The Jats - Their Role in the Mughal Empire/Chapter XIII

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The Jats - Their Role in the Mughal Empire
The book by Dr Girish Chandra Dwivedi, Edited by Dr Vir Singh 2003.
Chapter XIII: The Clash of Ambitions (1761-1763)
Maharaja Surajmal

The Clash of Ambitions (1761-1763)

[p.229]: The battle of Panipat, though a momentous event, proved unproductive from the viewpoint of the stakes actually involved. It hardly decided anything worth the name. The Maratha power, no doubt, suffered a stunning blow but their loss was neither perennial nor irreparable. Similarly, the Afghan Emperor, despite being triumphant, failed to reap any lasting material advantage. Not long after, he found it increasingly difficult to cope with the surging tide of the ferocious Sikhs in the Punjab. On the other hand, his Indian confederates had now to cope with the mighty Jats in place of the Marathas. As for the Mughal Empire, by no means did Panipat prove a panacea for its appalling ills. On the contrary, the Afghan-Maratha rivalry "caused the complete overthrow of the Mughal monarchy". [1] Shakir laments, "on all sides the Empire is encircled by enemies. " [2] They were scrambling madly for its slight remains and aspiring for individual ascendancy. The imperial Capital continued to be without the Emperor and the Wazir, who were at daggers drawn with each other. The Mir Bakhshi, who had grabbed all power in his hands, was strong enough, but he would not "make any sacrifice or run any risk" to bring in and install on the throne his professed sovereign (an exile in his own dominions). Ironically enough, the Mughal Emperor himself apprehended being put "helplessly within the reach"[3] of his Bakhshi, who was leading the exultant Afghans-the traditional enemies of the Royal Mughals. [4] Side by side, the Rohilla dictator exploited his pre-eminence in the government to aggrandize his own power, carve out a large independent kingdom and weld together and promote his own kinsmen and porteges.[5]

1. Memoires des Jats, 49.
2. Shakir, 115.
3. Sarkar, Fall, II, 529-530.
4. Ibid., 530; Also Mirza Ali Azhar in Freedom Movement, I, 215.
5. Sarkar, Fall, II, 39, 384-386.

[p.230]: A deadly clash was unavoidable when this policy came face to face with a similar bid from another quarter.[6] The post-Panipat period witnessed the heyday of Jat power. [7] With "an indescribable wisdom", marvellous political sagacity and an unrivalled diplomatic resourcefulness, Suraj Mal had steered his way through the stormy days in such a manner as to ensure growing prosperity and unstinted rise of his power "amidst the common decay."[8] He was by now the strongest and the richest ruler in the whole of the Indian sub-continent.[9] Amidst the changing circumstances, the animosity that already existed between him and Najib came to the forefront. Their rivalry forms the central theme of the history of Delhi in the succeeding years.

Mathura Congress: April to June, 1761

Mathura Congress (Middle of April to Middle of June, 1761), Suraj Mal and Efforts for Peace And Regular Imperial Government

In order to ensure regular payment of tribute from Hindustan and his unmolested hold over the Panjab, Ahmad Shah Abdali wanted to come to terms with the Marathas and impliedly with Suraj Mal. With the same purpose he wished to leave behind an agreed peace among all the potentates and a regular and smoothly functioning government at Delhi.[10] He had, therefore, confirmed Shah Alam as Emperor and appointed Imad as the Wazir and Najib as the Mir Bakhshi. Before his departure he had instructed his envoy, Yaqub Ali Khan, to finalize peace with the Marathas and carry the khilat, and qalamdan of the Wizarat to Imad, then living as pensioner of Suraj Mal. The Abdali had also written to Imad "to come and enter the city of Delhi declaring him plenipotentiary" on his behalf.[11]

On 9th April, 1761 Yaqub Ali Khan and Bapuji Mahadeo, the Vakil of the Peshwa, started from Delhi for Mathura where Suraj Mal and Imad had already arrived. The Jat King granted audience to the Afghan envoy on 19th April, 1761. Imad received the qalamdan and the khilat. Suraj Mal, Imad, Yaqub Ali, Bafuji and Gangadhar Tatya held talks between them. The "assemblage" especially Imad, Tatya and Suraj Mal dissuaded Yaqub Ali from going to the Peshwa, saying

6. cf. ibid., 385.
7. Memoires des Jats, 49, 63 and 67.
8. Memoires des Jats, 54; Also Siyar, IV, 27; Gupta, Panipat, 44.
9. Sarkar, Fall, Il, 381, 383, 442.
10. For details of the Abdali's objectives see Sarkar, Fall, Il,378-380; G. Singh, Durram, 260-263.
11. Nur. 53b-54a; SP.D., XXI, 202; Also Mirat, 920.

[p.231]: that there was no need for it and things could be discussed right there. [12] The Vakils of the heir, Jawan Bakht, Najib, Shuja and the par-Rohillas also reached there.[13] Thus, began in the Bharatpur State (Mathura) the congress of the important Indian powers to usher in peace and rehabilitate the normal administration of the country.

The congress was in session for two months;[14] but as could be foreseen, it ultimately proved infructuous. Mutual amity and goodwill were the pre-requisites for restoring normalcy. They were, however, lacking in the leading dignitaries of the day. Jealousy and intense political rivalry marked their mutual relations. Added to it were the personal prejudices which vitiated the atmosphere still further. There was no love lost between Najib and Shah Alam on the one hand and Suraj Mal and Imad on the other. When it came to the question of the Wizarat; Shuja, also had reasons to be sore with the Jat Raja, who formed the strength of Imad, and who, if the Marathi despatches are to be relied upon, had been instrumental in procuring the Wizarat for him.[15] Then again, if the Rohilla chief, Jawan Bakht, Zinat Mahal, Shuja and others abhorred the Wizarat of Imad-ul-Mulk, [16] there were others who were jealous of Najib and resented his growing influence at Delhi.[17]

The failure of Mathura peace congress has been ascribed by J.N. Sarkar to the alleged designs of Suraj Mal "to seize the actual government of the empire and wrest the neighbouring provinces from the Ruhelas, the Bangash and Shuja in the name of the Emperor but keep them himself under a veil." This made the Awadh and Afghan envoys indignant. "The natural result was that the negotiations broke down .... " [18]

This conclusion is apparently based on the Hingne's despatch. Bapu Mahadeo Hingne was an eyewitness and being the Vakil of the Peshwa

12. SPD., XXI, 202, II, 143 and 146, XXVII, 272, also XXIV, 50. Rajwade, I, 228; D.C.; Nur, 54a; Miral, 920-921; Sarkar, Fall, Il, 380. It may be noted that the basic points of peace had already been discussed and determined by the Peshwa. He informed his Vakil, Hingne, that he had empowered the Holkar to "conclude the subject" and that all matters should be referred to the HoIkar and his decision be accepted. (See Peshwa's letter quoted by Sardesai, Maralhas, Il, 463; Also G. Singh, Durrani, 262)-The Holkar's Diwan, Gangadhar was already at Mathura. Hence, there was nothing sinister about the Afghan envoy being detained at Mathura.
13. SP.D., II, 103, XXVII, 272; cf Nur., 54b.
14. Nur, 55b.
15. Rajwade, I. 288 also 297.
16. Mirat,921.
17. The Hingnes reporting from Mathura write (SPD, II, 103), "It is the desire of all that Ghazi-ud-Din should be installed (at Delh) as before, after eliminating Najib Khan." For the Par Rohillas' jealously towards Najib see Nur, 43b; Sarkar. Fall, II, 381; See also Abdur Rashid in Freedom Movement, I, 3 17.
18. Sarkar, Fall, II, 381.

[p.232]: was a leading participant too in the aforesaid congress. His and others' contemporary reports, therefore, form the most valuable source of information on the trends of the parleys at Mathura, especially when Nur-ud-Din (the servant of Imad) and Wendel (most likely present in the Jat Kingdom) do not throw much light on them. The latter in fact totally ignores the Mathura congress. Yet the Marathi despatches, particularly those of the Hingnes, at places appear vague and confusing. These, therefore, need to be interpreted with care and accepted with caution.

