and Dowson, VIII), p. 209; William Franklin, Shah Alam, p. 3.

34 Sirdeshahi, I, p. 102; Hingane, II, p. 40; Rajwade, I, p. 33; TAH, p. 117; Bhao Bakhar, p. 5; D.C. p. 48.

35 TAH, 111b.

36 SPD, XXVII, 104; J.N. Sarkar, FME, I, p. 324 f.n.

37 TAH, 114a.

38 K.R. Qanungo, Jats, p. 49.

39 Bhao Bakhar, p. 6; Gulgale Daftar (Sitamau, M.S.), Vol. I, No. 212 and 217 also confirm this move of the Jat Queen and her wining over the Scindhia to the Jat side.

40 Bhao Bakhar, pp. 7-11; Brave life of Subedar Malhar Rao Holker, pp. 71-73.

41 A.L. Srivastava, Two Nawabs, p. 237.

42 Siyar, III, p. 336; TAH, 127b; Tarikh-i-Muz, p. 89; J.N. Sarkar, FME, I, pp.323-33

43 Siyar, III, 337; Tarikh-i-Muz, p. 89.

44 Father Wendel quoted by K. Natwar Singh, op. cit., p. 51.

p.158

45 TAH, 128a; SPD. XXI p. 60. But Bhao Bhakar (p. 11) mentions that the amount of Khandani with the Jat Raja was fixed at Rs. 60 lacs.

46 Wendel Quoted by K Natwar Singh, p. 52.

47 Sudan, p. 224.

48 S.P.D. XXVII, p. 94, TAB, 121a.

49 J.N. Sarkar, FME I, p. 330.

50 TAH, p. 104, J.N. Sarkar, FME, I, p. 327.