A careful scrutiny of the Hingnes' above despatch would reveal that JN. Sarkar's interpretation is not wholly correct. The Hingnes despatches contain two most relevant points. The first part which reads, "That the Thakur (Suraj Mal) should have the full control over the Saltanatis the intention of all and of the Thakur himself.[19] is a logical continuation of the message from a preceding page of the same despatch but reproduced as a separate one. The subsequent part of the despatch apparently emphasizes another point. It goes on:

"The rest of the matter is that Thakur intends that he[20] should take under a curtain[21] the provinces of the Sarkar, to be released by the Thakur from Ayodhya and Patna and the Rohilla.[22] Therefore, the Vakils of Ayodhya and the Rohilla replied frankly that if (you try to) make us relinquish (our territories) by establishing contact with the Jat,[23] we shall not vacate. "[24]

19. SPD., II, 103. The first sheet of this letter is missing, which usually contains the date, the name of the writer and the addressee and the place wherefrom written. G.S. Sardesai, the Editor of SPD. volumes assigns this letter to the year 1759. This is not correct. Its contents unmistakably refer to the period of the Mathura congress. Incidentally, we have another letter (written by the Hingne brothers from Mathura on 6th May, 1761, S. P D., XXI, 202). It is incomplete and abruptly ends with" Ya go". On the other hand the fragmentary letter printed as no. 103 in SPD II, begins with "Shtisahi". Separately both these expressions are incomplete. But if we unite them, it becomes a meaningful word "Ya gosti sahi". As both these documents deal with one and the same theme it is most likely that they combinedly formed the orginal complete letter of the Hingnes, which got separated somehow and printed accordingly. Though Sarkar does not establish an irrevocable connection between them, probably on the basis of similarity of theme, he does conclude that the contents of SPD.XXI, 202 are completed by SPD II, 103. See Fall, II, 379, footnote.
20. It can also be interpreted as "You" meaning thereby the Peshwa.
21. The text reads "Padadyanta" which means "under a curtain, however, it docs not appear to be conveying a wholly cogent sense. May be that the original word in the Modi script, in which these despatches were written was "Padarant" which means "under one's control". The latter reading agrees more with the succeeding sentences in the text which express the indignation of the Vakils of Ayodhya (Shuja) and the Rohilla.
22. Obviously Ayodhya and Patna mean Shuja, while Rohilla. Najib.
23. Apparently JN. Sarkar interprets (Fall. Il, 381) Jathache Talook Karaan' as lease to the Jat but "Talook Karaan" should more appropriately mean 'establishing contact'.
24. S.PD., II, 103.

[p.233]: At first sight it would appear from the earlier part of the above extract that Suraj Mal wanted to "wrest" Patna, Ayodhya and other distant provinces, as J.N. Sarkar thinks. But such an Inference does not tally with Suraj Mal's characteristic caution self-control, shrewdness and strong sense of realism in politics- the traits Which the above scholar by implication himself concedes.[25] Suraj Mal’s career disproves of his entertaining such grandiose schemes. For full three years after Panipat he was the strongest Indian ruler and yet we do not find him embarking upon any distant conquests. As we shall see, after recovering his lost territories, his expansionist course was essentially confined to the adjacent areas only. Wendel supports us when he unequivocally says that he "never wanted to involve himself in wars or anything far away from his province."[26]

The Hingnes' report furnishes another relevant information namely the refusal of the Vakils of Shuja and the Rohillas to vacate the Maratha territories. To what extent this refusal reflects upon Suraj Mal remains to be seen. Incidentally, we come across a number of contemporary news-reports whose contents throw sufficient light on the context in which the above refusal was made. The victorious confederates of the Abdali had availed themselves of the first opportunity after the Maratha defeat to impinge upon their possessions in the Doab.[27] But the Abdali's return without pressing home the advantage of the victory and the leanings of the Shah Alam towards the Marathas,[28] as probably also the realization that the Marathas were still a force to be reckoned with induced the above usurpers to reshape their conduct. Najib and Shuja found it expedient to convey to Malhar Holkar that they would evacuate the usurped lands, provided he sent his collectors to take their charge.[29] Presumably not taking these chiefs at their words the Holkar (the custodian of the Maratha interest, authorized by the Peshwa) sent his Diwan, Gangadhar, to seek the support of the sympathetic and powerful Jat Raja for resettling the mahals in the antarvedi.[30] Gangadhar was also to seek the sanads of the holy places, Kashi and Prayag, from the Wazir, Imad-ul-Mulk.[31] However the Tatya's mission, his continued stay with Suraj Mal, followed by their

25. Sarkar, Fall, II, 257 and 442.
26. Memoires des Jats, 67.
27. For details see Srivastava, Shuja, I, 117ff.
28. SPD., XXVll, 263; Srivastava, Shuja, I, 120.
29. SPD., XXVll, 263.
30. SPD., XXVII, 268 XXIX, 10,/5 also XXI, 202, II, 144.
31. SPD., XXVII, 269, 114 (the date printed on this letter is wrong).

[p.234]: joint march into the Doab towards Kol[32] as also the Peshwa's correspondence with the Jat King in course of the Mathura congress ,[33] possibly irritated the Vakils of Najib, Shuja and others and at the same time provided them with a ready excuse for not vacating the Maratha Doab.

Viewed in this perspective, it is obvious that what is ascribed to as designs of Suraj Mal over the distant provinces was in reality a convenient pretext of the VakiIs concerned for not making over the lands to the Marathas,[34] or at worst their (the Vakils) Suspicion of Suraj Mal's attitude. Not that the Jat Raja was not ambitious but the implied purport of the part of the Hingnes' despatch quoted above, may reasonably be appreciated in this light.

The Hingne further refers that Imad-ul-Mulk, with the implied support of his patron, toyed at one stage with the ldea of putting up somebody else on the throne.[35] Ali Muhammad Khan goes to the extent of attributing the Jat capture of Agra (the second Capital) to Imad’s scheme of enthroning there the pretender, whom Safdar Jang had raised to the throne in 1753.[36] Imad obviously knew that his Wazirship would not be acceptable to the Emperor[37] who, if a Marathi despatch is to be believed, wanted "to do away with" his mortal enemy (Imad).[38] Therefore, the archschemer, Imad, wished to enthrone a new Emperor. On his part, Shah Alam always suspected it and it was to counteract Imad that he enticed Najib close to him.[39]

We are told that Imad broached the scheme to the Abdali's envoy, Yaqub Ali and sought his assistance in the matter. But the latter clearly told him that his business had ended with delivering to him the khilat and that without the Shah's orders he could do nothing on his own. Yaqub concluded "you (Imad) may do whatever you think fit (but only) upon your own strength".[40] But Imad had no strength of his own. All that he could count upon was mainly the help of Suraj Mal, and only

32. Rajwade, I, 285, 295.
33. S.PD., XXI, 202 also II, 103
34. Except Shuja to some extent, the Rohillas did not show any Inclination to part with the upper Doab. See Srivastava, Shuja, I, 120.
35. S.P.D., XXI, 202; S.PD., II, 103.
36. Mirat, 921.
37 cf ibid, 921
38. Rajwade, I, 295.
39. SPD . II. 103.
40 ibid.; J.N. Sarkar (Fall, II, 381) seems to interpret that Yaqub Ali saId this in response to Imad's request for reinstating him at Deihl. But If we read In one continuation the last three lines of S.P.D., XXI, 202 and the first three of S.P D. II, 103, it would appear that Yaqub's answer refers more to the case of Emperorship than that of his Wazirship.

[p.235]: casually that of the Marathas and the Par-Rohillas. Out of these the last two did not share Imad's aversion to the Emperorship of Shah Alam, though they generally supported his claims for the Wizarat.[41] As for Suraj Mal, he was keenly interested in it (Imad's Wizarat). Now that his protege enjoyed the ready sanction of no less a man than the victor of Panipat, the Jat King visualized to dominate the Mughal government through Imad's de facto installation and side by side to obtain a legal recognition for his ventures.[42] But his association with the hated regicide had justly incensed Shah Alam and Zinat Mahal. Only a short while ago, both these Shah Alam by implication[43] and the queen-mother directly[44]-had exhorted the Durrani to march against the Jat Raja. The latter, therefore, felt annoyed with Shah Alam. All the same, it does not appear that the astute Raja was prepared to take upon himself the infamy of enthroning a rival Emperor.

On the other hand, Imad had found it expedient in the past to replace the Emperor to suit his ends and he wished to do it again. But the fact that the Jat King was the mainstay of his power naturally smacked of the former's ready sanction behind Imad's move, whereas the reality was not so. Agra was captured and yet none was raised to the throne, then or ever alter. It appears that Suraj Mal's indifference eventually dejected his protege (Imad). We learn on the authority of the same Hingne that by the middle of June, 1761, (i. e. when the parleys were still going on) both had become reconciled to the Emperorship of Shah Alam and they even thought of "making friends" with him.[45] As for Imad's Wizarat, Suraj Mal certainly remained interested in it.[46] But Najib had firmly captured the actual government of Delhi with no intentions to tolerate others. In the circumstances, any attempt to install the Wazir designate would have virtually meant an outright invasion upon Delhi. This, Suraj Mal wisely avoided. Najib guessed it, when he said that if he first occupied the Capital, "the farsighted and temperamentally patient" Suraj Mal would not oust him from there.[47] At length, Yaqub Ali returned from Mathura to Delhi[48] and the Par-Rohillas also went back, without venturing to expel Najib, as the shrewd Rohilla had himselfforetold.[49]

41. It can be inferred from Nur-ud-Din (Nur. 43b, 54b) that the par-Rohillas supported Imad's Wazirship. For a discordant note see Sarkar, Fall, II, 381.
42. SPD., XXI, 202; S.PD., II, 103; Qanungo, Jats, 146.
43. See Shah Alam's letter to the Abdali quoted by G. Singh, Durrani. 232-233.
44. Supra, eh. XII, fn. 68-72.
45. S.PD., II. 146.
46. Miral, 928.
47. Nur, 55a.
48. SPD., XXI, 91 and II, 146.
49. Nur, 55a.

[p.236]: Thus ended the Mathura congress after protracted deliberations.

How it reflected upon the Durrani-Peshwa bilateral relations is not our concern. Its one objective was to institute a regular and mutually agreed administration at Delhi. It could not be attained, however, in so far as the controversy about Imad and Najib lingered on. Ignoring Najib's part, explained above, JN. Sarkar argues further that the parleys failed mainly because the Jat King and Imad were determined to have no lasting peace with Najib and Abdali, to brush the former aside and to assert their singular authority in the Empire.[50] This argument, however, cuts both ways. Comparatively, the blame of exclusive authority applies more to Najib than to Suraj Mal and Imad. It may be recollected that the Mathura negotiations took place to give effect to the Abdali's plan of running the Mughal government with Najib and Mir Bakshi. and Imad as Wazir. But while Imad had yet to receive the insignia of Wazirship and resume his office, Najib, fanning the existing feud between the Wazir designate and Shah Alam, manoeuvred to secure all authority and thus stole a march on Imad. The verdict against Suraj Mal and his protege would have indeed appeared convincing had they persisted in their hostility even in face of Najib's willingness to let Imad have his due as Wazir at Delhi. But there is nothing to prove that he ever wished to accommodate or live in friendly co-operation with the Wazir. If it were otherwise, there was hardly any need for Imad to seek others' help for his installation. He and his patron have been accused of wishing to eliminate Najib and seize power, but the latter had as good as banished Imad once he himself grabbed all power at Delhi. It was this precluding hold of Najib coupled with his persisting hostility to Imad that made some contemporaries exceedingly sceptical about the effectiveness, nay the very prospects of Imad's Wizarat.[51] The doors practically seemed slammed in Imad's face. In the situation, only the resort to arms might have enabled Imad to get his legal due. However disappointed Imad might have been, if Suraj Mal and others refrained from precipitating a clash, they certainly do not deserve a censure on that score. Further, the view that Suraj Mal was intransigent towards Najib is also one-sided. We have contemporary evidence to prove that Najib nursed sleepless malignity towards Suraj Mal and was pre-occupied with the thoughts of uprooting him,[52] while outwardly he made a deceitful show of his desire to come to terms with him. Then again, it should not be forgotten that Suraj Mal alone was not hostile towards the Rohilla chief. The

50. Sarkar, Fall, II, 380.
51. Rajwade, I, 297.
52. Infra, ch. XIII, fn.117.

[p.237]: Marathas, Hafiz Rahmat and others were also opposed to him and they all stood for the Wizarat of Imad as pointed before.

If we are then to assign individual responsibility, Najib perhaps had greater share than others in thwarting the efforts to instal a mutually agreed and regular administration in the realm. By his precluding control of the government, the Rohilla dictator had forestalled the fate of the negotiations at Mathura. As for Suraj Mal, he certainly cherished the ambition to dominate the Empire through the Wazir and he did not intend to submit himself to Najib's dictatorship.[53] The lesser powers also had their hand in the failure of the congress. The crux of the matter is that personal prejudices and rival ambitions had vitiated the thinking of all the powers.[54] Few could rise above their petty interests to view the Issues from a broader angle. Thus, even if appearances of cordiality could be kept up, big and crucial problems could not be solved in such an environment.

Suraj Mal did not force a war on the question of Imad's installation but Najib's policy and conduct in this regard annoyed him and increased friction between them.[55] On the other hand, his (Suraj Mal's) espousal of the claims of Imad annoyed the Nawab of Awadh,[56] who, though betrayed by the Abdali, apparently aspired as ever for the Wizarat of the Empire. This brought Najib and Shuja closer to one another against Suraj Mal and Imad.[57] The Par-Rohillas, however, maintained their contacts with Suraj Mal.[58] The latter so much reseented Najib's supremacy in the government that after the Mathura congress he even started thinking (early in August, 1761) in terms of Shuja getting the Wizarat and Imad, the Mir Bakhshiship.[59] The Jat King apparently made a suggestion of this nature to Shah Alam II. The Emperor, however, decllined to have any truck with Imad. Instead he desired his outright destruction and reportedly pressed for the surrender of his mortal enemy. Suraj Mal, however, did not agree to it. This incident must have marred the chances of reconciliation and increased bitterness between them (Shah Alam and Suraj Mal). [60 ]

53. Siyar (III, 402) says that Suraj Mal was disinclined to submit to Najib unless Shah Alam came to the Capital from Patna.
54. G. Singh, Durrani, 282.
55. Rajwade, I, 297; cf. S.PD., XXIX, 10.
56. Rajwade, I, 297
57. Ibid.
58. Rajwade, I, 295.
59. Ibid.
60. Rajwade, I, 295.

Suraj-Najlb Parley At Dankaurghat (November, 1761)

[p.238]: While the fate of the Wazirship hung in the balance, there was a move to conduct the Emperor to the Capital. Himself powerless, he was dependent on others for his de facto installation. But none was prepared to help him single-handed. This necessitated a concerted effort. The meeting between Najib and Suraj Mal, the two foremost personages, at Dankaurghat was, in part, the corollary of this move. Taking initiative in the matter, Najib despatched Nagar Mal, the veteran mediator to Kumbher (c. middle of September, 1761) to arrange for a personal interview with Suraj Mal. Three weeks later (7th October, 1761) Raja Diler Singh along with Rup Ram Katari and Mohal Singh, the Jat Vakils, left Delhi to meet Suraj Mal at Dankaur. They stayed there for five days, held consultations with the Jat Raja and then returned to the Capital on the 15th. The following day they met Najib to settle terms. Thereafter, Najib sent two envoys, Raja Chet Ram and Diler Singh to Suraj Mal with a Quran, on which he had taken an oath of sincerity for the Jat Raja. They were to arrange for a meeting nearby between the two chiefs. However, as per his programme, Suraj Mal proceeded to the fair of Govardhan, taking the two envoys with him. On 24th October, Raja Nagar Mal, Yaqub Ali Khan, Abdul Ahad Khan and others, after a talk with Najib, went to the Jat King to arrange for payment to the Abdali, who had threatened to invade if the Indian chiefs did not send him tribute. They were also to persuade Suraj Mal to meet Najib near Delhi after a fortnight, when the latter came back from his scheduled visit to Hissar.[61]

About the end of November 1761, the much awaited meeting between the Rohilla chief and the Jat Raja took place in the latter's camp at Dankaurghat. Their respective armies alighted on the opposite bank of the Yamuna. Against the suggestion of his advisers Najib crossed the river in a small boat with only a few attendants, leaving his troops behind. "Suraj Mal displayed 'great purity of heart towards him. "[62] It can be inferred from Hingne's despatch that Najib proposed to the Raja to send his son with him to escort the Emperor.[63] It is reasonable to presume that Suraj Mal took the opportunity to raise the question of Imad's Wazirship. However, nothing came of it. Beyond diluting their mutual antagonism, no useful purpose seems to have been served by this meeting.[64] The occasion did not usher in any genuine understanding

61. S P D., XXI, 89, 90, XXIX, 24 also 23, II, 108 (The date of this letter. as suggested by the editor is incorrect); D.C.; Sarkar, Fall, II, 386, 445-446.
62. Nur, 56a-56b; cf. SPD., XXIX, 23
63. SPD., XXI, 89.
64. cf. Sarkar, Fall, II, 446.

[p.239]: between them. Nor could a mutually agreed plan be devised for conducting the Emperor to Delhi. The fact is that despite its being talked about, none of the potentates except Shuja made any effort to retrieve the fortunes of Shah Alam.[65] On the other hand, Imad too could not be installed as Wazir due to the persisting opposition, apparently from Najib as also Shah Alam and Suraj Mal wisely refrained from carrying matters to the extreme. As the time rolled by, he seems to have dropped the irredeemable cause of Imad,[66] though he continued to support him otherwise, as before.[67]

Post Panipat Expansion And Strife Between Suraj Mal And Najib (1761-1763)

The Maratha rout in the battle of Panipat, coupled with the disinclination of the victor Ahmad Shah to remain here, created a void in north India, which the different powers, often at variance with one another, rushed to fill up. The big potentates and the dispossessed local chiefs alike fell upon the Maratha possessions in the Doab, Rajputana, Bundelkhand, Malwa and other places.[68] The Jats, the Afghans, the Rajputs, the Bundelas and Shuja all joined the race. The first to profit by were the exultant Rohillas, who, greatly enlarged their possessions.[69] Soon after Panipat, they occupied almost the whole of the Doab. Hafiz Rahmat Khan established his supremacy over the region consisting of Bhogaon, Etawah and Mainpuri; Dunde Khan brought under his rule Moradabad, Shikohabad and the nearby mahals; Ahmad Khan Bangash got hold of the territories from Sikandara to Akbarpur and aspired to move further to the east.[70] The foremost Rohilla chief Najib took the lion's share. He grabbed the Mian Doab country, Meerut, Sikandarabad, Dasna, Baghpat and seven Maratha mahals and several parganas in Haryana like Gohana, Dadari, Rohtak and Hansi-Hissar region and also cast his glances over the Sirhind district. [71] Najib aimed at carving

65. Rajwade, 1,297; SPD., XXIX, 5.
66. By the end of 176 I Shah Alam "felt himself free" to elevate Shuja to the Wazirship. The latter's investiture took place in February, 1762. see Srivastava, Shuja, I, 125f.
67. Imad stayed on in the Jat principality. In 1763 he marched with the Jat contingent, sent to help the Bangash chief. After the death of Suraj Mal he accompanied Raja Jawahar Singh in his attack on Delhi. See Nur, 58a and 76b.
68. A contemporary remarks (Memoires des Jats, 56, footnote):There was not a single zamindar in this country (northern India) who did not take the advantage of the opportunity to fall on and chase the Marathas everywhere. For details see SP.D, XXI, 75, 91, 92, XXIX, 5, 6, 12-15,20-22,24,25,27 also 36, 40, XXVII, 264, 267-269, 271,276, II, 7; Rajwade, I, 285, 288, 295-297 also 299
69. Memoires des Jats, 56.
70. Srivastava, Shuuja, I, 117-118.
71. Nur, 55b-56a; Rajwade, 1,297; SPD., XXI 89, XXIX, 24.

[p.240]: out extensive domains roughly stretching from Rohtak to Hissar and Sirhind districts and from the middle of Doab to the borders of his original faujdars of Saharanpur.[72]

The powerful Jat Raja was very ambitious and he could hardly remain a mere spectator amidst this mad scramble for the territories all round. As Wendel puts it, the Jats were "neither less nor more eager" than the Rohillas to turn the situation to their advantage.[73] If not throughout, certainly for sometime after Panipat, Suraj Mal had been keen to control Delhi government through Imad and to supplant Najib, his inveterate foe. Suraj Mal had reasons to be restless about Najib and vice-versa. [74] By an irony of circumstances, they had met each other for the first time as opponents, fighting on opposite sides in the second Bangash expeditions and then again in the Civil war of Delhi. Thereafter, their relations went on deteriorating. Suraj Mal had obviously not forgotten the most atrocious role of the Rohilla leader in 1757 (in course of the Durrani invasion).[75] Then, in 1759, Suraj Mal had sent a contingent against him to help Dattaji (against Najib)[76] and during Panipat displayed his sympathies towards the Marathas. After Panipat, Najib had tried to turn the Durranis arms once more against the Jat. But his plan miscarried because of the abrupt return of the Durrani. In view of all this, little wonder if Suraj Mal regarded as dangerous the consolidation of the Rohilla ascendancy at Delhi. [77]

It has been observed that Suraj Mal wanted to annex the entire Doab. [78] But in the light of his policy examined above[79] and his subsequent conduct too, this assertion appears to be over-drawn. Attempts to wrest the whole Doab would have precipitated a dangerous clash at one and the same time with Najib. Hafiz Rahmat, Dunde Khan, Ahmad Bangash, Shuja, the Marathas, the Bundela and other petty chiefs. Being an intensely practical statesman, it is unlikely that with all his superior power, Suraj Mal, would have liked to array such a host of enemies against him, especially when his relations with Madho Singh, on his back, had definitely become strained[80] and the latter had also entered into a collusion with Najib.[81]

72. For details see Sarkar, Fall, II, 384-386.
73. Memoires des Jats, 56.
74. Siyar, IV, 28.
75. Memoires des Jats, 61.
76. Supra, Ch. XI, rn. 32.
77. Qanungo, Jats, 147.
78. Pande, Bharatpur, 77 also Introduction.
79. Supra, Ch. X III , f.n. 26.
80. Memoires des Jats, 63.
81. Rajwade, I, 295.

[p.241]: Suraj Mal, however, wanted to recover his possessions across the Yamuna and expand them further in the ethnically Jat areas along both sides of that river, stretching upto the Ravi.[82] There is ground to suppose that his brethren in those areas resented the Rohilla domination and those of the Doab and Haryana at least aspired for a union with Bharatpur. Herein, then, lay an added incentive to the Jat Raja for expansionist activities. At any rate, it is a fact that Najib had established his sway over some areas around Meerut and Sikandarabad which Suraj Mal had formerly brought under his control.[83]

Besides the racial ties, Suraj Mal was interested in the tract to the south and west of Delhi for yet another reason. He wished to assign a separate domain comprising Mewat and part of Haryana to his restless son, Jawahar Singh, while his younger son, Nahar Singh, was to succeed him at Bharatpur. Jawahar Singh had been busy also subduing Mewat for the last ten years.[84] This apart, political geography also dictated inexorably a northward expansion. Not interested in further south, and barred on the west by the Rajputs and on the east by Shuja and the Bangash and the Rohilla sardars it was only towards north that he could expand with comparative ease."[85]

Close to the north of his principality lay "a number of rebels' dens"[86] of the Billoch landlords, approximating to parts of Rohtak, Mahendargarh and Gurgaon districts which form the heart of Haryana and where even to this day the Jats form the largest community. Committing usurpations, the Billochis set up their ownership at several places in the region. [87] The Jat being expansionist, the relations between the two could be anything but friendly. Moreover, the Billoch chiefs entertained the enemies of the Jat State and also fostered the forces of disorder and lawlessness in it. The instances of Fateh Singh Bargujar, whom Kamghar Khan, the former chief of Farrukhanagar, had extended shelter in 1755,[88] and of Sanulba the despicable Meo freebooter, whom Musavi Khan and Asadulla Khan Billoch patronized,[89] are sufficient to illustrate the point. After 1760, Najib extended his blessings and protection to those Billochis against the Jats.[90] Their alliance seems to

82. Qanungo, Jats, 146, 147.
83. TAL, 106; SPD., XXVII, 226, Tawarikh-i-Hunud, 21b; cf Sarkar Fall, II, 385.
84. Memoires des Jats, 46, 60, 62; Nur., 60b.
85. Memoires des Jats, 60; Siyar 29-30.
86. Sarkar, Fall, II, 39.
87. Sarkar, Fall, II, 38-39, Siyar, IV, 29-30.
88. TAL., 114.
89. Nur., 6Ia-6Ib.
90 SPD., II, 144; Rajwade, I, 297; Memoires des Jats, 60 and 61; Nur, 56b and 62b

[p.242]: have been as much of the Billochis' own seeking as that of Najib himself. With his deliverer, Ahmad Shah having gone back and his own resources having been depleted, Najib found himself unable to cope with his adversary Suraj Mal "who was too superior (to him) in everything."[91] In the circumstances, the shrewd Rohilla chief entered into a secret understanding with Madho Singh and Billoch chiefs and thus tried to throw a net of diplomacy around Suraj Mal. In emboldening the Billochis, he seems to have calculated to kill two birds with one stone; to create a diversion for the Raja and also to hinder his efforts for union with the Jats further on by interposing a block. This policy as well as his (Najib's) occupation of the disputable parts in Main Doab contained the seeds of portentous developments. They precipitated a deadly conflict with Suraj Mal.[92]

Suraj Mal's conquest of the imperial fort of Agra in 1761

Map of Bharatpur state

We may now take up Suraj Mal's military activities during the rest of his career. Remaining quiet during the first few months of 1761, he turned to conquer the imperial fort of Agra (middle of May, 1761). The local garrison had not received its pay for seven years and it met its requirements by disposing off precious vessels of the imperial stores.[93] So hard-pressed it was that it appeared to be entrusting the keys to any highest bidder. We learn from a letter of the Peshwa, that the fort commandant had offered or agreed (c. 1759) to surrender the fort to the Marathas in return for Rupees three lakhs in cash and a jagir worth Rupees ten to twenty thousand. However, its takeover was reluctantly shelved for the time being, lest Suraj Mal should feel it.[94]

Finding it opportune, now Suraj Mal despatched a big army (said to be consisting of the incredible figure of 50,000 horses and 1,00,000 foot),[95] under Balram, while he himself stayed on at Mathura. The city and the nearby areas were taken over easily. The first Jat assault on the fort was, however, repulsed by the garrison. The Jats then laid a regular siege, but to capture the impregnable fort by an assault was an uphill task. After plundering the houses under the fort-walls the Jats imprisoned the dependents of the fort garrison, living there. At last, after a siege of less than a month, the fort commandant opened the gates, on being assured Rupees one lakh in cash and five villages for his maintenance. It is estimated that the Jats grabbed

91. Memoires des Jats. 61. Najib himself acknowledged it, when in a message to his rival he said "I know very well that in all things you have superiority over me" see Nur., 66b.
92. Sarkar, Fall, II, 385.
93. Memoires des Jats, 57.
94. SPD., XXI, 168.
95. Rajwade, I, 288.

[p.243]: 50 lakhs[96] from the place. Large quantities of stores of artillery, gunpowder, balls, furniture and other articles of the royal wardrobe were taken away. The best of the things were carried to Deeg and Bharatpur. Najib, on getting the intelligence of the Jat designs, had earlier planned to move out with Prince Jawan Bakht and to obstruct the Jats. Musavi Khan and Bahadur Khan Billoch had also joined him with a few thousand troops. However, considering his inferiority in men and ammunition, he wisely refrained from confronting the far out-numbering army of the enemy. Thus, a Jat became the master of Agra, the first Capital of the Great Mughals.[97]

While the siege of Agra was on, a Jat contingent was detached and sent across the river Yamuna to re-occupy the neighbouring areas.[98] After the termination of the Mathura congress, Suraj Mal himself issued (middle of June, 1761) from Mathura and crossing the Yamuna, went to Kol. He encamped there for a few weeks and recovered his former possessions in that region.[99] Gangadhar Tatya, with his small force, accompanied the Jat Raja and stayed on with him at Kol. [100] The Holkar's Diwan had been trying to reach an agreement with Suraj Mal for active assistance against the Rohillas in recovering the Maratha possessions nearby.[101] But beyond extending his initial diplomatic support to some extent, and this bore some fruits as well, [102] Suraj Mal did nothing more in the direction. Presumably, to counteract Najib's diplomatic move, Suraj Mal was keen to entertain the overtures of the Par-Rohillas who were courting his friendship.[103] Hence, in contravention of his own interests the Jat would not fight the Rohillas for the sake of the Marathas. Gangadhar must have felt dejected at the Jat's attitude when he returned to Indore.[104] Later, in tune with the prevailing trend, the clever Jat even laid his hands upon several Maratha possessions. Though it cannot be said with certainty he is also reported to have made a hint to Raja Madho Singh and Raja Bijay

96. Wendel simply mentions 50 lakhs. It is not clear whether it was cash or included valuables as well. .
97. Memoires des Jats (Fr. Ms.) 57-60; SPD., II, 144, XXIX, 5 and 10; Rajwade, I, 288 and 297; Mirat, 921; Siyar, III, 402; Gut. 116; Gulistan, 83; Sarkar, Fall, II, 382, 443-444.
98. SPD., II, 144; Memoires des Jats (Fr. Ms.) 58.
99. Rajwade, I, 285, 295.
100. Rajwade, I, 285, 295 and 288.
101. SP.D, XXIX, 10
102. SPD., XXVII, 268.
103. Rajwade, I, 295; cf. Shah, 9; Also SPD., II, 103.
104. S.PD., XXI, 75 (announcing Gangadhar's departure only).

[p.244] Singh to move on and wrest Ujjain from the Marathas, where he would combine with them after uprooting the intervening Maratha outposts. [105]

About October, 1761, we find the Jat Raja at Dankaur probably busy settling that region. Meanwhile, his troops annexed Jhajhar and other parganas on the other side of the Yamuna. [106]. [XXI] It has already been referred to above that Najib initiated negotiations with Suraj Mal. [107] Raja Diler Singh, Rup Ram Katari and Mohan Singh went to the Jat Prince at Dankaur and after holding discussions for five days returned to Delhi on 15th October, 1761. According to the agreement, Jhajhar and other parganas recently acquired were confirmed to Suraj Mal in return for an annual tribute, for which Raja Nagar Mal stood security. On behalf of Najib, Raja Chet Ram and Raja Diler Singh went to Suraj Mal, taking a Quran on which Najib had pledged his sincerity for the Jat Raja.[108] Later in November, 1761 Najib held an interview with the Jat at Dankaurghat the details of which have already been narrated. [109]

We may pause here to examine two letters of Shah Waliullah of Delhi addressed to the Rohilla chief. The latter had informed the former about his "preparations for Jihad against the Jats" and sought his advice about the policy to be adopted towards the group of Mohammadans who had turned favourable towards the Jat.[110] Shah Waliullah wrote to him:

105. S.PD., XXIX 29. There is some difficulty in exactly co-relating the surviving contents of this mutilated despatch the first sheet of which is missing. Dr. Pande (Bharatpur 77) asserts that Suraj Mal, apparently in 1763, (he does not specify the date) entered into a conspiracy with the Rajput chiefs to expel the Marathas from the north. But at least three of the authorities that he cites do not support him S.P.D., XXI, 50 deals with the events of 1753. Its writer Antaji was no more in this world, whereas S.P.D., XXIX, 29, as already mentioned, is too mutilated to bring forth indisputable meaning. As regards Suraj Mal's letter to some Prem Singh, its date, as Dr. Pande gives, is 1809 V.S., which roughly corresponds to 1751 -1752 A.D.). In view of this it is not possible to regard his claim altogether beyond suspicion. Even otherwise, it seems a little improbable that Suraj Mal would have preferred to open a new front in an opposite direction in 1763, when the development near Delhi necessitated his exclusive attention.
106. SPD, XXI, 90.
XXI. One Jhajhar is situated few miles away from Dhankaur on Chola-Jewar road on the east side of Yamuna. Suraj Mal 'captured Jhajhar, Dhankaur and other places not far away from the capital.' (See last sentence of f.n. 115 of this chapter itself.) On the other side i.e. west of Yamuna, Jawahar Singh annexed other Jhajhar, Mewat and Rewari Parganas in Haryana. Sarkar, Fall, II, (1991), 266-267; U.N. Sharma, Maharaja Suraj Mal Jat, 443. Jhajhar is spelt झज्जर in Haryana and झाझर in Uttar Pradesh.-Editor.
107. Supra, Ch. XIII, Suraj-Najib Parley at Dhankaurghat (November, 1761),
108. S.P.D, XXI, 90.
109. Supra, eh. XIII, Suraj-Najib Parley at Dhankaurghat (November, 1761).
110. Shah, 9.

The victory over the Jats is invisibly confirmed. You should not entertain any misgivings about that. By the grace of God the moment there is a confrontation this (Jat) tillasm will (also) break like that of the Marathas (a clear reference to Panipat).

He further pacifies Najib not to get disappointed and not to have any apprehension because of the numerical superiority of the enemies or on account of the friendship of a group of Muslims with them, as ultimately the latter would not be able to fight against him. [111] "Their hands would be restrained." Shah Waliullah in his letter also warns Najib not to trust the opponents' prevarications for peace or to listen to such Muslims as might attempt to desist him from his course by harping on the innumerable dangers ahead. Exhorting him to exert fully in his task, Shah Waliullah asks Najib to inform him when he "sets out" Jihad against the Jats so that he may remain busy in offering prayers from the core of his heart from the beginning "till his victory. "[112]

Najib sent to his guide and mentor a verbal message requesting him for a "detailed" reply with regard to the points raised about the "predominance" and "refractoriness" of the Jats around Delhi[113] in a tone similar to the previous one, the great thinker again assured Najib that he has perceived the "extirpation" of the Jat people also in the manner in which the Marathas had already been uprooted and that the Muslims, especially the Rohillas would conquer and occupy the Jat villages and forts. Ultimate success being a foregone conclusion, the task of suppressing the enemies should be undertaken at once. In the concluding part of his letter, Shah Waliullah dwells upon two points. He reminds Najib that fortune fluctuates in war and he should not get "disheartened" over any bad news. Secondly, he cautions him against attaching credence to the peace moves of certain Hindu officers, who apparently were "your and your government's servants" but secretly were "in collusion with" the Jat opponents and as such did not like the Jats "to be uprooted". Shah Waliullah ends with a further note of caution that if Najib entertained their overtures "conquest (of enemy's territory) would be delayed. "[114]

111. Compare from Najib's own statement in respect of the Rohilla Sardars that they "are my brethren and will not gird up their loins for slaying me", Nur., 54b.
112. Shah, 9.
113. Shah, 8.
114. Shah, 8.

[p.246]: A careful perusal of the contents of these letters makes it clear that both these letters were written after Panipat (c. middle of 1761 ).[115]

These invaluable documents throw a flood of light on the underhand policy of Najib-ud-Daulah towards the Jats. Though these letters communicate Najib's anxiety about the Jats as intermixed with

115. The editor, Professor K.A. Nizami, by identifying (Shah, 55 and 81) "the group of Muslims" with Safdar Jang, seems to be placing the date of the letter NO.9 between 1753 (when Safdar Jang and Suraj Mal united for the war in which Najib came to Delhi and fought on the opposite side) and October 1754 (when Satoar Jang died). However, it looks a little difficult to accept this hinted date on the following grounds: (i) Najib is addressed in both the Ietters as "Amir-ul-Umra Bahadur", But during this period he was only a Panch Hazari noble and not Amir-ul-Umra. He was appointed Mir Bakhshi in February, 1757 and Safdar Jang had died about 2 years and 5 months before this incident. This implies that the letter must have been written after February, 1757 and not before that. (ii) The letter alludes to that no sooner the Jats are faced in a battle than their tillasm would also be broken like that of the Marathas (earlier). This is by far the most helping statement in determining the date of this letter. The instance of the Marathas here clearly refers to their debacle at Panipat. Impliedly it means that the letter must belong to post Panipat period i.e. after Najib's reappointmet as Mir Bakhshi by the Abdali. (iii) The apprehensions of Najib arising from the stronger position of the Jats are quite apparent from the text. This is also indicative of the post Panipat state of affairs, wherein the Jats were stronger than any other power including Najib. (iv) The theme of the letter also points to Najib's pre-occupation with the Jat problem. That the responsibility of resolving the Jat crisis predominantly rested on Najib is also evident. Both these facts, essentially relate to the post-Panipat days, when on the one hand Najib became the dictator of Delhi and on the other, by virtue of his presence in the Capital was brought face to face with the Jat Raja. The above clarifications may suffice to show that in all likelihood the present letter dates to post Panipat era, As to the group of Muslims in question it may reasonably be identified With Imad, then living under the patronage of Suraj Mal, and the par-Rohillas like Hafiz Rahmat Khan, who partly due to their grudge against Najib and partly to their self interests gravitated towards the willing Suraj Mal, as explained in course of narrative above. (Also see Nur, 54b also 59a; Raj. I. 295). The first evidence of their drifting closer coincides with the timing of Mathura congress. On this basis it can fairly be conjectured that this document was penned down either in May, 1761 or a little later but certainly before the commencement of Najib's efforts to seek terms with Suraj Mal, in October, 1761.
As regards letter No.8, on a critical perusal, this letter also seems to be referring to the same period as the above one. To give a few points; it speaks of the Marathas having been extirpated once again-an indisputable reference to their Panipat disaster. The Hindu subordinates under Najib's "administration" described to be in league with Suraj Mal appear to be the imperial Diwan, Raja Nagar Mal (cf. TAL. 108), Raja Diler Singh, who had served as Peshkar to the Wazir, Imad (see Miral, 920) and Raja Chet Singh etc. We have seen above, that all the three were employed to carry on negotiations between Suraj Mal and Najib, while the first two had lived, over a year (1760) at the Jat Court Besides, the reference to the 'Jat predominance' towards Deihl, may easily be identified with the Jat capture of Jhajhar, Dankaur and other places, not far away from the Capital.

[p.247] that of Shah Waluillah, there remains much to unfold that chiefs fierce animosity towards them. One letter especially connects his fury with the Jat encroachment. But this fact cannot be stretched beyond a limit. We know that Najib had instigated the Abdali (February, 1761) against the Jat chief even when the latter lay inactive in his capital. It would appear that Najib's attitude as revealed in these letters was essentially linked with his basic and old policy towards the Jats. Najib's intimation to Shah Waliullah about his preparations for 'Jihad against Suraj Mal when read along with Shah Waliullah's desire that he should intimate when he undertook the Jat campaign, reveals that Najib was determined on ruining the Jat Raja. Not that Suraj Mal was not inimical to or worried about Najib, but in his case we do not possess such a weighty and exactly contemporary evidence to show that he too, on his part, nursed such a deadly malignity. The statements in later works such as Gul-i-Rahmat,[116] indicting Suraj Mal alone, are obviously biased and half-truths only. Shah Waliullah's letter unmistakably shows that had his resources permitted, Najib would have jumped at the first opportunity to annihilate Suraj Mal. What deterred him from such a course was apparently the superior power of the Jats, strengthened further, in Najib's view by the 'friendship' of the Muslims, impliedly the Par-Rohillas and others. Viewed in this light, it may not be incorrect to say that his efforts for terms with the Jats were not intended to secure honest peace but were born of his own weakness and consequent doubt about his ultimate success. They were a mere pretext to gain time and to conceal his evil intentions, as is impliedly conceded by the author of Siyar.[117]

To resume the thread of our narrative, though clear evidence specifying the time of his subsequent annexations is not forthcoming, Suraj Mal seems to have the following two years (1762 and 1763).[118] Jawahar Singh was busy to the west of the Yamuna in Mewat and Haryana, while Nahar Singh [119] was active to the east of that river in the middle Doab. Having captured the country side of Rewari, the Jats under Jawahar Singh [111] carried their outposts to Sarai Basant and Sambhal (20 miles from Delhi). Their villages stretched up to 12 miles from the

116. Gul., 116.
117. Siyar (lV, 28) while criticizing Suraj Mal also for his "ambitions", "restless" and aggressive conduct does remark that Najib "was uneasy at his (Suraj Mal's) power and his character and that he (Najib) concealed his inquietude thereon".
118. cf. Shah, 34.
119. Memoires des Jats, (Fr. Ms.), 62 (by implication); Qanungo, Jats, 148.

[p.248] Capital and were "administered by the Jats" .[120] On the other side, the Jats gradually seized the major part of the modern Bulandshahar and part of Meerut districts up to the Ganga, in addition to their earlier acquisitions in the district of Aligarh, Agra and portions of Etah (Jalesar[121] etc., which previously formed part of the Jat Kingdom). [122]

By the year 1763, the Jat power under Suraj Mal had reached such glorious heights, as had never been attained before or after. [123], [XXII] Owner of spacious Kingdom, of the-richest and overflowing treasury, [124] and of the most formidable and gallant troops unrivalled in contemporary India,[125] as Suraj Mal was, little wonder that needy persons like Mir Qasim of Bengal, turned their eyes for help to him. [126] But the shrewd Jat Raja, with his usual restraint, would not get himself involved in the affairs of such distant regions. He, however, did send, presumably on request a contingent of 2,0000 under Kripa Ram Purohit early in 1763[127] to the help of the nearby Nawab of Farrukhabad and other Afghans against the veiled threats of Shuja-ud-Daulah. Incidentally, this episode would show the continued association between the Jat Raja and Imad (who had accompanied the above Jat force) on the one hand and the

120. Nur., 60b-61 a; Prof. Qanungo (Jats, 148-149) says that besides Rewari and Garhi Harsaru, Rohtak was also captured by the Jats about this time. Following him Dr. Pande (Bharalpur 78) also says this, but he does not cite any authority in his support. As to Garhi Harsaru proper, it was captured long before in November, 1755 (See TAL., 1114). We have no information when it ceased to remain under the Jats. As for Rohtak, it does not appear to have been occupied by the Jats. If it were so Najib must have included this also, while complaining to Suraj Mal about his "having desolated some villages belonging to him". See Nur., 67a.
121. SPD, XXVII, 206.
122. Memoires des Jats. (Fr. Ms.), 56 and 57.
123. Memoires des Jats, (Fr. Ms.), 49 and 67.
XXII. The estimate of the Jat power at the time of Maharaja Suraj Mal's death in 1763, is very correct. But the author has not studied the period 'after' 1763. Therefore it is uncalled for to include it. The glorious heritage of Maharaja Suraj Mal under Jawahar Singh (1764-1768) was not only well maintained but also the power and prestige of the Jats was enhanced both area wise and efficient military and in political affairs also. See Rajpal Singh, Rise of the Jat Power, Chapter VI; Upendra Nath Sharma, Maharaja Jawahar Singh Aur Uttradhikari, Ch. I-VI-Editor.
124. ibid, 64ff. especially 66.
125. Nur. 66b; Siyar IV, 28
126. N.L. Chatterjl, Mir Qasim (Allahabad, 1935) 254-255; Prof . A. Srivastava (Shuja, I, 145), however, disagrees With Prof. N.L. Chatterji. Incidentally, a Marathi despatch of 1764 shows (S.P.D., XXIX, 73) that the Nawabs of Bengal kept in touch certainly with Raja Jawahar Singh. That the former did say in case of Jawahar's immediate predecessor (Suraj Mal) also, does not appear unlikely
127. Nur., 58a.

[p.249] Bangash and Rohilla sardars on the other,[128] as also Suraj Mal's strained relations with the Nawab of Awadh.

The Jat attack on Farrukh Nagar

Towards the end of 1763, arose a quarrel between the Jats and the Billochis. The" expansionist ambitions of the former and the latter's unfriendly policy towards the Jats (before and after Panipat)[129] formed the general background of this event. But what precipitated the conflict was the tendentious patronage of Musavi Khan, the chief of the Billochis, to the subverters of law and order in the Jat principality. Mewat was infested with gangs of robbers. Jawahar Singh dealt with them sternly, but robbery seemed to be in their nature and partly because of the encouragement and protection they received from the Billoch barons, and they would not give up their activities. One of these hated highway robbers was Sanulba who, with a gang of ten horsemen, carried out regular depredations upto Deeg, the centre of the Jat principality, or otherwise upto Hodal and Barsana. A constant source of oppression to all, this most notorious outlaw defied Jawahar Singh by slipping into the Billoch territory. The gangster resided in the fortalice of Tauru with Asadulah Khan Billoch, who used to take a share in his booty. Jawahar Singh told his father that unless subdued, the Billochis would not expel Sanulba and other outlaws willingly. Apparently, to avoid hostilities, Suraj Mal at first asked the Billochis "to drive Sanulba out." But they refused "to lose such a profitable agent in crime", and so the Jat Prince moved against them. Taj Muhammad Khan of Bahadurgarh and other Billoch barons rallied to the support of Musavi Khan. In the ensuing encounter, Jawahar Singh, after an initial advantage, was eventually repulsed This reverse exasperated him and informing his father about his firm resolve to crush the Billochis, he marched on a second time.

Najib-ud-Daulah, "the patron of the harbourers of these robbers" objected to Jawahar Singh's action but Suraj Mal pleaded his helplessness about his son's determination. He, however, added that the Billochis deserved to be chastised as they sheltered such highway robbers as Sanulba. Suraj Mal himself moved on with a strong force of 20,000 cavalry, big infantry and part of artillery to re-enforce his son and laid siege to the strong fort of Farrukhnagar in October, 1763. Now Musavi Khan was confronted by a perilous situation. His own resources were much too inferior to that of Suraj Mal's and Taj Muhammad also did

128. cf. Najib's statement (Nur, 59a), "The Jat army also is allied to the Afghans (the Bangash and Par-Rohilla chiefs)"
129. Supra, Ch. V, f.n. 95-96; ch. XIII, f.n. 47.

[p. 250]: not turn up this time to his help. Entreaties for help were made to Najib, who was lying indisposed at Najibabad. The Jat artillery breached the walls of the fort. At last getting desperate, despaired Musavi Khan came out and met Suraj Mal and offered to hand over the fort to him, provided he promised him a safe exit along with his kith and kin. As messages were being exchanged, Suraj Mal must have learnt of Najib's march towards "the scene of war" and the latent purpose behind it. In order to avoid being attacked in his rear, he seems to have been keen to wind up the matter soon and hence extended promises of safety to Musavi Khan (according to Wendel on oath of the Ganga's water). But next day when Musavi Khan and his dependents went to him, Suraj Mal, violating his promises, put them in confinement and later sent them as prisoners to the jails at Bharatpur. Thus, after a siege of two months, the fort of Farrukhnagar, alon with all its effects came Jat possession (about 12th December, 1763). Nemesis was, however, not slow in taking revenge. [130]

Fight between Suraj Mal And Najib (December, 1763)

The Billoch incident, in turn, precipitated a clash between Suraj Mal and Najib-ud-Daullah, both of whom "looked with an evil eye at each other like two men inclined to come to blows together on the first occasion”.[131] To all intents and purposes, Najib had sent out, from Najibabad with a view to giving succour to the Billochis, following their frantic call for "aid" against Suraj Mal.[132] It stands to reason to believe that they must have been bewildered at the dramatic suddenness of the events. His allies had succumbed to the Jat stratagem only two days before he could reach Delhi (14th December 1763).[133] Well might have Najib willed to chastise the Jat for uprooting his proteges, but he was constrained by his marked inferiority in resources as also by prolonged indisposition.He, therefore, found it expedient to seek refuge in diplomatic suppleness and "dissimulation", contriving to postpone the issue till some favourable opportunity,[134] may be as Professor Qanungo convincingly argues,[135] his getting assistance from his old protector Ahmad Shah Abdali. On the other hand, Suraj Mal wished to come to a reckoning with him at once now that the revealing fact of his (Najib's)

130. Nur., 60a-64b (best and fullest account); Memoires des Jats (Fr. Ms.) 60; D.C.; Siyar, IV, 30; Sarkar, Fall, 11, 447-449; cf Shah Waliullah's letter to Taj Muhammad Khan Billoch, Shah, 34.
131. Siyar, IV, 28.
132. Nur., 63a-63b.
133. Sarkar, Fall, 11,449.
134. Memolres des Jats (Fr. Ms.), 61.
135. Qanungo, Jats, 150; cf Najib's entreaties 111 1764 to the Abdali for protection against Raja Jawahar Singh, Sarkar, Fall, II, 460.

[p.251]:march fanned bitter anger and hatred in him towards the Rohillas.[136] And yet he too tried to conceal his designs. Both Najib and Suraj Mal were skilled in the art of diplomatic guile as is evinced by their counter messages on this occasion. They form one of the finest examples of diplomatic guile. Thus, a message from Najib to Suraj Mal stated:

You are a great captain and between you and me there is a perfect friendship. These Billochis were my dependents and you have treated them so oppressively and never considered my feelings in the matter. What kind of courtesy is this?.... Let what is past be past. You may retain the fort. ... (but) you ought to release them (the Billoch captives) [137] out of regard for me.

Suraj Mal replied:

Between you and me there is agreement and alliance. These men are enemies .... Now is it proper for you to exert yourself for the release of my enemies and argue in the matter? It was unbecoming of you to march from Najibabad to Delhi. It became known (to all) that you had come on an expedition against me ... .If this campaign had not by this time come to an end, you would have joined Musavi (Sic.) Khan (against me). You had been contemplating such action. Then the alliance between you and me was broken and breach of faith took place on your part. Do not have any expectation of good from me. [138]

Najib, dreading the tremendous strength of his foe, attempted to placate him more than once. But Suraj Mal was so much annoyed with his conduct that all his efforts proved to be of no avail. [139] Meanwhile, the

136. Memoires des Jats (Fr. Ms.) 61; Qanungo, Jats, 149-150; Sarkar, Fall, II, 450.
137. Musavi Khan and others obtained their liberty from the jails of Bharatpur latter (1766) on the occasion of the birth of a son (Kheri Singh)[xxiii] to Ratan Singh (son of Suraj Mal). See Memoires des Jats (Fr. Ms.), 61.
XXIII. The name of Ratan Singh's son is Kehri Singh not Kheri Singh, for which Dr. Dwivedi cites Wendel's source where only 'nephew of Jawahar Singh is written. Qanungo (2003 ed. p. 106) gives the name of this nephew as Kheri Singh which is possibly a misprint for Kehri Singh due to foreigners and Persian pronunciation for 'K' as 'Kh'. C.P. C., 11, letter 1499, 1st August 1769, spelt it Kehar Singh and C.P.C. II, letter 1389; Dastur Kaumwar, VII, p. 325 names him Keshar Singh. But most of the sources agree on Kehri Singh. For details see U.N. Sharma, Maharaja Jawahar Singh Aur Uttradhikari, p. 196, fn. 1-3.-Editor.
138. Nur., 64b-65a, Also see Bihari Lal in Islamic Culture, X, 654.
139. Memoires des Jats (Fr. Ms.) 61; Siyar, IV, 30. It says that Suraj Mal demanded the faujdari of the "Gird" (district around the Capital). Bayan-i-Waqa (quoted by Qanungo, Jats, 150 footnote) claims that he even asked Najib to leave Delhi and cede Main Doab and that Najib offered to give Sikandara[XXIV] and other parganas, but Suraj Mal was not satisfied with it.
XXIV. This Sinkandara is not of Agra. It is Sikandarabad Pargana in Bulandshahr district of U.P. in the said Gird around Delhi. Najib has captured it from the Jats after Panipat See Ch XIII f.n. 83 – Editor

[p.252]: news of the arrival on the bank of the Ganga of a body of Afghans under Najib's father-in-law, Dunde Khan, further angered the Jat Raja. [140] The mediators sent by Rohilla chief-Yaqub Ali Khan, his servant Karamullah and others-failed to pacify him. He told them:

Cleansing (of heart) is impossible now. He has come from Najibabad solely in pride of his troops of clansmen. It is, therefore, necessary for me to see this army once.[141]

The couriers came back disgusted to Najib on the fifth day i.e. 23rd December, 1763. [142] Suraj Mal , leaving Jawahar Singh with a strong garrison at Farrukhnagar, crossed the Yamuna south of Delhi and stayed on the west bank ot the river Hindan (a tributary of the Yamuna). His detachments plundered and burnt the villages in the neighbourhood of Ghaziabad. Thereafter the Jats returned south of Delhi. The Rohillaa chief on getting this news, marched out of Delhi with his forces and stood in the garden of Khizrabad within four miles of the Jat troops. But he repaired to the city without engaging them in a battle.

Meanwhile, Suraj Mal, detaching his baggage, again crossed Yamuna and encamped on the other side. [143] Making a last minute desperate bid, Najib sent his agents (Karamullah, Sagar Mal Khatri, Yaqub Ali and others) with a present of two pieces of beautiful Multan Chintz and a message to Suraj Mal. The message stated:

What is past is past. I know very well that in all things you have superiority over me. You have excellent musketeers, mounted on good horses. Strong forts are in your possession, no other Raja of Hindustan , in these days, is so well equipped as you. Therefore, it is not that I am fighting you, but you are wantonly displaying violence .... You ought now to go back.

This appeal too failed to calm down the exasperated Jat Raja who sent a challenging reply to it. While departing, Yaqub Ali requested him not to resolve upon any action until his return the following day (i.e. 25th December, 1763). Suraj Mal, however, replied that if he had the same mission he had better not come at all. Obviously, the more the Rohilla turned diplomatically soft, the more daring the Jat became. Little could he realize that his end was drawing close (the following evening). Yaqub Ali still stood for negotiations. But Karamullah, visibly offended, suggested nothing but immediate war, and the Rohilla leader justly getting angry, approved of it. [144]

140. Nur, 66a; (completed by) Bihari Lal in Islamic Culture X, 654.
141. Nur:, 66a; Siyar, IV, 30-31.
142. D.C.
143. Nur., 66a-66b, Memoires des Jats (Fr. Ms.), 61.
144. Nur., 66b-67b; Siyar, IV, 30, 31; also Bihari Lal in Islamic Culture, X, 654.

Suraj Mal's death

Maharaja Suraj Mal

[p.253]: The die was now cast. Najib-ud-Daulah, takin Gulab Singh Gujar, Sayyid Muhammad Khan Billoch (Siyyidu), Afzal Khan, Sultan Khan, Zaibita Khan and all his troops, less than 10,000 in number, crossed the Yanuma two hours before dawn and took post on the west bank of the Hindan, 10 miles south-east of Delhi. Suraj Mal, with his army of at least 25000 strong and heavy artillery, pulled up opposite to them. Several small engagements occurred in which the Jats displayed their superiority. Cannonading was a so resorted to between the two sides which lasted till 3 p.m. Thereafter, Suraj Mal tried to surround his foes from three sides, deploying 5000 men to Najib's rear. About sunset (the same day i.e. Sunday, 25th December, 1763),[145] Suraj Mal, while watching the movements of the troops with a small retinue; was killed by by Siyyidu and his men who most probably lay in ambush for him.[146] As usually happens in such cases, the leaderless Jats, overwhelmed with shock decamped the same night (25th-26th December, 1763), thereby conceding to Najib-ud-Daulah "a victory which no one had expected." The Jesuit observer aptly says that Najib and his men "were victorious without knowing it." [147]

Fate thus cut short at a comparatively early age (nearly 57 years), [148] the illustrious and still rising career of "the eye and shining taper"[149] and the Jat "Plato"[150], Maharaja Brijendra Bahadur Sujan Singh,[151] popularly called Thakur Suraj Mal.

145. Delhi Chronicle assigns 25th December, 1763 as the date of the death of Suraj Mal. A later authority, Fransoo (Tawarikh-I-Hunud, 22a) however, says that the Raja was killed on Paush Badi 12th, Samvat, 1820 (31 st December, 1763). Fransoo is no doubt an important authority of Jat history. But in this case we cannot give him precedence over the author of Delhi Chronicle for the simple reason that its author most likely present in nearby Delhi recorded the event only two days after its occurrence (i.e. on Tucsday).
146. For a detailed discussion about the circumstances of Suraj Mal's death see Appendix D.
147. Memoires des Jats (Fr. Ms.) 63; Siyar, IV, 29 and 33; Majma-ul-Akhbar, in Elliot, VIII, 363; Scott, Dekkan, II, 246.
148. This calculation is based on his own confession stating to "have already crossed fifty" by March, 1757. See his letter to the Abdali, Supra, ch. X, f.n.45. The testimony of Wendel (Memoires des Jats, 63) followed by the modern scholars, that he was about 55 at his death is not correct
149. Siyar, IV, 27.
150. Imad (Pers. Ms.), 84.
151. Nur., 33a; Brijendra Vinod (Hindi Ms.) 212; cf. TAH., (Pers Ms.) 43b.

End of Chapter XIII: The Clash of Ambitions (1761-1763)
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